CASIS International Conference

Simon Fraser University, Harbour Centre

16-18 October 2003

 

Student Reports

 

 

Reporting by Garett Toporowski, Simon Fraser University

 

Welcome

 

Tony Campbell, President, CASIS

Mr. Campbell welcomed the participants to the conference, remarking that a problem for the organisers of this year’s conference was the overwhelming demand and interest in the proceedings. This led to an overselling of places by ten percent, forcing organisers to schedule concurrent panels due to time and space limits. This year’s conference marked many milestones, not the least of which was the participation of forty students from across Canada.  They would be providing reports of conference proceedings, to be posted on the CASIS website. Mr. Campbell also encouraged interaction between all participants at the social events to come. Special emphasis was placed on the CASIS mission statement, which will hopefully create a forum for debate and discussion. This was an open conference that included academics, law enforcement personnel, policy makers, and the media.  A round of thanks was given the many sponsors, without which the conference would have been impossible. In conclusion, Mr. Campbell addressed the title of the forum, “Homeland Insecurities”, a subject matter that was noted to be a matter of activity and policy thinking in a changing world. 

 

Alison MacPhail, Deputy Solicitor General, British Columbia

Miss MacPhail welcomed participants on behalf of Premier Gordon Campbell and Solicitor General Rich Coleman. She noted that such an event gave her the opportunity to renew old contacts and make new ones. The presenter noted that all democratic governments were facing challenges in finding a balance between civil liberties and security. Despite the inherent difficulties posed by this endeavour, Miss MacPhail expressed her optimism that such was not a hopeless task due to improved technology as well as increased information exchanges between various government, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies. She pointed to some of these very initiatives in British Columbia, such as improved emergency response. In conclusion, she remarked that many building blocks have been put in place but the need to continue building remains.

 

Michael Stevenson, President, Simon Fraser University

Mr. Stevenson welcomed participants on behalf of SFU and noted that it was an honour for the university to play host to the event.  He also remarked that issues of security and intelligence were important for an institution such as SFU for a number of reasons.  Not only are these issues a matter of research interest for academic study but they also impact student and staff mobility and affect international student recruitment and learning. Since 11 September 2001, these matters need to receive the greatest possible public policy attention and universities can play an important role in focusing attention and educating the wider public.

 

 

 

 

Keynote Speaker

 

Reg Whitaker, University of Victoria,

The Bush Doctrine, the Western Alliance, and the Use and Abuse of Intelligence.

 

This keynote address focused on the recent use, or abuse, of intelligence in the post-September 11 era. Professor Whitaker noted two great intelligence failures that have become apparent.  First was the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks.  Second was the failure of intelligence in estimating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. More disturbing was the deliberately misleading (ab)use of intelligence by both the American and British governments to justify “regime change” in Iraq. In addressing this issue, Whitaker noted that while the preponderance of responsibilities for the 9/11 failures must rest with the intelligence agencies, the responsibility for the Iraq failure must rest with a political agenda that was not intelligence driven. 

 

Despite the virtual unanimity of consensus within the Western alliance on the “war on terror”, this consensus broke down over the Iraq question.   The desire for regime change in Iraq was present before 9/11, so this crisis gave some in the Bush administration the chance to push this agenda.  Although the American government tried to link the Iraqi regime to terrorists, this assertion was unsubstantiated.  The post-war justifications such as the need to get rid of an evil dictator and the need to promote democracy ring hollow.  The drive for regime change was fuelled by the so-called “Bush doctrine”, in which unilateral pre-emption plays the central role. 

 

To help bolster the claim for regime change in Iraq, America and Great Britain presented exaggerated intelligence to convince members of the Western alliance, the United Nations, and domestic electorates. However, this presentation represented a break from tradition in which secret intelligence is not publicly displayed (with the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis).  Another break with the past was the political manipulation of the intelligence to bolster American and British government claims, while ignoring contradictory information. The most notable examples of this are the “Kelly affair” and the ongoing Hutton inquiry in the UK and the “Wilson affair” in the U.S.  Whitaker noted some the more infamous claims that were later proven misleading, exaggerated, or altogether false:  the “45-minute claim”, the imminent Iraqi nuclear threat, and the Niger uranium claim. The fact that the governments “cherry-picked” the information that they had makes a strong case for this as an example of the bad use of intelligence. This is something with which the American and British governments and intelligence agencies must live. The overall proportion of blame on the intelligence agencies remains to be determined but these developments have had a negative impact on their reputations. 

 

 

Reporting by Cameron Ortis, UBC

 

Welcome and Introduction

 

As a non-partisan, voluntary association established in 1985, the primary purpose of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) is to provide a forum to generate interdisciplinary, cross-border, and cross-jurisdictional discussion and analysis on pressing security, intelligence, and law enforcement issues that affect Canada and the international community.  The mission of CASIS is timely, given that security and intelligence issues in Canada remain poorly understood.  This year’s international conference, guided by the theme of “Homeland Insecurities: The Shifting Borders of Security, Intelligence and Law Enforcement” will address the security issues that challenge the institutions of democratic nation-states. 

 

This year’s conference represents a milestone.  More than forty undergraduate and graduate students – sponsored by the Solicitor General of Canada - have been integrated into the proceedings.  There are twenty-three distinct sessions comprising seventy-four speakers from the academic, security and intelligence, and private sectors.  Altogether, this represents the largest CASIS conference to date.

 

Keynote speech: Professor Reg Whitaker

 

Professor Whitaker delivered the keynote address on the subject of the Bush doctrine, the Western alliance, and the use and abuse of intelligence.  The key point was made that there have been two major intelligence failures since September 11, 2001.  The first was a failure to predict and prevent the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.  The second was a failure to generate accurate estimates of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the subsequent use of these estimates by the United States and United Kingdom governments to justify an unpopular war.  In addition to these failures, the links between terrorist groups and Iraq were also overstated.

 

Secret intelligence was used to justify action to domestic and international audiences. The resulting failures have seriously stressed the Western alliance.

 

While there was unanimity throughout the West on the war on terrorism, this cohesion completely broke down over Iraq. Pundits and the media have often confused “intelligence failure” with “government failure.” Any analysis of what Whitaker calls the “twin intelligence failures” must be undertaken within the context of the intelligence cycle - a cycle that begins with governments setting agendas and ends with governments as consumers of intelligence.

 

The burden of twin intelligence failures rests with both the intelligence community and the politicians.  The failure to predict and prevent 9/11 rests with the intelligence agencies.  The failure to estimate accurately the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability of Iraq rests with the U.S. and U.K. governments.  There are implications from both failures. First, because secret intelligence has been conscripted to justify the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the relationship between the intelligence community and the government has shifted – perhaps permanently.  In the past, the presentation of secret intelligence was used intermittently.  Now, this has become a permanent feature to try and convince new audiences.  Traditionally, secret intelligence was used to aid or assist government decision-making. The audience has shifted, as secret intelligence is being used to sell decisions and policies to the domestic populace, foreign governments, and the United Nations.  The purpose is to sell rather than aid or assist.

 

 

Reporting by Robert Hartfiel, UBC

 

Panel 1: Homeland Security/Insecurity: Responses to 9/11

 

Paul Kennedy, Senior Assistant Deputy Solicitor General for Canada

A View from the Federal Government

 

International terrorist networks are more sophisticated than previously thought.  They have an ambitious agenda to undermine global security. Canada is not immune.  There is a real possibility that these groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction. A significant attack on a major Western city is now considered only a matter of time. In this context, Kennedy highlighted the legal constraints under which Canada’s security agencies are working. Authorities must balance effective responses with the need to protect rights and freedoms.  Some of the proposed solutions to these security threats are not consistent with the kind of society in which we want to live. Technological solutions involving data mining have been particularly controversial.

 

In response to the terrorist threat, the federal government has added a total of CDN$9.5 billion in funding over five years, an increase that includes a forty percent increase in resources to the RCMP and a thirty percent increase in resources for the intelligence services.  Law enforcement agencies have been given new legislative tools (Public Safety Act).  Canada has frozen the accounts of several hundred individuals and entities that have links to known terrorist groups. Kennedy emphasized the government’s efforts to increase cooperation with municipal, provincial, federal, and international partners.  As part of the Smart Border Declaration, Canadian security agencies are now collaborating with their US counterparts in joint efforts, such as Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams, and the Cross-Border Crime Forum.

 

 

Greg Treverton, Rand Corporation,

Domestic Intelligence and Homeland Security

 

Treverton began his discussion by likening the efforts of various US security and intelligence agencies to watching eight-year olds playing soccer: ‘everyone’s going for the ball.’ There are positive and negative aspects to the increased attention and resources focused on the terrorist threat. On the positive side, communication has increased between the various security and intelligence agencies, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and local authorities.  On the downside, however, problems still exist with integration and organizational culture. According to Treverton, these agencies are operating more as a “confederation” – separate components within the newly-created Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). 

 

Treverton moved on to discuss several issues for the future.  There is the challenge of safeguarding civil liberties at a time when the powers of the FBI and the CIA are being enhanced, and the barriers between them are coming down.  Treverton also made reference to the debate underway in the U.S. on whether it should emulate the U.K., Canada, and Australia in creating a domestic security intelligence organisation. 

 

Alfred Rolington, Group Managing Director, Jane’s Information Group

Lessons of an Open Source Organization from 9/11

 

Jane’s started writing about al-Qaeda as early as 1993; however, it was not until 2001 that they started writing significantly about them.  Just prior to 9/11, Jane’s published an article that mentioned al-Qaeda members reportedly enrolling in flight training.  However, after 9/11, it was discovered that Jane’s clients were suffering from “information overload” and had generally not read the article.  This led to recognition that traditional ways of organizing data must be questioned. 

 

To search for information effectively, you must know for what you are looking. However, Rolington observed that people often do not know what they are looking for until they see it.  An ‘evolution of taxonomy technologies’ is allowing Jane’s to organize data on its website in ways that accommodate both information-gathering methods.

 

Rolington observed that intelligence has traditionally been created in a rational, linear way: the analyst collects the data, makes an assessment, writes an analysis, and delivers the intelligence. However, there is also another, non-linear way: a dialogue between specialists and generalists that is more interactive than the traditional method. This method of intelligence creation has important ramifications for Jane’s Information Group, from office layout and meetings, to their editorial systems and practices. 

