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2006 CASIS International Conference, Day 1 Student Reports (October 26)
Editor: Cameron Ortis, University of British Columbia

Conference Opening and President's Welcome

Presenters: Professor Wesley Wark, CASIS President and Munk Centre, University of Toronto
Professor Gerard Hervouet, CASIS Vice-President and Laval University
Rapporteurs: Eva Serhal and Dylan Powers, University of Toronto

Dr. Wark: The record breaking attendance at the 21st annual conference of CASIS underscores a renewed interest in the study of intelligence and security. This attention is largely due to the heightened desire for reform, propelled by the events of 9/11. This conference aims to expand awareness regarding these issues for the 530 participants involved this year. Moreover, this new interest is demonstrated by the increased number of students, a record of 85.

This conference's speakers include a diverse mix of current and veteran practitioners in the intelligence field, leading academics, and members of the media. Dr. Wark thanked the program committee, particularly, the Executive Secretary, Matina Kokkas for organizing the event. He also thanked the various government departments that contributed financial support; notably Tony Campbell for his fundraising efforts.

Dr. Hervouet: Re-iterated Dr. Wark's introduction in French. In addition, he recognized that there is a growing sense of insecurity within Canada, and as a result, we need to develop ways to protect and preserve our values.

Guest of Honour

Presenter: Dave MacKenzie, parliamentary secretary, in lieu of Minister Stockwell Day
Rapporteurs: Brian Neary and Nancy Nguyen, University of Toronto

After his opening remarks praising CASIS, Mackenzie noted that we are a critical juncture: 9/11 + 5 years, echoing the conference's theme. New budgetary initiatives were discussed, including development of a new border strategy, and the arming of Border Guards. Mackenzie reaffirmed the Anti-Terrorism Act as useful legislation, saying it must be "broadly based," and praised the use of public consultation in new security developments.

Mackenzie stated that North America is at the centre of terrorist issues, and that dangers facing Canada "have not diminished." He mentioned terrorist attacks in non-North American countries, and the pre-emptive arrests of terrorist conspirators in June by RCMP and other agencies. Law-enforcement must reflect social values, and individual rights are integrated with law enforcement, Mackenzie said. Openness, transparency and accountability are necessary to protect our "core values," with checks and balances being central to this process. Mackenzie reminded listeners that Canada is a signatory of numerous UN human rights resolutions. Home grown terrorism and new radicalization are rising concerns, as was affirmed by the recent G8 meeting's discussion of these issues; emphasis was placed on the importance of social groups like family and friends to addressing these problems. He finished by praising CASIS's valuable role in assisting the government in protecting cherished Canadian freedoms.

In response to questions, Mackenzie stated that the O'Connor report's recommendations may help "tighten up" procedures, but didn't foresee resultant major policy changes. He also

discussed boarder security timetables, the western hemisphere travel initiative and Canadian foreign intelligence initiatives.

Keynote Speaker

Chair: Gavin Cameron, University of Calgary
Presenter: Professor Bruce Hoffman, Georgetown University
Title: "Al Qaeda in Retreat or on the March? The Challenge of Intelligence on Terrorism"
Rapporteur: Karen Moses and Jessica Horwitz, University of Toronto

Mr. Hoffman first reminded conference participants about the continued vulnerability to terrorist threats, despite the media portrayal of al-Qaeda as broken, beaten and incapable-a belief that has provided a false sense of security. Mr. Hoffman described al-Qaeda as "on the march," with the inspiration and organization function of al-Qaeda relatively intact. He noted that the psychological effects of using exotic/unconventional weapons are well understood by terrorists. Their use is employed not as a tool to produce high mortality rates but serve better as a source of fear and anxiety within society and as a challenge to public confidence in government. A revitalized al-Qaeda exists, and Hoffman warned that threat assessments should not be blinded by wishful thinking and politicization.