 

 

Reporting by Stephen Yung, University of Toronto

 

Panel 1: Responses to 9/11

 

The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has made drastic improvements in areas of homeland security and protection following the events of September 11, 2001.  One of these improvements is a new cooperation and implementation of new authorities with regards to the charter of rights and freedoms and the privacy act. This will enable better cooperation between federal and provincial agencies and support for intelligence research and data collection.

 

 

A view from the federal government

 

According to Paul Kennedy’s view on the federal government and its response to terrorist threats, one must achieve a balance of effective responses to defend democratic rights and freedoms. Finding practical solutions to combat international terrorist networks must be a priority. Unfortunately, these networks have ambitious agendas and we in Canada are not immune to these threats. The real picture is that these threats consist of possible biological or chemical attacks for which the Canadian government is not fully prepared. The reality is that threats on a global scale are imminent and very possible. To combat this threat of terrorism, there must be increased developments in the technology of intelligence and, most importantly, the academics of intelligence. Public safety and security must be an issue that is at the top of every federal priority list, especially when concerning assets such as economic security. On the Canadian side, the federal government recently tried to implement new programs and increase funding for the development of intelligence study, research, and collection. The federal government has increased major resources for organisations such as the RCMP to combat the issue of homeland (in)securities. Emergency programmes have been implemented so that agencies can react faster and more efficiently when dealing with terrorist scenarios. International partnerships are increasing to improve sharing of information regarding terrorist cells and personnel. Tip lines have been set up to increase public awareness and involvement in combating the threat of terrorism after the events of 9/11. However, Paul Kennedy did mention that these new developments cannot come into effect immediately; several years will go by before changes can be seen and felt. What can be done today is improve the cooperation between Canadian intelligence and American intelligence agencies, especially concerning cross-border issues. Challenges in the post-9/11 world abound, such as the creation of “departments of homeland security” and the complexity of these intelligence organisations. What is being achieved is a multidisciplinary, cross-border relation with the U.S., particularly concerning transnational crime and terrorism. However, the challenge to cross-border relations is the difficulty in coordinating, streamlining, and integrating reactions to the threat. Paul Kennedy concluded by stating that economic support from the federal and municipal governments is essential when dealing with intelligence against a new form of terrorism.

 

 

 

Domestic intelligence and homeland security

 

Greg Treverton stated that all agencies are combating the threat of terrorism. The upside is that agencies will talk and cooperate with one another. FBI-CIA relations are the prime example of the sharing of research data for the benefit of homeland security. Treverton also mentions the TTIC, which is a large database that brings together all analysis from different agencies. However, the downside to all agencies combating the threat of terrorism simultaneously is that these services lack coherence and a central thread to what is being gathered. How well can these agencies function, then? Treverton mentions the future challenges with an eye cast to the past, when combating terrorism was still not enough to bring on CIA-FBI cooperation. Realistically, according to Treverton, these agencies generally failed to cooperate due to the drastic cultural and organisational differences of these agencies. To improve the gathering of intelligence, Treverton suggested that, if possible, more use be made of local peoples, citizens of enemy nations, and members of enemy groups.

 

 

Lessons from an open source organisation after 9/11

 

The fact that al-Qaeda was funding a pilot training programme in the USA prior to 9/11 is only one of the many strands of the investigation following the attacks. Alfred Rolington stated that technology now makes information available to almost everyone around the world. New and improved search engines have been created to increase the effectiveness of search queries. An example of this is the evolution of taxonomy, which can limit the search effort, unlike other methods such as keyword search. Taxonomy makes categorisation hierarchical, making search methods more efficient when dealing with questions to which you do not know the answer, such as terrorist plots. A categorisation method divides the information in concentric circles that allow analysts to view data in a more efficient fashion. Data is therefore presented more easily, unlike old-fashioned printed materials. Rolington concluded by stating that technological innovation is an essential tool when combating the threat of terrorism.

 

 

Reporting by Brendan Dahlin Nolan, University of Toronto

 

 

Panel 2: Terrorism

 

Moderator: Paul Kennedy

Panellists: Andre Gerolymatos, Douglas Ross, Patrick Smith

 

Andre Gerolymatos opened the session with his overview of the Greek experience in combating the terrorist group “November 17”, which confounded authorities with their streak of twenty-one assassinations of Greek and American officials and businessmen over twenty-seven years. Gerolymatos reviewed the history of the group, describing an organisation without mass popular appeal or any concrete political platform for changing Greek society, relying instead on its leader’s strength of character to guide the small, secretive group. Despite “N17” being linked to a number of European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, Greek authorities were never able to infiltrate the group. Gerolymatos attributed this fact to the small size of the organisation (never numbering more than nineteen members drawn from two families over three generations), the absolute secrecy in which it operated, and the apparently random nature of the assassinations. Ultimately, it was not any legislation or security measure taken by Greek authorities that prompted the apprehension of the members of N17, but the injuring of one of its members with the premature detonation of one of its bombs and some smart police work by Greek investigators. Gerolymatos concluded that the lesson of N17 was that a small, committed, radical group could easily mimic the N17 model and wreak havoc over an extended period of time despite the presence of strong security legislation. This would be especially dangerous if it were to be adopted by other Balkan groups.

 

Douglas Ross continued on with the theme of terrorists operating within the system with a relative degree of impunity in his discussion of the threat that nuclear terrorism presents to North American society. Ross noted that while America has become quite aware of the potential danger that it faces in a nuclear or radiological attack, Canadian society has come to see itself as immune to such dangers by virtue of its much-touted Canadian foreign policy, which Ross felt was merely a narcissistic approach to the issue. Ross noted that while people tend still to think of a terrorist attack occurring on the scale of Oklahoma City (where two tonnes of TNT were used), the reality is that in the event that a terrorist utilised a nuclear device in an attack, such a device would be between one and fifteen kilotonnes in size. This would trigger devastation on the scale of Hiroshima – an explicit goal of terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. Ross hypothesized that US leaders might find themselves with a “nuclear pistol” pointed to their heads if terrorists smuggled in a number of nuclear weapons into the country and pre-positioned them as the Soviets had done seventeen years earlier, according to one GRU source. In this scenario, Ross believed that terrorists would not risk incurring the full wrath of the United States by detonating the first bomb on US soil, instead opting to target Canada as a demonstration. As such, Ross concluded his presentation with the recommendations that i) Canada re-think how we deal with nuclear weapons, including a complete re-evaluation of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; ii) improve intelligence gathering co-operation mechanisms; iii) undertake anticipatory emergency preparation, increasing public security funding, and possibly creating an element within the Canadian Militia to deal with such matters; iv) closing the Canadian nuclear industry; v) ensuring that spending on nuclear materials abroad is spent effectively, not in small spurts.

 

Patrick Smith then concluded the panel presentation section with an examination of the shifting balance between the needs of security legislation and the protection of civil liberties following September 11th. Smith felt that the long-standing balance that had previously existed for most of the 20th century before September 11th (with only a few hiccups) had been lost in the wave of legislation following the attacks, especially in the US following the passage of the Patriot Act. Smith noted that while Americans still viewed the McCarthy era as an overreaction to a smaller issue, many of those same individuals did not see the Patriot Act in the same light. Furthermore, Smith expressed dismay at the efforts made by government officials and security advocates to truncate debate on the impact that security legislation will have on civil liberties if allowed to go through without the usual checks and balances such as “sunset clauses” previously included in such legislation. Smith concluded with the warning that bin Laden’s legacy might very well be the transformation of US society into a more totalitarian state.

 

Patrick Smith’s concerns were carried over into the short question period, where the differences between the US and Canadian approaches to the balance between security necessity and civil liberties were discussed. Paul Kennedy and Patrick Smith both agreed that while Canada has also had overreactions to perceived security threats in the past, Canada generally takes a different, less absolute view of human rights which has allowed it to shape legislation to meet both the security requirements and civil liberties concerns. The session ended with a brief discussion on how Canadians should adapt to live with terrorism as a possible part of our society, which included the recommendation from Douglas Ross that before any society starts restricting civil liberties, all possible should first be done to regulate strictly dangerous commodities.

 

Reporting by Robin Frost, Simon Fraser University

Panel 2: Terrorism

 

Andre Gerolymatos, Simon Fraser University

November 17: Urban Terrorism in Greece, 1975-2002

 

Prof. Gerolymatos outlined the unusually lengthy and violent history of the Greek “November 17” terrorist group, which existed for 27 years until being finally closed down in 2002. The group, a radical Marxist organisation with its roots extending to the founding of the Greek Communist Party in the 1920s and a later offshoot, the Archive Marxists faction, assassinated 21 people. The targets were apparently randomly selected from all parts of the political spectrum and the organisation followed no clear pattern of activity. This, and the fact that it was a very small, closed organisation consisting exclusively members of two families, made it impossible to penetrate and equally impossible to predict. It was only dismantled due to chance: a member accidentally blew his hand off with a bomb. When he was admitted to hospital his home was searched and this led to the exposure of the entire group.

 

Douglas Ross, Simon Fraser University,

Intelligence and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

 

Prof. Ross discussed the diminishing level of concern, outside the United States, about the possibility of terrorists causing massive casualties and argued that any sense of comfort was misplaced. He described the Canadian attitude towards the terrorist threat (after Michael Ignatieff) in particular as “naïve and narcissistic”. He pointed out that the Oklahoma City bomb involved only two tons of TNT equivalent and invited speculation as to the effects of a Nagasaki or Hiroshima-level device, of about ten or fifteen kilotons, on a major North American city. Prof. Ross discussed the possibility of nuclear weapons being smuggled into North America by a rogue proliferator and ‘prepositioned’ for blackmail, and suggested that second-rank states, including Canada, could be selected as targets for demonstration purposes. He concluded, however, that the detonation of an RDD (Radiological Dispersal Device, or ‘dirty bomb’) that could be constructed using an orphaned domestic radiological source was probably the most likely scenario.

 

Patrick Smith, Simon Fraser University,

Osama Wins! Security versus Human Rights: Lessons from American, British, and Canadian Anti-Terrorism Legislation

 

Prof. Smith argued that Osama bin Laden, by prompting Western governments to rush potentially repressive anti-terrorist legislation into force, had already substantially altered the way of life of these countries for the worse.

 

 

Reporting by Oliver Rohlfs, CCHS / CIR, Liu Institute, UBC

 

Panel 3: Urban Security and Resiliency

 

In the panel’s first presentation, Stuart Farson of Simon Fraser University argued that in the post-Cold War world, every aspect of the traditional national security paradigm – in its military, intelligence, and security dimensions – are being challenged. Cities are gaining from this gradual erosion of state sovereignty, but this process presents significant challenges in terms of governance, security assessment, and risk management for cities. The speaker went on to present the results of a survey on perception of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in greater Vancouver, which by virtue of being a major port, transport, and aviation hub is atypical of many cities. Accordingly, the results should not be extrapolated and liberally applied elsewhere. Respondents identified a very broad range of threats facing Vancouver – both man-made and natural – and, significantly, terrorism did not feature in the top tier for many of them, whereas organised crime did. There is, moreover, broad recognition among crisis managers that an integrated approach and response is required to respond to these types of threats. With an estimated eighty percent of critical infrastructure being in private hands, proper strategic assessment planning requires government authorities to collaborate with companies. This brings up all sorts of questions, however, including whether intelligence can be shared with the private sector, what principles should guide this transfer, and how can intelligence be properly distributed to the private sector.

 

Robin Gardner first summarised the history of infrastructure protection in Canada, including the “Vital Points” Program first established in 1938, and comprehensively reviewed in 1978. This identified critical facilities at the federal and provincial level, de-limiting which fell under federal or provincial authority, and what type of security inspection would be required for each type of facility. All this information was regrouped in a ledger, which is classified information. The speaker then highlighted that infrastructure systems in major urban areas are interconnected and vulnerable to complex system failures. A key lesson from the 9/11 attacks was that cities with less resilient infrastructure than New York would likely have not fared as well. Gardner then turned to the collaborative work being pursued in BC on infrastructure security and protection, which includes a steering committee (ERASE – Emergency Response and Security Entity), an infrastructure representative committee (ISIIS – Infrastructure Security Integrated Intelligence Scheme), and an intelligence gathering function (TRAIT – Threat Risk and Intelligence Team). Finally, the speaker outlined the latest advances in Canada, highlighting the work being pursued by the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) on developing a National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (NCIAP). Having drafted a discussion paper, a consultation process with different stakeholders – including the private sector, which operates 85-90% of critical infrastructure - is now underway. In conclusion, Gardner commented on the way ahead for BC, given OCIPEP’s work.

 

Sebastian Moffat presented the results of CitiesPlus http://www.citiesplus.ca, a case study of multi-sectorial integrated planning for Greater Vancouver’s long-term urban sustainability that won an international competition in June 2003. From a security perspective, Moffat highlighted three key findings from CitiesPlus. First, with technological, demographic, climate change, resource scarcity, globalisation, and other challenges ahead, the 21st century could be one of crisis for world cities such as Vancouver. The rate of change, moreover, is likely to be exponential, and the complexity of threats will increase as well. Second, successful cities will marry sustainability with resiliency, he said, resulting in cities that are far less vulnerable.

 

The first question from the public centred on involving the private sector in security situations, and in particular the issue of costs to be borne in security planning. In response, Gardener highlighted the need for a mix of “carrots and sticks”, pointing to the U.S., where legislative action was being pursued for water purveyors. There is growing recognition, moreover, that the security business case is not yet well developed for all infrastructure developers. Another question dealt with informing the public on these issues whilst avoiding media hysteria. Gardener pointed to a recent Environment Canada regulation on emergency planning around toxic and chemical waste that, for the first time, includes a public outreach obligation in its provisions. In response to one final question, Farson stated that the plan for evacuating the Lower Mainland in case of emergency is not clear. Admittedly, it may not be prudent or necessary to do so, even in case of a large earthquake. The largest evacuation of people in Canada this summer due to the wildfires in BC’s interior went smoothly, moreover, in part thanks to the command and control assistance of the BC Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS).

 

The panel chair, Patrick Smith of Simon Fraser University, thanked the presenters and participants and adjourned the session.

 

(NOTE: There was no Panel 4)

 

 

Reporting by Julie Breton, Université Laval

 

Orateur principal : David Chuter

 

L’orateur principal du vendredi 17 octobre 2003 était David Chuter du Centre d’étude sur la Défense du King’s College de Londres en Angleterre. Bien que David Chuter travaille au Centre d’étude sur la Défense, celui-ci est toujours au service du Ministère de la Défense britannique. Il y travaille depuis vingt-cinq ans maintenant. Durant ces années, David Chuter a été emmené à travailler pour l’International Institute for Strategic Studies. David Chuter a beaucoup publié, entre autres, Adelphi Papers sur l’Afrique.

 

L’exposé de David Chuter était divisé en deux parties. La première partie concernait les problèmes permanents et temporaires liés à la collecte et l’analyse du renseignement et la seconde partie sur les grands problèmes du monde actuel. Parmi les problèmes inhérents au renseignement, on retrouve l’aspect incomplet de ceux-ci, la question culturelle et les problèmes linguistiques, le fait qu’il y a une quantité énorme d’information et le problème de rendre le tout cohérent. M. Chuter a aussi mentionné la question des choix : les priorités doivent pas avoir une certaine constance; la difficulté d’utiliser les renseignements dans un contexte global et le danger de s’attarder sur des détails, qui est le point fort du renseignement. Il faut s’assurer que l’information est véridique, qu’il ne s’agit pas de désinformation et connaître la motivation des sources : celles-ci ne doivent pas être attirées par l’appât du gain, par exemple.

 

Dans la seconde partie de son exposé portant sur les grands problèmes du monde actuel, David Chuter a rappelé la différence contextuelle entre la période de la guerre froide et la période post-guerre froide. Puis, il a abordé le fait que les problèmes mondiaux relèvent plutôt d’une dynamique locale. Il recommande d’étudier ces dynamiques locales et note l’importance de la connaissance de la langue. Il faut éviter de vouloir imposer son cadre intellectuel à cette étude. Ensuite, David Chuter a abordé l’influence de l’Ouest sur les problèmes présents et a donné pour exemple l’Afrique où les états sont une pure fabrication d’origine coloniale. Il a aussi rappelé que les conflits d’aujourd’hui sont très différents des conflits d’hier. En effet, le rôle de l’état est moindre aujourd’hui et le monde doit faire face à des combattants non-étatiques et plus ou moins organisés. En ce qui a trait à la violence, celle-ci était le fait du monde occidental envers le reste du monde alors qu’aujourd’hui la tendance est inversée. La violence peut être aujourd’hui utilisée contre l’Ouest. Le monde occidental est motivé par la peur qui dépasse parfois la logique. Le point final de David Chuter consiste en la tendance que nous avons à refuser de croire que les autres ont des motivations rationnelles et qu’il peut s’avérer dangereux de prendre au sérieux les objectifs des autres parce que nous pourrions réaliser que nous sommes dans l’erreur. La recommandation de David Chuter est qu’il faut prendre ces groupes au sérieux et privilégier une analyse historique plutôt que technique.

 

David Chuter a conclu en mentionnant que les problèmes de l’avenir sont différents pour les services de renseignement et que la tendance actuelle en est une difficile pour les services de renseignements et ses concepts traditionnels. L’orateur principal a terminé avec cette recommandation très pertinente : « Intelligence is not a substitute for intelligence ».

 

 

Reporting by Russell Ward, UBC

 

Keynote Speaker: David Chuter, Senior Associate, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London, The Post-Iraq Security Outlook - Can Intelligence Help?

 

Key Points in Presentation

 

Principal ‘generic’ difficulties in using Intelligence in policy making.

Intelligence is incomplete:

 

Complexity of Post-Cold War world:

 

Problems with the Groups we gather intelligence on:

 

‘Foreign Armies East versus Foreign Armies West’:

 

Democratization of destruction:

 

Homeland Insecurities:

 

 

Key Questions and Responses

 

 

In some cases, it becomes obvious why we need to wage war or why we must react to a certain situation in a certain way.  When it is less obvious, are we, as democracies, prepared to go to war based on incomplete intelligence?

 

We don’t do ‘threat analysis’ (we can’t truly get ‘inside their heads’); we do ‘vulnerability analysis’ instead.  Comments?

 

Traditional analysis doesn’t seem to work.  Therefore, what does work as regards making good policy?

 

Issues Arising for Future Consideration

 

 

Reporting by Bob Martyn, Queen’s University

 

Panel 5: International Intelligence Cooperation

 

Following Martin Rudner’s explanation that this panel emerged from the work of the Intelligence Liaison and Alliances Research Group, (which is meeting next in Berlin - March 2004), the panellists presented three interrelated views of intelligence sharing.

 

Johan Truyens’ descriptions of the Belgian system rang true for many smaller country participants. The logic of sharing, based upon mounting information requirements, yet constrained by insufficient personnel and budget, exists across most intelligence services today. This argues for the development of niche expertise and the ability to see the bigger picture, which may be otherwise lost in large, hyper-specialized analytical groups. In some circumstances, information collection is easier for smaller countries simply because they are small - any imperial threat is lacking.  These advantages are then parlayed into intelligence sharing arrangements based upon quid pro quo, or the ‘give and get’ principle. Certain conditions, such as a ‘marketable product’ based on common interests, buttressed by confidence in security arrangements, must be met. Negotiating sharing ensures agreement on the intelligence domains (e.g. warning intelligence or security intelligence), the level (e.g. political, tactical or technical), and if there are any special conditions (provision of raw data only or completed estimates).

 

Mike Warner then re-titled his presentation to “How a Big Country Used to be a Small Country,” in order to make a more smooth segue from Johan’s ‘small country’ view. The pre-1940 United States military was capped at 175,000, or about the current size of Belgium. The intelligence capabilities were of a similarly reduced scale. Yet the intelligence services were not as isolated as generally believed, as it was acknowledged that maintaining some degree of skills was cheaper and more effective than attempting to re-build a capability in a crisis. There were some problems, of course, particularly in intelligence ‘ownership.’ The FBI’s increased domestic security intelligence was beholden to the State Department, which decided with whom the information could be shared. The War and Navy Departments similarly chaffed against State Department restrictions. The war brought massive expansion in intelligence activities, ranging from William Donovan’s OSS to the growth in SIGINT and IMINT. Regrettably, some of these skills were again allowed to whither in 1945, forcing ‘reinvention of the wheel’ as the Cold War progressed.

 

Greg Treverton provided the “large, unfriendly ally” end of the spectrum, as seen from the post 9/11 context. Two themes ran through his presentation: institutions and practices suitable against a stable, cold war adversary set us up for failure against an asymmetric foe; and, the currently evolving system combines old and new methods. For example, sharing with trusted allies, using time-tested methods, continues. Yet now, the domestic intelligence system includes over 18,000 law enforcement agencies alone - most without security cleared personnel. In addition to the staggering number of new players is the need for ‘new thinking.’ To make this point, the audience considered the dubious pre-9/11 targeting of flight-training schools with Middle Eastern students.