There are several examples that may be used to illustrate the continuous threat posed by Al Qaeda. It was originally thought that the group behind the July 2005 London subway bombings was an independent extremist cell, however subsequent evidence shows that the group had strong Al Qaeda connections. The chief organizer of the attacks was found to have visited Pakistani Al Qaeda terrorist camps between November 2004 and February 2005 to receive training. The martyrdom videos of the suicide bombers were released through the Al Qaeda media network. There is also now evidence that Al Qaeda may have been behind the 2004 Madrid metro bombing. Also, in August 2006 a plot linked to Al Qaeda was revealed a plan to detonate explosives aboard several transatlantic airliners. A disquieting aspect particularly of the August plot was that they were not against "soft" targets such as public transit or civilian-populated areas, but against commercial airlines.

Hoffman proposed several changes to improve security assessment and the use of intelligence: reorganization in formulating estimates and improved education of the public and intelligence/security communities. Better security assessments, and therefore, counter-terrorism activity, must start with a bottom-up approach. Local and global capacities are equally important to deal with terrorist threats. Bilateral, multilateral and local efforts must work together in "fusion centres" where information (open sources as well as declassified materials) may be accessible to those who may benefit from its availability. Hoffman noted that effective counter-terrorism depends on active liaising among those involved, and suggested a transnational policing network.

There must be a respect for the academic commitment to think critically, be skeptical, and provide clear, reflective estimates that are not tainted by bureaucratic influence. Hoffman saw this as a potential challenge, referencing specifically the changing nature of al Qaeda. He called for the re-education of the public and championed "proper expectations" for counter-terrorism results, quoting that "we can stop most, but we can't stop all of them". The challenge for counter-terrorism activities is to learn from both successes and the failures. As terrorists evolve, so should the methods and techniques used by counter-terrorism agencies evolve.

While counter-terrorism activities have included the capture and killing of terrorists, Hoffman pointed out that this is not enough. Instead, for Hoffman the intelligence and security community must be aware of the three "Rs" of terrorism: recruitment, regeneration and residence. Breaking the cycle of recruitment is of paramount importance, but should not be directed at current –or even the next- generation of terrorists who are already indoctrinated, but should target the generation beyond them. . Hoffman stated that the enemy's morale and motivations must be understood, and the audience to be won over needs to be identified. Hoffman stated that opportunism has sustained al Qaeda.

Questions from audience:

Question: What are we currently trying to do to eliminate the root causes of terrorist attacks rather than just foiling them?

Answer: The fundamental challenge is not only to be able to capture terrorists, but to break the cycle of the three 'R's: recruitment, regeneration, and residence. In the next five years we should address the strategic threat and identify where terrorists are gaining their traction. Particularly, we should address extremist flows of information and exchange via the internet. This is not currently being done enough.

Question: There is a conception in the public that to have 'effective' counter-terrorism, we must have no terrorism. How should the government proceed to teach the public that this is not necessarily the case?

Answer: The rhetoric of the political realm has undercut education about terrorism. In the United States, there is a false sense of security that is propagated by the belief that 'if we're fighting there, there's no need to fight here.' We must not have unrealistic expectations; another terrorist attack is always inevitable because the problem is dynamic. The government should work with the media to dispel false assumptions, particularly regarding the types of weapons that terrorists use. They are considering unconventional weapons such as "dirty" bombs, even though they are less effective at killing, specifically because they spread panic and fear.

Question: Could you discuss the view of personality and bureaucracy on the assessment of threats?

Answer: Agencies throughout the world are confronted with the issue of rapid expansion of their numbers. The response of the academic community, security, and police forces should be to participate in education. We need the right system to bring people up through the ranks so we have specialized forces working in these areas. There should be a focus on recruitment, as well as the education of current officers.

Question: In today's terrorist world, are we focusing too much on Al Qaeda and ignoring other threats?

Answer: We should not be blind, but we need to face the fact that Al Qaeda is the preeminent threat. There are two reasons for this. First, because of not only Al Qaeda's grandiose ambitions to kill in the thousands, but because of their unprecedented success in the achievement of their goals. Second, because Al Qaeda co-opts the agendas of smaller groups and reorients them to global ambitions. We must have the capabilities to understand all threats; this is one of the greatest challenges in 21st century security.

Question: Are these captures the result of developments in counterintelligence, or of internal collapse within Al Qaeda? Also, is a root cause of terrorism the lack of democracy in developing countries?