 

In the end, all three panellists agreed that intelligence sharing is not a new phenomenon. Occasional snags continue to plague the various bilateral and multilateral arrangements, but the obvious benefits have led to already significant changes.

 

Reporting by Andrew Fraser, NPSIA, Carleton University

 

 

Panel 5: International Intelligence Cooperation

 

Johan Truyens, Ministry of Defense, Belgium

Michael Warner, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington DC

Greg Treverton, RAND Corporation

 

It has been argued that of all the fields in modern intelligence, international intelligence alliances and cooperation has been studied the least.  Johan Truyens introduced the issue from the perspective of a small nation, where the strategy for entering intelligence sharing frameworks is to establish a niche.  Belgium often exchanges information with its allies in areas where it has vast intelligence expertise, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, for intelligence on areas where it has limited expertise, such as Latin America.  Such arrangements allow smaller nations to be included more easily in intelligence sharing frameworks with larger nations.

 

Michael Warner discussed the issue of intelligence sharing from an historical perspective, describing how the United States grew from being a small intelligence power to being one of the preeminent actors in the field, in no small part because of American alliances with foreign intelligence services.  Prior to the Second World War, American intelligence capabilities and intelligence cooperation was both limited and ineffective.  The shock of Hitler’s march across Western Europe in 1940 boosted the sharing of intelligence between the United States and Great Britain, resulting in the mutual ascent of their signals and image intelligence capabilities.  International liaisons reduced the maturation time of American intelligence services considerably.  Conversely, some of the weaknesses in American intelligence in the immediate aftermath of the war, such as the decline of image intelligence capabilities, were the result of failures to continue international cooperation. 

 

Gregory Treverton approached the theme from a modern American perspective, observing that the War on Terrorism has increased international intelligence sharing and in the process raised a series of new concerns.  Among these concerns is the trustworthiness of new allies, as nations formerly seen as enemies are now being consulted on intelligence sharing.  As well, the United States now finds itself in the difficult situation of exchanging intelligence with nations engaged in serious disputes with one and other, India and Pakistan being the most obvious example.

 

All of the panelists stressed that no nation, no matter how powerful, can afford to go it alone when it comes to intelligence.  Regardless, of the pitfalls, the further development of modern intelligence services will always depend on strong international cooperation.

 

 

Reporting by Jaime Sims, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 6: North Asia Security Trends

 

The discussions brought to light in Panel 6 revolved around the topic of North Asian Security Trends.  The speakers were: Sueng-Whan Choi, from the Centre for Security and Defence studies (Carleton University, Ottawa), Shuhfan Ding, a researcher at the Institute of International Relations (National Chengchi University, Taiwan) and Wen-Cheng Lin, a senior advisor with the National Security Council (Taiwan).  Even though each presenter had an individual perspective on North Asia Security Trends, the overarching theme of An Asia in Transition was evident in all discussions.

 

First, Wen-Cheng Lin discussed The Taiwan Security Outlook - highlighting the conflicts in the Taiwan Straight between China and Taiwan.  Mr. Lin pointed out that Taiwan was a unique culture, an independent state, a powerful economy and a military powerhouse.  However, because Taiwan is a fairly young democracy, the political system is shaky and unstable. It is also a young democracy unrecognized by the majority of multilateral/international organizations.  Taiwan’s poor international identity and the partial withdrawal of American involvement have led to an opening for China to re-claim Taiwan for the Republic of China.  Mr. Lin went on to explain that the Taiwanese are spending upwards of 20 Billion Dollars (USD) on military advancements such as Mid Range Ballistic Missiles because of the Chinese threat. In conclusion, Mr. Lin’s reinforced his idea of maintaining the status quo of “preparing for the worst by negotiating the best” because, as Mr. Lin states, “The best defence is a good offence.”

 

Shufan Ding next discussed his paper, China’s Nuclear Strategy, Mr. Ding argued that China (and Asia to an extent) is currently in transition.  However, the goal of this transition for China is to emerge as a secondary “war-power,” rivalled only by the USA.  This goal of a secondary Asian hegemon is only hampered by outside influences from other nuclear (semi-nuclear) states such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the USA. Along with the efforts of other states that are attempting to control China’s power, international organizations and firms are trying to limit the nuclear capabilities of China. Only when these external forces are removed from the Chinese system can China truly emerge as the “war-power” it is intent on being.  Mr. Lin concluded that, following the September 11th attacks, the U.S. has slowed their interference in Chinese matters, and has begun focusing on other issues.  This will ultimately lead to the creation of a “war power” China.  Only then will China look at matters that concern them, such as Taiwan.

           

The final presenter in panel 6 was Seung-Whan Choi, discussing his paper, Turbulent Geopolitics in the Korean Peninsula.  Mr. Choi believes that South Korea has three major problems: international, domestic, and intelligence.  Korea’s international problems were described as stemming from American interference in South Korea’s political system.  This American role in South Korea has left the Korean population without a voice, and they are ignored in international matters.  Secondly, Korea’s domestic problems have arisen through an unsupportive “congress” which is adamant on disrupting the stability of the domestic regime.  Along with an unsupportive political body, the media (news and newspapers) and international business continuously undermine the political powers of local officials and create further instability in the region.

 

Mr. Choi returned to the topic of American influence and how it controls almost every aspect of South Korea’s intelligence and military affairs. This reliance on the American military has created an unwanted yet necessary symbiotic relationship within Korea, further degrading the power of the South Korean government.  In conclusion, Mr. Choi believes that in order for North and South Korea to get along, the US must evacuate the area and let the two countries form a relationship based on trust, not personal gain.  Once this bond has been built, South Korea will be able to grow; yet this State growth will not be completed overnight. As some scholars have said, “Rome wasn’t built in a day.”

 

 

Reporting by Richard King, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 6: North Asia Security Trends

 

Three speakers in Panel 6 offered their views on security trends in North Asia.  Chair Brian Job introduced Wen-Cheng Lin, Shuhfan Ding, and Seung-Whan Choi.  Their presentations represented their personal views, and not those of the states or organizations that they represented.

           

Mr. Wen-Chen Lin, the first speaker, discussed Chinese/Taiwanese relations from a Taiwanese perspective and provided an explanation of events that would constitute an attack by China, the methods of possible invasion, and Taiwanese fears of changing relations between China and the United States.  Mr. Lin noted that 9/11 changed the US’s relationship with China.  China is no longer seen as a threat to US global hegemony but as an ally.  There is a fear that the US will sacrifice Taiwan for improved relations with China.  Mr. Lin also went on to discuss the changes and challenges facing both Taiwan and China, such as Chinese leadership issues, and Taiwanese economic dependency on its larger neighbour.  He asserted Taiwan’s need for military capacity to defend itself from aggression by China and stated that sometimes offence is the best defence, advocating the development of midrange ballistic missiles in Taiwan.  Mr. Lin concluded his presentation by stating that Taiwan wants peace, but also that the Taiwanese people desire to remain independent and they are willing to use force to protect themselves.

           

The second speaker was Mr. Shuhfan Ding.  He discussed China’s views on homeland insecurities by describing trends within the country and highlighting three events that have influenced recent Chinese policy, beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting arms control initiatives.  Mr. Ding argued that the arms control community’s welcoming of China was an important event.  The second stage centred on concerns over tensions with the US, exemplified by incidents like the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.  Mr. Ding outlined two drivers of Chinese policy – the “hardliner” and “moderate” factions within China, and he argued that the “moderate” faction currently directs policy.  The third stage Mr. Ding noted was the post 9/11 world of tensions and China’s concerns with defence against terrorism.  Mr. Ding ended his presentation by concluding that homeland security - or insecurity - issues currently play a minor role in policy compared to the development of China into a world-class power.

           

The final speaker was Mr. Seung-Whan Choi.  Choi discussed the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and the influence of three factors that have hindered a solution to the North Korean/South Korean conflict: international influence, domestic issues, and South Korea’s intelligence deficiency.  International influences have hindered relations between the two countries because outside powers like the US have such a dominant role in foreign policy-making that it leaves South Korea with little input.  Mr. Choi argued that outside powers do not want unification because it would result in a Korea that is too powerful.  Domestic pressures are also important, according to Choi.  S. Korea’s new president may have plenty of good ideas but he lacks the power to implement them because of a minority government and enemies within the opposition, business community, and major newspapers.  Until he gains more power, it is unlikely that the North/South issue will be solved.  The third aspect handicapping S. Korea is the lack of sufficient intelligence capabilities, forcing them to rely on US sources. 

 

Mr. Choi concluded his presentation by arguing that, however bleak the difficulties in the peninsula look, given time there will be peace in the region.  Both Koreas are in the process of developing, and they need time to solve their problems without outside interference.

 

 

Reporting by Brent Ellis, NPSIA, Carleton University

 

Panel 7: Responding to Asymmetrical Security Threats

 

The panel consisted of two presentations discussing specific asymmetrical threats - food security, and the threat of biological terrorism - and a third presentation concerning the Bush administration’s response to the emerging post 9/11 security environment. 

 

 

 

 

George Betts, PCO,

The Threat of Biological Terrorism

 

The focus of Betts’ presentation was on the threat biological terrorism poses to populations, focusing particularly on our vulnerabilities.  Betts started his discussion by noting that biological warfare has a long history stretching back centuries.  However, the current threat of terrorist use of biological weapons is new.  This new dynamic in the terrorist landscape is marked by a form of dual uncertainty: uncertainty in terms of our understanding of the threat, how terrorists may utilize biological weapons, and what the effects of terrorist use of BW would be; but also in terms of terrorist uncertainty over the effects and outcomes resulting from their use of BW.

 

Betts’ presentation then focused on two key questions: first, why are we so concerned about the threat of terrorist use of biological weapons; and second, what are our vulnerabilities to a BW attack, assuming a terrorist ability to utilize such weapons?  Examining the first question, he suggested that our concern over our vulnerability to infectious disease, and recent problems managing breakouts of diseases have led to an increased sense of vulnerability to biological threats, both naturally occurring and terrorist inspired.  He also cautioned that the recognition among terrorists of our vulnerabilities in this area may increase terrorist interest in utilizing a BW capability.

 

In examining the second question, he highlighted the difference between communicable diseases and non-communicable microorganisms, suggesting that the threats posed by each type of agent are quite different.  Non-communicable agents, Betts suggested, may be easier to acquire but tougher to disseminate, making mass-casualty attacks tougher to carry out.  For communicable diseases, however, the situation is essentially the opposite.  Acquisition of these agents is very difficult, while the dissemination and spread is relatively easy to carry out due to the nature of the agent.  In assessing the impact of BW terrorism Betts noted that, in many cases, mass disruption and panic, and not mass casualties, could be the most decisive impact of an attack.

 

The last portion of his presentation focused upon the response to BW terrorism, emphasizing the need for early identification, response, and containment through a cross-jurisdictional and multinational approach.  Betts suggested that essentially the same response to deal with natural outbreaks of disease is required to deal with outbreaks resulting from intentional dissemination of BW agents.

 

 

Richard Fadden, Canadian Food Inspection Agency,

Food Security

 

The presentation focused around three main thoughts.  First, the high vulnerability and economic cost of threats to food security was stressed.  Second, Fadden noted that lethality may not be the main focus of terrorist action.  Instead, he suggested that the primary motivation of terrorist action is to create fear.  Third, the sources of threats to the food supply were outlined: inattention and happenstance; organized crime; state action; and terrorist action.  Fadden also suggested that action on the latter two threats, perhaps the current focus, is not beginning with a clean slate.  Actions taken over the past fifty years to counter the threats posed by the first two sources can still apply in the current threat environment.  However, he also stressed that new tools are also required.

 

Discussing the response required to deal with threats to food security, Fadden noted that international and inter-jurisdictional collaboration is key because pathogens know no borders.  He also noted that improving capacities to deal with terrorist threats to the food supply necessarily improve capacities to deal with threats from other sources.  Fadden also suggested that international cooperation in identification and diagnosis, and protocols for such interaction, are key areas for further development of a coherent and effective response.

 

In shaping the policy response to food security threats, the suggestion was made that a focus on the creation and dissemination of greater information surrounding the problem of food security is required.  The unknown is scary and is not a sufficient basis for creating policy.  He clearly stressed that both policy-makers and the public need to be informed on food security issues, and that discussion in forums like the CASIS conference is a key element in the policy process.  Indeed, it was suggested that low-cost measures can be taken to significantly reduce current risks.

 

 

Colin Campbell, Canada Research Chair, UBC,

The Bush Administration’s Response to the New Threat Environment

 

The last presentation of the panel examined the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 utilizing a tripartite decision/policymaking formula comprised of policy competence, strategic competence, and fiscal competence.  The main implication of Campbell’s analysis is that fiscal competence can affect (and did affect) the formulation of both strategy and policy, and that there can and may be a gap between rhetoric and the implementation of policy.

 

These conclusions were drawn from an analysis of a number of key events and turning points leading up to the American invasion of Iraq. The discussion that followed the presentations highlighted a number of issues including: the need for early warning to include information pertaining to the intentions of terrorists to ensure an early response to an outbreak if prevention is not possible; the need for technical understanding to allow informed analysis; the need for intelligence to focus on the big picture, to identify trends and draw them together; the potential for commercial sabotage through biological warfare; the need to focus upon general threats and vulnerabilities (primarily in food security) as opposed to becoming transfixed upon the terrorist threat; and the need for and difficulties in prioritizing measures to deal with security threats.

 

 

Reporting by Matthew Symes, University of New Brunswick

 

Panel 8: Signals Intelligence History

 

Chaired by David Kahn

Panel speakers included David Alvarez – St. Mary’s College, California and John Ferris – University of Calgary.

While they used different examples, both John Ferris and David Alvarez stressed the exact same point.  Before we can adequately quantify the importance of intelligence, we must first “strip away the myth” so that we can rethink the actual effect.

 

Alvarez’ talk was entitled Superfluous Success: The limits of American Intelligence.  In spite of the misrepresented success of American signals intelligence, research supports the harsh conclusion that American diplomatic intelligence, with few exceptions, played no role in diplomacy between 1930 and 1945.  The lack of success, according to Alvarez, was the result of both the professional mentality of American crypt analysts and an uninterested president.  The professional mentality of U.S. crypt analysts focused on breaking codes regardless of origin and importance.  Thus, a code break was a code break; a solved Brazilian message was equal to that of a German, Italian or Japanese.  Several attempts to change this professional mentality resulted in failure and, by the end of the war, American signals intelligence was actually attempting to break more country codes than it had at any point prior.  Compounding the problem of professional mentality was that of Roosevelt’s indifference to their reports.  Alvarez bluntly stated that the President’s intuition counted for more than any single piece of information.  In fact, the President wanted little more than the intelligence headlines and there is no evidence that Roosevelt ever formally requested a single intelligence document.  In sum, presidential neglect of intelligence coupled with the professional mentality of crypt analysts resulted in the lack of influence of Arlington Hall.

 

Though Ferris presented the same revisionist stance, he did so in a manner that proved the importance of British intelligence during both World War I and World War II.  Ferris also asserts the notion that the British, while being the best in World War I intelligence collection were only marginally ahead of the Austrian Hungarian Empire.  Therefore, there existed a type of “checkmate” in intelligence during the First World War.  All this is to say that we should not overstate the importance of intelligence during WW I.  During WW II, there is a similar myth concerning the effects of Ultra.  In fact, the German enigma was very effective until about 1942.  Despite the fact that the British intelligence service was producing massive quantities of decrypted messages, there were few that were significant in terms of the war.  By mid-1942, according to Ferris, the tides turned and the allies gained a significant edge in intelligence.  However, based on the evidence he has found, Ferris disputes the claim that Ultra ended the war two years early.  In sum, Ferris insists that we must not mistake technical prowess for particular ability and, in the case of the British, this ability did not show itself until mid 1942.

 

The two panellists finished by engaging several questions from the audience.  However, there was little objection to the two theses presented.  The lesson of their research was obvious and clear:  The myth of intelligence success has the ability to distort its actual effect.  Thus, it is important to look at the evidence before we accept the myths of intelligence.

 

 

Reporting by Bradley Bamford, University of New Brunswick

 

Panel 9: Reform in Intelligence, Security and Law Enforcement Organizations chaired by Don Munton, addressed the challenge for intelligence analysis in today’s complex security environment.

 

Carol Dumaine, Sherman Kent Centre, Washington

 

Carol Dumaine opened the panel with her focus on intelligence analysis.  The complex nature of today’s security environment not only makes traditional intelligence analysis difficult, but new approaches must be developed.  Dumaine advocates a very post-modern view of intelligence collection and analysis.  In her view, reform is a combination of ‘sense making,’ that takes into account the changing global environment, and ‘insight as product,’ that includes a diversity of voices in the final intelligence product.  This can be achieved, Dumaine contends, through greater dialogue with a diversity of people, communities and agencies.

 

Michael Herman, Oxford University

 

Michael Herman made the case that intelligence services must become agile to confront the national security threats of today.  This requires that they focus on better management practices and leadership, areas in which they are currently deficient.  His three major points were: that the intelligence services lack leadership qualities within their organizations; that there has been no thought given to the career plan of intelligence or counter-terrorism specialists; and finally, that the services require better management.  Herman posed the question “how do we improve intelligence judgments?”  This is difficult to answer, but Herman suggested that a combination of better selection criteria for analysts, based on personal and professional traits, training and professional development might be a good starting point.  If intelligence services can achieve this, the end result may be a better intelligence product. 

 

Wesley Wark, University of Toronto

 

In light of recent decisions by the British and American governments to place the Iraq dossier in the public domain, Wesley Wark asserted that this may indicate a new age for intelligence.  Whereas the 20th century was the age of secret intelligence, the 21st century may become the age of public intelligence.  Wark argued that public intelligence is the new reality, the new problem and the new challenge facing the intelligence community.  This represents a radical departure from the way intelligence services have operated in the past because it requires that intelligence will be created for public consumption.  He noted that, as a result, more thought must be given to the intelligence product and how it will be shared safely with the public.  The major implication arising out of this new age, Wark argues, is that intelligence services will face the challenge of producing information for the public.  The future, according to him, will be to create intelligence that is safely usable in the public domain and that conveys the so-called ‘pure motives’ of government to the public.

 

 

Reporting by Sara Guirguis, Dalhousie University

 

Panel 10: Cross Border Cooperation in Policing and Security

 

Kevin Begg, Director of Police Services, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, BC (Chair)

 

Bill Ard, OIC, Border Integrity, RCMP,

Current Initiatives

 

The focus of Bill Ard’s presentation was to highlight the importance of harmonizing cross border police cooperation. By 1997, both the US and Canada had become increasingly aware that they faced similar cross border challenges. In September 2001, both governments sanctioned the formation of an Integrated Cross Border Enforcement Team. This resulted in the signing of the US-Canada Smart Border Declaration on December 12, 2001, by then Foreign Minister John Manley and U.S. Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge. The declaration insured the secure flow of people and goods, as well as coordination and information sharing to attain these objectives. A number of integrated task forces, such as the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) and the Integrated Border Intelligence Team (IBIT), were consequently formed. The aim of these organizations is to work effectively and in coordination with one another to combat terrorism, organized crime and other joint issues facing Canada and the United States.

 

 

 

 

 

Gary D. Bass, A/Commissioner, RCMP,

Barriers

 

Gary D. Bass’ focus was on the barriers currently facing effective cross border cooperation. The Canadian-US relationship is extremely good, especially in the post 9/11 environment.  More importantly, 9/11 highlighted to both sides that cross border crime was a problem that could be effectively tackled through their coordination of efforts and resources. Bass maintains that while there are no actual barriers, there are a few surmountable challenges. Mutual legal assistance continues to be an issue that needs to be further discussed and overcome. This can be done through a process of judicial exchange to enhance understanding of one another’s legal systems. Disclosure is also an important issue that can be overcome through a mutual exchange of information and increased awareness of the legal issues facing each side of the border.

 

Marvin Wodinsky, A/Consul General of Canada, Seattle

 

Marvin Wodinsky aimed to paint a picture of border issues as seen in Seattle. The view from Seattle focuses on misconceptions about SARS, BSE, and other food and security issues. In turn, these misconceptions have made the border more vulnerable to closure. The Canadian Consul in Seattle sets out to correct these misconceptions. Additionally, the Consul emphasizes that the US has a vested interest in keeping the border open. Organizations, such as the Border Trade Association, are also working towards enhancing the existing good cross border relationship to keep the border open. It is vital that the border should not become a porous border. Instead, it should be secure and efficient to ensure its openness and security to further mutual Canadian-US interests.