Answer: We have been successful in degrading Al Qaeda personnel and senior leadership, but it is a much deeper 'bench' than that. We must breach the cycle of the "three R's". As for root causes, there is no 'one size fits all' solution. One problem is that we buy too much into Al Qaeda's propaganda. Before addressing root causes we must understand our enemy; their motivation, and how they maintain cohesion. We must by using this information exploit internal disputes. There has not been an empirical scientific study done on this.

Question: How can we instruct security officials if the threat is always changing?

Answer: Opportunistic strategies used by terrorists render prediction difficult. Managing the perception of what we do is important. The main Al Qaeda threat has shifted to Europe, not just because of homegrown radicalization but because of subversion. Al Qaeda has built a foundation in Europe to exploit radicalization. The July 7 attacks were the first manifestation of this.

Question: Do you believe that the dialogue about the "axis of evil" leads to alienation in developing countries?

Answer: Words do matter. The real challenge for the future is the youth bulge in developing countries. It is the generation after next that we must focus on.

Question: Do conflicts between police and intelligence agents pose a challenge to bottom-up integration?

Answer: Fusion centres are essential, and funding should be increased. We also need a better system to analyze open source information.

Question: Should we focus less on prevention of terrorism and more on not making more enemies?

Answer: This is easier said than done. The genesis of the terrorist threat goes back centuries. We have simply reached the next extension of its evolution.

Panel 1

Chair: William Elliot, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
Presenters: Dr. Jennifer Sims, Georgetown University
Richard A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School and Judge, US Court of Appeals
Reid Mordon, Reid Morden Associates, for DM Foreign Affairs and former Director CSIS.
Dr. Michael Wesley, Director, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia
Rapporteur: Kyle D'Souza, University of Toronto

Jennifer Sims: Intelligence theory can help us understand the origins of both success and failure of intelligence performance. Intelligence reform is an insider's game, which can only be understood if you know the workings of intelligence from the inside. Intelligence is defined as a collection and analysis of information on behalf on policy makers engaged in various enterprises. National intelligence deals with life and death issues. There are two misconceptions

about intelligence regarding the reliability and the methods employed to gather intelligence. The purpose of intelligence is not to be 100 percent accurate every time but to maintain a "decision advantage" against adversaries. Secondly, intelligence is not about stealing secrets, because this gives too much credit to the adversaries. If we focus on finding out the secrets of our adversaries then we may miss other areas of importance.

Intelligence is a service industry whose job is to feed information to decision makers. Intelligence is not about speaking truth to power because no one has monopoly on truth, but really intelligence and decision making is helping decision makers improve their decision making skills not to make it perfect.

Richard A. Posner: Mr. Posner began by stating that he was appalled at the state of intelligence in the United States. Americans, he claims, are monolingual and not interested in the affairs of other countries. Mr. Posner discussed how the design and cultural flaws of the FBI and CIA are often confused, and moreover discussed the reasons as to why the FBI is not a source for gathering international intelligence. Mr. Posner used an analogy to stress the differences between the FBI and CIA by comparing them to cats and dogs. There is a difference in attitude between the two bureaucracies toward sharing of information.

Reid Morden: Mr. Morden evaluated the performance of the Canadian government in terms of improvements made to intelligence systems post 9/11. Morden argued that Canadians are safer than they were before 9/11, yet also gives the Canadian government a barely passing grade for its efforts to improve security. Yet, Morden was reluctant to call for the government to create a foreign intelligence service. Morden strongly disagrees with the view of Sir Richard Dearlove who has stated that Canada's intelligence agencies "free load" off of other countries intelligence agencies including the United States and the United Kingdom.

Michael Wesley: Dr. Wesley listed seven factors which demonstrate that despite the fact that reform processes are not complete, they are in place.

1.) Transnational threats changed public expectations of government regarding security.
2.) Intelligence now has a front line central role with increased resources and expectations.
3.) Intelligence is becoming an instrument used by government to increase power.
4.) Stakes of intelligence are high.
5.) Governments are just starting to understand delicacy of intelligence. Governments need fearless agencies willing to give them information,
6.) Governments need to realize that resources and structural reforms will not erase tensions surrounding intelligence.
7.) There is a need to re-think where intelligence sits in structure of government.