 

 

Reporting by Kwabena (Coby) Asiedu, Simon Fraser University

 

Panel 11: South and Southeast Asian Trends and Prospects

Chair: Roger Girouard, Commander, Canadian Fleet Pacific

Summary of the Panel: Gerard Hervouet of Université Laval, Quebec, Chyungly Lee of National Chengchi University, Taiwan, and Gordon, D. Longmuir former Canadian Ambassador to Cambodia made presentations at the CASIS international conference on October 17, 2003, based on their research about the security trends and prospects in South and Southeast Asia.

 

Professor Hervouet presented a speech entitled Southeast Asia: The Risks of Mixing up Terrorism(s)?  His central theme was that the widespread use of the term terrorism after 9/11 is a bit misleading and conceals those aspects of terrorism that are not entirely global in outlook. Prior to and post-September 11, very few members of the small mainly "Islamic militant" groups in South and Southeast Asia had received any form of organized training in Afghanistan. Hervouet argues that internationalizing militancy that is clearly regionally focused only strengthens the resolve of non-homogenous militant groups. It should be dealt with as a regional problem. ASEAN/ARF should not be trapped in the global definition of terrorism. He argues that, diplomacy, intelligence, and South and Southeast Asian law should play a larger role than military action in this region’s counter-terrorism policy. Instead of waging "war" against terrorism, it is essential that ASEAN/ARF applies a broader range of alternative policies and strategies in combating terrorism.

 

Professor Lee's speech titled ASEAN Regional Response to 9/11: Implications for Asia Pacific Security Multilateralism focused on the security dynamics of ASEAN/ARF after the September 11, 2021 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. ASEAN security dynamic prior to 9/11 was deliberately understated and never articulated a formal model of regional security. A preference for informal consensus building and dialogue was and still is paramount in ASEAN/ARF-ASM. However, since 9/11 there has been a shift in the search for the right security formula. She argues that while ASEAN states are slowly improving their own mechanisms to combat terrorism, adequate security in the future depends on a far broader range of measures requiring shared goals and cooperation between member-states.

 

Longmuir's speech titled Terrorism and Responses in S. E. Asia focused on the perception of the threats posed by mainly "Islamic militant" groups in Southeast Asia. He argued that it is pertinent to note that the threat emanates from small but well organized groups that predate Al Qaeda. In his view, the scale of threat posed by these small groups pales in comparison to the threat posed by Al Qaeda internationally. South-East Asian and Asian terrorist groups such as Al Jamahiriya, Abu Sayyaf, and Jamal Islamiya are all mainly regionally focused in ASEAN and are generally country specific. Furthermore, he argues that most of these groups can be described as either nationalist, separatist, ethnic, and irredentist groups; accordingly, defining these groups as terror movements is problematic. He argues that almost all ASEAN countries were in denial on the problem of terrorism until the Bali bombings in Indonesia drew out Indonesian political elite denial.

 

 

Reporting By Anita Horvath, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 12: Student Panel – Weller Prize Winners

 

The panel opened with some remarks on behalf of the Solicitor General about the Office’s support of CASIS and students of intelligence.

 

The first student presentation was Rethinking Moscow’s Interwar Infiltration of the British Government, 1919-29 by Victor Madeira. His paper documented the infiltration of Scotland Yard’s Special Branch by a Moscow network run by a journalist named Trilby. The activities of these spies aroused MI5’s suspicions. However, the operation was effective because Trilby’s network infiltrated the very branch of the British Government that was concerned with anti-Soviet counterintelligence. This Soviet intelligence success effectively compromised all of the intelligence passed to the Special Branch during the interwar period.

 

Robert Martyn’s paper, The Scylla of Morality and the Charybdis of Operational Necessity: The Ethical Dilemma of Intelligence Collection, began with the premise that gathering intelligence information is amoral. In his view, the method of intelligence collection determines the scope of its amorality. All forms of intelligence collection transgress some individual and societal rights, but a line must be drawn using the idea of minimum trespass. The speaker applied ideas from authors and philosophers such as Michael Walzer, Hegel, and Thomas Aquinas to address the problem of morality in intelligence. Supervision, with attention to the concepts of Double Effect and Supreme Emergency, is necessary for intelligence collection. Military and Police personnel must pay close attention to ethical issues.

 

The third presentation was Joshua Perell’s Subjectivity of Method: On Strategic Intelligence Historiography and the Ideological Subversion of Objectivity. The presentation drew attention to the special problems faced by historians of intelligence, who must deal with restricted access to relevant information. In the field of the history of strategic intelligence, objective and subjective interpretations must be synthesized and deception must be taken into account. Sherman Kent’s methodology, based on the scientific method, contrasts with the No-Fault method, which considers everything to be subjective. Kent’s methodology also considers subjective factors, while insisting on the production of objective, credible and reliable information. Strategic intelligence, however, is not an exact science and close attention must be paid to the dangers of ideological blindness that may result from a careless application of methodology.

The final presentation by Matt Symes discussed Stalin’s Secret Weapon: The Influence of the Red Orchestra on the Russian-German War. The Red Orchestra (Rote Kapelle), established in 1938, was an espionage ring of loosely connected Soviet spies.  The Rote Kapelle operated from neutral countries, and included the notable operative “Lucy” in Switzerland. The three major successes of the Rote Kapelle were 1) the identification of Japan’s intentions during the German drive towards Moscow 2) the interception of plans allowing the creation of a trap in the form of the battle of Stalingrad, and 3) the procurement by Lucy of the plans for Operation Zitadelle, the attack on Kursk. Intelligence from the Rote Kapelle allowed for the maximization of resources and was the single most important factor in the Russo-German conflict and perhaps WWII.

 

 

Reporting by Mark van Akker, Camosun College, Victoria

 

John Tate Memorial Lecture

Ward Elcock, Director CSIS

 

CSIS is a “vastly different organization” than it was at its conception, and has withstood “a number of operational tests,” says Ward Elcock, Director of CSIS. Mr. Elcock spoke to delegates of the 2003 CASIS Conference in Vancouver, BC.

 

CASIS president, Tony Campbell, introduced Mr. Elcock at the Conference’s gala dinner, speaking highly of his contribution to CASIS in more than a dozen years of service.

 

Mr. Elcock took the opportunity to outline the history of CSIS over its twenty years of existence, from debates that surrounded the drafting of the CSIS Act, to present day considerations of new global security realities. In his opening, he spoke of the choices Canadians made at the conception of CSIS, and how those choices have shaped our security service.

 

From the outset, both legislators and CSIS employees have taken great pains to strike and maintain balances between several conflicting issues. Individual vs. collective rights, political accountability vs. accountability to the Courts, foreign vs. domestic operations, and civilianization are just a few of the concerns that continue to challenge both legislators and intelligence collection practitioners.

 

Appropriately, Mr. Elcock spoke first of what is arguably the most important aspect of the CSIS Act: the delicate balance between collective and individual security. The McDonald Commission, 1993’s Special Senate Committee, and Canadian Civil Liberties Association court challenges have all served to build, strengthen, and prove the integrity of the framework that is the CSIS Act. This framework shelters and protects fundamental rights of privacy, dissent, and unpopular opinions while providing the tools necessary to assess and deal with such threats as espionage and terrorism.

 

Significant in the address were references to CSIS foreign intelligence operations. Mr. Elcock reassured delegates that the CSIS mandate has always clearly included the collection of intelligence abroad, and that such collection has indeed been happening for over a century. He stated, “The legislation authorizes us to conduct operations abroad. It wasn’t in hindsight that some loophole has been discovered.” He noted the McDonald Commission’s conclusion, “If security intelligence investigations which begin in Canada must cease at the Canadian border, information and sources of information important to Canadian security will be lost.” Threats to Canadian security have shifted abroad; “Extremists respect no barriers, international or moral,” and CSIS is responding to this emerging challenge with “an integrated approach to intelligence collection that is not bound by artificial, administrative barriers.” An intelligence rather than enforcement model is being adopted, and CSIS employees are increasingly broadening the scope of their education. Respect of civil liberties as well as training in management, advanced operations and informatics build on a foundation of analytical skills learned through higher education that all CSIS employees must have. A change in the culture of CSIS toward a more open, civilian based, and ethnically and culturally diverse employee base continues to make CSIS a more effective organization.

In conclusion, Mr. Elcock mused that although legislators may not have foreseen the extent to which extreme views and violence would be exported around the globe, they “clearly anticipated a world of increasing complexity,” and provided a mechanism which has proven its effectiveness in dealing with today’s emerging threats. “Because the ability to adapt to change is a built-in feature of the CSIS Act, we can also adapt - and we will.”

 

 

Reporting by Maureen Mahoney, Dalhousie University

 

Panel 13: New Dimensions in Critical Infrastructure Protection

Margaret Purdy, (Chair) Visiting Scholar, UBC and Associate Deputy Minister, Government of Canada

 

James Harlick, Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Canada

 

Harlick’s presentation, Public Policy Challenges in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), focused on government policy for infrastructure protection, particularly challenges that must be addressed. Since most challenges have to do with a lack of awareness on how interdependent and interconnected the sectors are, the Government’s CIP program sought to bring the sectors together. From these consultations came the Protection and Assurance Program where each actor ensures the protection of their service. However, this program can only go so far without increased resources. Another challenge is the exchange of intelligence information. The issue here concerns the gap in comprehension of the receivers’ needs. That is, the intelligence officer has to be sure that what is decided as relevant actually is useful and made applicable. To address this, regular consultations are held. The final problem comes from the Canadian-US infrastructure connections and the lack of a cyber security leader in the US. Until this has been solved, little can be done to remedy the problem. For the future, the Government looks to increase awareness and collaboration between the sectors.

 

Matthew Morrison, Executive Director, Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWRE) Seattle, Washington

 

Morrison’s presentation, titled Private-Public Sector Partnerships in Critical Infrastructure Protection, discussed the importance of a public-private relationship for the protection of CIP. The reason for this is because all forms of infrastructure needed for society’s operation are interconnected on an array of levels. In order to ensure society’s protection, these actors must come together, determine their vulnerabilities, and formulate response plans for emergencies. PNWRE, has succeeded in bringing together actors of both sectors, and has already completed a mock emergency situation to test the response plan. In the future, Morrison plans on re-testing the plan in order to increase awareness, and to perfect the response plan. The hope is that more groups like PNWRE will form, and that cooperation between the sectors will increase.