Questions from audience:

Sir Richard Dearlove wanted to clarify a quote of his used by Reid Mordon in which Dearlove called Canada a net beneficiary of intelligence cooperation with allies. Dearlove argued that this claim was taken out of context.

Answer: Dearlove stated that the reason Canada should create an intelligence service is not because it is freeloading of allies, rather because Canada has it sown foreign policy and identity and as a result enjoys certain advantages that the United States and the United Kingdom do not. Canada occupies a different moral territory and would have unique advantages as a

collector if it sought to develop an intelligence system. Dearlove explained that CSIS is only concerned with domestic security.

Question: What effect does terrorist organizations that are horizontally organized have on their ability to operate?

Answer: Jennifer Sims- We are pushing risk management down because of the question of accountability, and working with what we already have. Terrorist organizations that are organized horizontally operate independently and give them a better position to attack Western Countries.

Question: Every system Reid Morden spoke about included an intelligence system that is close to a political system. How would you go about establishing something with a gap between to two?

Answer: Difficult to establish something at the time with a distinct division between the two. In establishing a system you want a system that is led by people who do not cajole as Canadian leaders have done so to date.

Panel 2

Chair: John Adams, Chief, Communications Security Establishment
Presenters: Mel Cappe, President, Institute for Research on Public Policy
Dr. Paul Heinbecker, Centre of International Governance, University of Waterloo
Rapporteurs: Josh Bowen and Zeeshawn Ali, University of Toronto

Mr. Adams discussed the impact of September 11th on Canada. There have been several significant changes in Canada in the five years since 9/11. For example, Canada now has an official national security policy and anti-terrorism act; neither of these were present prior to 9/11. Also we must recognize that there is a legitimate tradeoff between security and civil liberties but government must possess the tools to combat terrorism in order to be effective. Furthermore we must learn lessons from the past five years including from judicial inquiries into the Arar affair and the Air India bombing. Finally, working with our partners and allies must be an essential part of security in Canada post-9/11.

Mr. Cappe compared security and intelligence practices in Canada and the United Kingdom suggesting Canada can draw ten lessons from the British example. Also, these lessons are simple and straightforward and both countries can learn from these ten fundamental lessons.

1. Intelligence agencies must co-operate and coordinate: In this regard the British system is better in five ways:
    1) The British prime minister takes a great deal of interest in these matters and is very personally involved unlike in Canada.
    2) The Head of the British agencies meet every week which encourages the whole apparatus to mobilize and forces the lover levels of the agency to talk to one another.
    3) The British Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) allows different agencies to be integrated and cede sovereignty to a central authority.
    4) History: the United Kingdom has had a history of dealing with Irish terrorism. Also, SIS became more important as a result of World War II.
    5) The role of national security policy: Up until 9/11 Canada never had one.

6) The police and intelligence interface: MI5 and the metro police work well together; we have a lot to learn from how the special branch works with BSS.

2. Decision makers have to demand intelligence and use it: In UK the prime minister and ministry recognizes that intelligence is important to political action.
3. Optimal amount of oversight: more oversight means more constraint on the actions of agencies which makes it more difficult for international collaboration; the British think we are overly reviewed.
4. Optimal protection of human rights: the British are much more satisfied with a political solution whereas we require legal solutions. They also have a better appreciation of the existential threats to the state.
5. Being prepared and planning for resilience: the British are well prepared and practice what needs to be done in case of an attack.
6. Demand international collaboration: there were things in the JIC that were being scheduled that Canada would not be invited to because we did not participate in Iraq; we should never forget the importance of defence intelligence
7. Collect and analyse foreign intelligence: the British do it with a separate agency and Canada must do more but not with a separate agency.
8. Develop public knowledge and understanding: the Canadian public doesn't know Canada don't know what CSE is while British public is more prepared.
9. Reach out: We do it better than the British but we must do more.
10. Provide resources: This is a crucial concern and cannot be solved by simply throwing money at the problem.

Paul Heinbecker, a former ambassador and current professor at the Centre for International Governance Innovation at the University of Waterloo, spoke on his experiences as a "consumer of intelligence" throughout his career. Ambassador Heinbecker presented what he saw as the two key issues in the debate on cooperation: tactical reasons for cooperation and strategic reasons to avoid it. Reflecting on his career in Foreign Affairs, the ambassador recalled that he "didn't look at intelligence when advising people" as he felt he could still give sound advice without consulting intelligence reports.

Ambassador Heinbecker posed a rhetorical question concerning the establishment of a Canadian foreign intelligence service in the vein of MI-6 stating that it would be expensive, however, it would result in the ability to make decisions based on independently collected intelligence rather than on that collected by Canada's allies. Ambassador Heinbecker stated that he "remained a skeptic" of the intelligence apparatus and its role in the political decision making process.

Mr. Heinbecker proposed that there is a strategic versus tactical question that must be answered in terms of how intelligence is being used. For example, there has been considerable exaggeration of the importance of intelligence and various misuses of it; Iraq serves as a case in point. Also, this highlights the politicization of intelligence and the dangers of 'cherry-picking' and fixing intelligence to fit the policy. Furthermore, cooperation with our allies comes at a cost because we feel like we have something to give; we start to become susceptible to suggestion about certain matters. Nevertheless, strategic cooperation with our allies is necessary; they have more experience, more money, better people, and generally perform better than we do here in Canada. However, we must recognize that those countries we work with on these things have the lowest standing in the world and we should ask ourselves if it is in our interest to work with these countries.

Questions from audience:

Question to Mr.Heinbecker from Professor Wesley Wark: Is there a contradiction your views on the need to get away from our dependency and his skepticism about not believing in intelligence?

Answer: Mr. Heinbecker agrees that there is a contradiction but this is because he is a skeptic and would be less skeptical if we could do this and it would be effective and independent, however, it is likely that we still remain dependent.

Question to Mr. Heinbecker: If we weren't prepared to spend the billions of dollars on technical collection then what are we going to do to get all the required information we need in order to have independent assessment capabilities to allow policy makers to make a decision?

Answer: Mr. Heinbecker argues that we've never been richer than we are now and are better able to afford an intelligence capacity, foreign policy, and military capability.

Question to both panelists: what is your view on Canada's diplomatic reporting, its breadth, and impact on policy?

Answer: Mr. Heinbecker notes that there have been cutbacks which have hurt. We can do it but we are not putting the resources where they need to be, we have fewer people abroad than we need to have. Mr. Cappe agrees with Mr. Heinbecker and believes that there is a search for what is value-added. There are a number of people who added their own analysis to their reporting. We need to set a different standard; the training of diplomats is a different issue, the amount of paper generated is breathtaking and not helpful.

Distinguished Lecture

Chair: Margaret Purdy, Resident Scholar, University of British Columbia
Presenter: Richard Clarke, former Special Assistant to the President on global affairs, former national coordinator for security and counterterrorism, and former Special Advisor to the President for cybersecurity.

Rapporteurs: Nicholas Deshpande, Royal Military College

The overarching theme of Mr. Clarke's speech was the existence of the decline of public confidence in intelligence agencies in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. This is apparent in media and popular culture. He stated that this has resulted in a crisis caused by a number of factors that needs to be addressed in a number of ways.

Overall, the lack of public trust has resulted from the global war on terrorism and actions undertaken by the intelligence community to conduct counter-terrorist operations. Specifically, the failure to penetrate al Qaeda, the failure to capture or kill senior leadership members of al Qaeda, and unprofessional handling of intelligence (especially that concerned with the Iraq War) have contributed to this crisis of public confidence. These failures coupled with the exposure of torture programs and domestic surveillance operations have only served to exacerbate this problem, in his opinion.

He prescribes five solutions. First, ensure that the heads of intelligence agencies are not political appointees and that they serve for a fixed period. Second, the intelligence community must adopt a code of conduct and ethics. Third, increased legislative and executive oversight. Fourth, the modernization of surveillance laws, finally, develop standards for the analysis of information and the training analysts that reinforces quality over quantity.