 

David Mussington, Political Scientist, RAND, Arlington, Virginia

 

Mussington’s presentation, Challenges and Lessons Learned in Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, traced the CIP journey before September 11th and after to determine the changes that have been made to the means of protection. Before 9/11, the threat was to cyber space and the Government tried to convince the private sector of the threat’s existence and the need to change approaches to protection. However, the threat could not be readily illustrated and it was up to the private sector to pay for any needed changes. After 9/11, everything changed. The threat shifted to physical infrastructure, and societal vulnerabilities were realized. In response, money was invested, new organizations were formed, and policies reformed. For instance the Department of Homeland Security was created and the relationship between federal and state governments changed to increase their involvement in protection. The challenges that must still be faced concern finding funding for the added measures.

 

 

Reporting by Andreas Linnet, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 14: Iraq Lessons: Intelligence, Media and Information Warfare

Philip Gibson, Canadian Intelligence Service (chair)

 

Tony Campbell, Campbell Intel Services Inc.

 

Campbell argued that the war in Iraq was the fist in a new category of warfare—information world war. Campbell stated that Canada has no information sovereignty, but bases its decisions on US information or other information Canada itself did not collect or analyze. Because of this, it is very easy to be misled. Campbell did a short history lesson of propaganda, first applied by the allies during the World War One. Campbell argues Canada must do something about its information sovereignty to make sure Canada is not misled by lies. Canadian intelligence services need restructuring to meet this new threat. Canada has to have access to adequate information before engaging in any war.

 

John Prados, Vietnam Documentation Project

 

John Prados argued that there was no information available to American polity-makers prior to the latest war in Iraq that could have legitimate military intervention. The CIA and the White House made up the information that led to war. Congress insisted it get public reports that stated the reasons for the war but failed to get enough information out of the White House and failed to criticize the lack of evidence and stop the war. The information used to legitimize the war was obtained from defectors making claims that Iraq had chemical weapons capabilities, portable laboratories, and connections with Al Qaeda and so on. Neither the US nor the UK had a single agent inside Iraq and the story leading to war was produced by a series of bits and pieces collected by all kinds of Intelligence agencies. One must be more conscious and critical when receiving information – especially “second hand” information from other services.

 

 

 

 

Robert David Steele, OSS.net

 

Steele agued that open source intelligence collection is the only way to go to avoid people or other countries deceiving us. Israel was playing a big role in the game of deceiving and making Iraq seem like a threat to the world. The US is a country at war with itself – misinforming and deceiving its own people. Steele argued that we need global information standards on intelligence to avoid a situation like this again.

 

The Chair, Philip Gibson

 

Gibson made a short speech about the media’s total failure to cover the truths of the war. He cited the untrue coverage of the complete looting of the national museum in Baghdad. In his view, for example, the media overestimated the amount of stolen artifacts.

 

 

Reporting by Nicholas Dauphinee, Dalhousie University

 

Panel 14: Iraq Lessons: intelligence, Media and Information Warfare

 

Tony Campbell, Campbell Intel Services Inc.,

Lies, Damn Lies and Intelligence: The Iraq Experience and Canada’s ‘Information Sovereignty’.

 

Tony Campbell argued in his presentation that we have witnessed a shift in warfare from conventional to information warfare. Wars are now fought with information more so than military hardware. It is increasingly important for a country to have control over its access to information, which he calls information sovereignty. Information sovereignty is defined as the ability of a state and its citizens to access adequate and reliable information to facilitate wise decisions and policies. Campbell argues that Canada’s experience during the Iraq conflict suggests that it does not hold control over information. He argues further that this lack of control over information facilitated Canada’s failure on five out of six of the information battlefields, which he outlines as being the new fields of warfare. One must be able to control and manipulate each of the battlefields in order to be successful. He describes the battlefields as follows: armed conflict, attitudinal and idea space of leaders/civilians of opposing forces, attitudinal and idea space of leaders/civilians of one’s own nation, the cyber battlefield, attitudinal and idea space of key allies and finally public opinion (Canada’s one success). If Canada hopes to remain a player internationally, we will need to significantly increase our intelligence collection and analysis abilities in order to gain better control over information. Becoming a nation with sovereignty over our own information, and having an ability to manipulate and spin that information, will best serve Canada’s interests.

 

John Prados, US National Security Archive,

Intelligence and the War with Iraq

 

John Prados argued in his presentation that false intelligence played a major role in the run up to the war in Iraq. Unreliable reports of Iraqi defectors, controlled largely by the Iraqi national Congress and other questionable sources, were taken as truth by many in the administration and were subsequently paraded in the national media as fact. Despite apparent objections of the CIA, the intelligence gathered from the defectors was used to validate the war effort in important speeches, namely the President’s state of the Union address to Congress in 2002. The charges against Iraq were conditioned by assumptions in the Iraqi NIE that anything not a proven negative automatically was assumed to be positive. Prados draws attention to the example of supposed Iraqi weapons caches. These caches were assumed to be in existence based on the belief that since they had not been proven to have been destroyed, they must still be in existence. Prados argues that intelligence in Iraq failed to be at all useful and only led to easily avoidable political problems and resulted in three high level investigations in the three major coalition partners in the War on Terror (U.S., Britain and Australia). The information garnered by the U.S. administration from these defectors and from other unreliable sources regarding WMD in Iraq was distributed to intelligence partners, namely the British and Australians through intelligence sharing arrangements—leading all three countries to reach the same conclusions based on this faulty intelligence. Because none questioned the sources used, all three are in the process of dealing with high level investigations that would have been avoidable had the information been questioned.

 

Robert David Steele, OSS.Net,

Seven Generations of War, Intelligence and Information Operations: Placing Iraq on the Continuum of the Possible.

 

Robert David Steele argued in his presentation that the current framework surrounding the use and collection of intelligence, namely that of the cold war, is now anachronistic and only serves to limit the ability of the United States to promote its values abroad. The current reliance on the closed, secret system of intelligence needs to be replaced with a more open source, public system with varying degrees of security depending on the information. Intelligence should be available online and to the public in general. The wide availability of intelligence would allow more public input and better government decisions. He outlines seven generations of war and seven generations of intelligence. As we progress through each level we encounter increasing levels of difficulty regarding the requirements of government. The cold war framework should be discarded in favour of a more open system available to all.

 

 

Reporting by Tessa Jackson, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 15: Innovation in Security, Intelligence and Law Enforcement - Case Studies and Best Practices

 

An eclectic mix of case studies detailing innovation in security, intelligence and law enforcement were presented by Larry Hannant, Christopher Spearin, and David Charters. 

 

Larry Hannant, from the University of Victoria, began by detailing RCMP innovations in response to the Sons of Freedom Doukhobor terrorism threat in southern BC in the 1950s and 1960s.  The Freedomites were considered terrorists; they acted violently and used arson and bombings to receive better treatment from the federal and provincial governments.  Innovative methods were used to neutralize the threat posed by the Freedomites.  The RCMP used the media to generate positive stories about their raids on Doukhobor houses to force children to attend school.  The RCMP exposed a large group of violent Freedomites.  In the trials for these Freedomites the RCMP investigated all the potential jurors to select people most inclined to find the Freedomites guilty.  The government of BC supported attempts to force modernization on the Doukhobors by forcing television and electricity on them. A number of Doukhobors left their homes and marched to Vancouver to join their brethren in jail.  This march effectively solved the problem of Freedomite terrorism. When they arrived in Vancouver they discovered modern conveniences, stopped resisting modernization, and stopped using terrorism to seek their goals. 

 

Christopher Spearin, from the Canadian Forces College, spoke about Canadian policy concerning international private security companies.  In recent years new a type of “mercenary” service has emerged, the private security company (PSCs).  Approximately 5% of all PSCs are based in Canada.  Current Canadian policy governing the actions of PSCs is horribly outdated. It was developed to stop Canadians from fighting in the Spanish civil war over 60 years ago.  Canada needs to update its policy concerning PSCs. Spearin put forward three broad ingredients needed for regulation of private security companies: licensing and qualification of firms, licensing and inspection of individual contracts, and monitoring PSCs in the field. 

 

David Charters of the University of New Brunswick spoke about federal and provincial cooperation in security and intelligence, especially in the area of intelligence lead policing. Intelligence lead policing is the collection and analysis of information to inform police decision making at both tactical and strategic levels.  Cooperation is inhibited by the incompatibility of technology at different levels, and deciding who should know what when, without compromising secrecy.  Until 9/11, security was not seen as a responsibility of the police force, but now new systems of cooperation are needed to facilitate the RCMP’s new job.  Cooperation and sharing of information between federal, provincial and municipal governments is essential between all levels.  Sharing must be mandatory, reciprocal legislation should be enacted at the different levels, and common provincial crime data bank needs to be established.  Charters contends that greater cooperation between all levels of policing will ensure the most effective use of resources, and minimize duplication of work.  Once the existing system goes through some minor changes to facilitate cooperation between all levels of government, policing will be more effective in dealing with the problems of organized crime and terrorism. 

 

 

Reporting by Mark Anderson, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 16: Teaching, Learning and Leadership in Security, Intelligence and Law Enforcement

 

The CHAIR of the panel, Robert Fahlman, introduced the speakers and gave a description of their backgrounds and credentials.

 

Paz Buttedahl, from Royal Roads University, gave a brief description of the graduate studies program at the University on Human Security and Peace Building. This Master’s level program is new at the University. The program is two years in length and requires the completion of 14 graduate level courses, includes three residences, three distance sessions, a simulation exercise and major project. The students are subjected to a large workload which keeps them busy for the entire length of the program.

 

The Human Security and Peace Building program is an integrated and applied program focused on the learning needs and organizational demands of working professionals. The program seeks to provide its students with the comprehensive experience needed to meet real world challenges. It promotes critical thinking, judgment, leadership, compassion, communication and ethics. The students will graduate with the applied, and networking skills needed in today’s changing work environment.

 

The second panel member was Greg Fyffe, from the Privy Council Office of Canada. His lecture analyzed success and failure in the intelligence world and what can be learned from both outcomes.

 

Failure occurs anytime the chain of success is broken and this can occur during the intelligence gathering or analysis processes. Important information may be readily available but it is useless without successful interpretation and analysis. Failures include, unintelligent analysis, misinterpretation and preconceived conclusions.

 

Analysts must find new ways of thinking that exhaust all avenues of possibility in an ever changing world full of new threats. These ways must focus on non linear thinking where every avenue of possibility is considered and examined and never completely dismissed. Analysts must be a paranoid group, never putting aside their doubt but using it constructively to examine and investigate all possible causes and reactions.

 

Carol Chisholm of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Leadership Academy concluded the panel. The Leadership Academy is enjoying its first year of operation in providing CIA officers with additional leadership training relevant to their field of work. This is especially important in the modern CIA where the traditional forms of military based hierarchical leadership are becoming less relevant.