He explained that without the application of these changes, the intelligence communities in the Western world face a serious problem with long-term ramifications.

Questions from audience:

Question: What qualities does UBL possess that has allowed him to avoid detection?

Answer: His ability to escape detection and arrest is because of support from people who live around him. They see him as a quasi-religious figure who is doing the right thing and he has financial clout; the people around him do not see UBL as a terrorist or criminal. People like him – even love him – that's what we do not understand. He possesses great political skills and understanding of how to promote ideologies. He is an ideological hero dead or alive.

Question: With the reorganization of intelligence community in the US and the addition of the DHL and the DNI, do you think recent reforms in the US Intelligence Community are positive and sufficient?

Answer: Neither of the organizations has had a significant impact and they have drawn a great deal of resources. A public confidence problem demands action. It requires reform, but not necessarily reorganization.

Question: What is the impact of the positions taken by top legal academics on the intelligence community? And especially regarding torture?

Answer: Not a significant one. This parsing and technicalities in legal terms is hurtful and unproductive. There should be blanket policies.

End of Day One

2006 CASIS International Conference, Day 2 Student Reports (October 27)
Editor: Cameron Ortis, University of British Columbia

Keynote Address

Chair: Ward Elcock, Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence
Presenter: Sir Richard Dearlove, Master, Pembroke College, Cambridge, and former Chief. British Secret Intelligence Service, 1999-2004.
Rapporteurs: Ardiana Mustafa and Christina Smit, Ryerson University

The main question that Sir Richard Dearlove raised was how 9/11 has impacted the characteristics of intelligence and security issues. The intelligence world is microcosmic – it is very difficult to extrapolate from large scale trends. Intelligence agencies hold the belief that nothing preceded 9/11, but it is important to look at the historical background of intelligence agencies. There are four distinct historical influences that led to the change and development within British agencies. First: the rise and defeat of the German Reich; second: the rise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War; third: the postcolonial issues that arose after World War II; and lastly the rise of new threats. One important methodology to replace the redundant model within intelligence agencies is the ability to coordinate and integrate terrorist activities among different governments. September 11 has redefined national security and the driving change within intelligence agencies after this event is the difference between the organization and the network, and the difference between a sect and a movement.

The operational success against Al Qaeda was two edged in consequences: it meant a loss of infrastructure for Al Qaeda and the dispersion of their organization. This tactical success has brought with difficulties as it has become more complex to confront the organization. However, there have been no terrorist attacks that have matched 9/11 and this has been the success of intelligence. A consequence of this is that there has been a shift away from the importance of human sources and the effective use of them.

The access to terrorist movements is transient, thus quick action is required to successfully act on the information gained from these sources. Thus, investing too many resources into human sources can be wasteful because of its small return. It has also become difficult to recruit human sources when driven of the moral high ground.

The strength of terrorists is their ability to adapt to the global community. Thus, the ability to collect intelligence is crucial and this demands large human resources and bigger and better international organization. In order to achieve an effective synthesis of human technology, the role and position of government needs to be linked to the international community. It requires a complete joint departmental relationship and close cooperation with other nations, especially Middle Eastern nations because of their closer origin to the problem. Managing these relationships would require a lot of human resources. The strength of these personal relationships plays a crucial role in the success of counter terrorism.

Sir Richard Dearlove found it surprising that Canada does not have a proper intelligence service as CSIS does not have the capacity to operate off shore. This creation would contribute to Canada's national security and the international security in large. Furthermore, it is important that there is a consensus and will to pursue this project over a long period of time. Thus, the role of the security agency will be larger within the global community.

Question: What specific function do British intelligence with regards to Syria have that Canada does not have?

Answer: It may be necessary to develop counter terrorist relationships and adversarial relationships with other states.

Question: Counter-terrorism might not be an effective way to battle terrorism. How do we avoid counter-terrorism to loose its references and funding?

Answer: We need to think about the strategic progress. The government's failure is their inability to think long term about counter-terrorism.

Question: Can you reflect on the UK's position to do intelligence work?