 

The Academy focuses on new types of leadership training and its goal is to make better leaders out of all officers who pass through the program. This is accomplished by recruiting a diverse field of qualified students who will get the most out of the program, as well a providing the right environment to nurture their growth. The subjects learn from each other as well as their instructors and this is a reflection of the high calibre of the recruitment field and their ability to change and adapt in an ever changing world.

 

 

Reporting by Shawn Haines, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 17: International Trends and Challenges

 

T. Raja Kumar, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Singapore, Security Challenges Faced By Singapore

Virgil Goaga, Counsellor, Romanian Embassy, The Security Outlook of Romania

Janine Krieber, College Militaire Royale, St Jean, Quebec

 

Panel 17 discussed emerging trends being followed by numerous intelligence and policing bodies around the world, as well as the challenges that are slowing the trends from progressing.

 

T. Raja Kumar of Singapore focused on the lessons learned from the recent terrorist attacks in that country - the recent Bali bombing and the Marriot blast. As Director of the Police Intelligence Department, Kumar is responsible for operations planning, emergency planning, and operations management. Kumar posited that Singapore is likely to be attacked by a terrorist faction because it is a hard target, highly focused on western values, and constantly thwarts the plans of Jemaaih Islamiyah (JI). Kumar insisted that “transformation is imperative” for Singapore, and that a transformation needs to be both mental—in the way society deals with attack—and institutional —the way in which the people and officials in Singapore orientate themselves both to prevent and recover from attack through the use of governmental and police agencies. One step that Singapore is taking to further its own war on terrorism is to align itself more with intelligence and policing agencies worldwide, and to be more collaborative with its newfound allies in the world of intelligence. Kumar is actively involved in furthering the development of the ICA, or Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, as well as the Central Narcotics Bureau, and the Singapore Civil Defence Force and Prisons. In conclusion, Kumar noted the new world of “un-order” emerging both in Singapore, and round the world. To battle this trend directly, Kumar said that “new eyes” are needed to prevent and attack terrorist oppression; this attack and “new eyes” are found in the shift to sensing. Lastly, Kumar summarized the four domains of knowledge response: the complex, or the networked community; the knowable, used by experts; chaos, found in crisis and intervention; and the known, dealt with bureaucratically.

 

Virgil Goaga, from the Romanian Embassy, focused mainly upon the dilemma that security problems are not geographic as they were in the past; security problems are now foreign and domestic. Goaga also noted that Romania faces virtually no risk of formal military attack, only attack from internal sources or terrorist attack. Globalization is effecting Romania; willingness to accept globalization within Romania is essentially split, with half of the population considering globalization to work in the best interests of all, and the other half positing that globalization is of utmost concern and will likely lead to corporate and institutional corruption. Romania’s foreign policies are involved all around the world; Romania is an active country in U.N. negotiations, and as well is constantly deploying its troops wherever and whenever they are needed, such as recently deploying troops to places like Afghanistan and Iraq. In conclusion, he commented on Romania’s ongoing transition from being a leftist state in the last century, to being an active state in current world affairs.

 

Janine Krieber, from the College Militaire Royale in St. Jean, Quebec, whose thoughts and discoveries came from a case study on France, focused mainly upon how security and intelligence practices in Europe are no longer simply concepts—they are a reality. Krieber insisted that France was strongly affected by the tragic events of 9/11; France is similar to the United States in being a democratic, capitalist society, and 9/11 displayed how France could be similarly attacked in the future. Such places that could possibly be a concern for revolt in France are the so-called “no-go-zones” of economic disparity and political radicalism. Krieber continued to describe five new objectives to aid in dealing with problems both internally and externally in France: a new security infrastructure will be introduced, territorial reform within France will be enacted through police forces, there will be a drastic modernization of security forces, there will be a decentralization of groups (the likes of the “no-go-zones”), and there will be a mobilization of public services. One impediment to further developing inter-departmental cooperation in France is found in hostilities between France’s military and police forces. Some of the inter-organizational hostilities stem from a lack of funding in the past, but recently funding has been increased by six-billion Euros over a period of years. Krieber posited that protecting people is not only the prime feature of France’s security but an initiative for the entire world.

 

 

Reporting by Angela Simpson, University of Northern BC

 

Panel 17: International Trends and Challenges.

 

This panel focused on the ways in which three nations (Singapore, Romania, and France) have modified their approaches to security and intelligence in the post-9/11 international atmosphere.  Each recognized that there are a variety of lessons to be learned in terms of national approaches to security and intelligence, and each has been utilizing innovations to develop more integrated security measures.  Each understands that the world today is much more interconnected than in the past, and that the new - and emerging - global reality requires international cooperation, innovation, and the ability to respond to emerging threats with speed. 

 

The Singapore Experience - Raja Kumar

 

9/11 shows us changes in society, the mental parameters, and the realm of possibility.  In the Singapore area the terrorist group JI is a major threat to security, as shown by the Bali and Java bombings as well as other incidents. Singapore is a target because it is considered difficult to penetrate, and is a cosmopolitan region with western and American interests. It would boost moral of JI members if it were hit.  In response to this threat Singapore has had to shift its mental models - threats are no longer perceived as remote - ‘we’ are just as likely a target as ‘they’.  There is a recognition of the connection between crime and terrorism, and therefore an increased need for the involvement of regular police forces.  The strategy? A layered defence plan.  This includes: international intelligence cooperation, more checks (i.e. at ports), mobile x-ray units, increased coastal patrols, a visible police presence, increased border security, increased standards for private security firms, and briefing the public (through a 24hr hotline,  an emergency webpage, handbooks and pamphlets).  Mr. Kumar used the example of Singapore’s approach to the SARS epidemic to illustrate the country’s improved approach to national security.  Broken down into four quadrants, threats are approached in a variety of ways from each realm - the known, normal, complex, and chaotic.  The key? Seeking out patterns and pattern management. Dealing with the SARS threat involved cooperation between medical personal, police forces, military, and international groups; the threat moved through the four quadrants of threat management mentioned above.

 

The Romanian Experience - Virgil Goaga

 

The Romanian territory has a 2000 year history of dealing with a variety of threats - from the Ottomans to the Communists.  Romania has long worked for the defence of common European values (i.e. democracy).  The 21st century is an uncertain era, and there have been many changes in the international realm. Our security threats are no longer dependent solely on geography, though there remains a division between domestic and international threats.  Romania’s strategy includes: ensuring the security of the country, and dealing with non-military type threats (economic, social, and environmental).  Threats are considered diffused, interdependent and multidimensional.  One of the major challenges to Romania has been the transition (in the past decade) to a market economy. There have been high levels of corruption and social instability within the country.  One of the main problems facing Romania is the lack of access to resources.  Today, the focus is on preventing and fighting terrorism and restructuring the intelligence services - both foreign and domestic.  Romania has contributed troops to Afghanistan, Iraq and NATO, and trans-Atlantic ties are considered a key to its security.

 

The France Experience - Janine Krieber

 

Security in Europe is a day to day reality. There are new challenges, new enemies, new approaches and new technologies, all of which change very quickly.  France faces an aggregation of social problems, such as the urban ‘no-go’ zones which face extreme poverty, gang problems, drug trafficking, and Islamic fundamentalist groups.  The situation in these areas has reached a point that is no longer acceptable in the public (or governmental) eye. Therefore France has developed a new strategy to deal with the threat.  In terms of both internal and external threats facing the country France has developed a coordinated, five-fold approach.  The five objectives are: new institutions and security architectures (use of forces and the Department Conference of Security, territorial reform (concerning the ‘no-go’ zones and the police), modernizing information and mobility (i.e. computers in cars), decentralization and unification of the two, previously separate, police forces, and a focus on human rights.  This approach utilizes vertical integration and horizontal cooperation, and has already shown a dramatic improvement in the situation in the ‘no-go’ zones.

 

 

 

 

Reporting by Nathan Nickerson, Dalhousie University

 

Panel 18: Lessons Learned: Conference Wrap-up

 

Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke

 

Dr. Corke noted that the dominant theme at this year’s Conference remained focused on various bureaucratic and intelligence-based responses to 9/11. Many recommendations emerged from discussions with one prominent one, echoed by Dr. Wesley Wark, calling for increased public oversight of intelligence. Most importantly, CASIS provides an annual forum for dialogue and reforms in academic and policy spheres in which students can participate.

 

Dr. Martin Rudner

 

Dr. Rudner stated that there are both positives and negatives that we can take from this Conference. Such positives include the expanded agenda that accommodates changing conceptions of intelligence studies, a familiarization of intelligence studies learning, and that the qualitative and quantitative study of intelligence has increased. However, the entire intelligence community has failed to secure increased funding for students of security and intelligence studies. He noted that a varied representation of disciplines (law, economics, and sociology) also remains limited. But most importantly, there are few young scholars being established in Universities in this area of study. CASIS must do whatever possible to energize the study of intelligence at the university level.

 

Julie Breton, Student Representative

 

This Conference has presented an opportunity for students to experience a diversity of views of intelligence studies emanating from policy-makers and academics, and from national and international levels. Presenting papers and being Rapporteurs has also given us added motivation to continue study in this area.

 

Dr. Reg Whitaker

 

Ideas such as dissolving boundaries and “threats without boarders” were the dominant themes at this year’s Conference according to Reg Whitaker. The growing relationship between Intelligence and information is indicative of the growing complexity of security intelligence studies. Emerging trends are forcing increased ties between agencies and governments and traditionally-conceived of boarders are increasingly being transcended. The bureaucratic and legal disintegration of jurisdictional boarders is a concept that is difficult to fully understand. Illuminating the differences between intelligence and the manner in which it is represented in public discourse, while encouraging, must also be undertaken carefully. Since intelligence requires an air of secrecy, understanding the complexity of our field must be done with the debate over civil liberties continuously being kept in mind. If not, that which our intelligence services are supposed to protect may become endangered.

 

 

Anthony Campbell

 

Inherent in the public perception and discourse of intelligence is, according to Tony Campbell, the manipulation and selective use of information. This causes the public to react with cynicism toward the dissemination of knowledge in general. As Churchill once said, “The truth is so important that sometimes it must be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies to protect it.” This notion fosters cynicism and justifies unethical behaviour. Forums which encourage the debate over aspects of security and intelligence encourage the “objective” search for knowledge. “Truth” is so important that, in actuality, it requires bodyguards of professionals to protect it and it would appear that Mr. Campbell believes that this is a goal CASIS can help society to realize.