Answer: There has been a revision of the law in the UK and a modernization of legislation which has caused a big debate. Furthermore, the sophistication of techniques is growing.

Question: Do you see any big changes on "these" fronts?

Answer: No, internal, external, and technical there are no benefits from the common recruitment of all three services. By keeping agencies separate, the recruitment is separated as well. There should be a minister responsible for the agencies as well in the cabinet.

Question: Is an increase of investigative power going to reduce the Western moral high ground?

Answer: There is a huge debate about the need of individual liberty. I don't think it's a worry when thoroughly regulated and legislated.

Question: What about the education of future generations in the complex environment of intelligence and the internal training within agencies?

Answer: The training of intelligence is done internally by the agencies. Interdepartmental training is happening but more could be done. There is the need to build understanding and trust within the various departments.

Special Address

Chair: Bob Gordon, Associate Chief, Communications Security Establishment
Presenter: Ambassador Henry Crumpton, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, United States Department of State
Rapporteurs: Ted Thomas, University of Toronto
Adam Marcotte, University of Windsor

Ambassador Crumpton began his presentation with a rebuttal to comments made by Richard Clarke the previous evening. Disagreeing as to the existence of a crisis in confidence in American intelligence, Crumpton pointed to application rates to the CIA, as well as the budget of that organization, as indicative of ongoing confidence in the intelligence services. If such a crisis existed, one would be better to look to the 1990s, when budgets were cut, and indeed when there was even serious discussion about eliminating the CIA altogether.

Ambassador Crumpton argued that an enormous global change has been taking place, with an accompanying cognitive dissonance that has led to a disconnect between the intelligence services and policy making. In 1989 and again in 2001, thresholds were crossed, which has led to a new era of conflict. Mirroring the processes of globalization, this new conflict has three salient features: a global battlefield, micro-sized enemies, capable of delivering a global impact. This new form of conflict presents a number of challenges, including:

- How to find these small actors in a global size network (the needle-in-a-haystack effect)?
- How to engage these actors once found?
- How to collect domestic information and intelligence toward this overall search?
- How to use old tools in this new war?
- Whether to be defensive or offensive in this new war?
- Questions of morality – who are 'we' in this new global environment? How should we reconcile our values with our perceived need to act?

Moreover, the new forces presenting themselves as actors operate in a variety of ways, ranging from denial and deception, to subversion, terrorism, and outright open warfare (as we see in Iraq). The best strategy for dealing with this is borrowed from doctrines of counter-insurgency, which suggest three principles sources or targets upon which our response needs to be directed: enemy leadership (which one aims to nullify), enemy safe havens (which one aims to deny the enemy), and those local conditions which the enemy exploits to draw political, economic, and societal support (which one aims to replace with positive conditions).

The tools to address these strategic targets include traditional means – diplomacy, military strength, rule of law, covert action, economic power, etc. – as well as new non-traditional means, such as the exertion of influence through MNCs and NGOs. These tools should be used with regard to seven virtues: strength, speed, agility, precision, stealth/surprise, stamina, and virtue (with virtue being the most important). To this end, intelligence provides an important link in the formation of appropriate policy, as it allows us to understand how to select/blend/apply these instruments of statecraft, against whom, and when and where. The important interplay between intelligence and policy can have important impacts in the social and political spheres. It helps leaders to know who can be trusted to work with and where strong networks can be formed to deal with conflict. The future of war is going to be in the building of trusted networks to take on the threats of asymmetric warfare. The resolution of conflict must be based on leadership and on the creation of prosperity and security.

Ultimately, the future of this new war rests on the fostering and sustaining of trusted networks across the changed landscape. Whereas in the Cold War we knew a world defined in terms of mutually assured destruction, we are increasingly facing a world that can and will be defined in terms of 'mutually assured prosperity', built necessarily upon strong and well-informed leadership.

Question and answer period:

Question: Have we failed in Afghanistan?

Answer: No. The window may be closing, but opportunity still exists. Success will depend on addressing the three strategic targets using the instruments and means discussed above.

Question: Your view of WMD capabilities of terrorists?

Answer: Not very advanced, however the intent to acquire and use these weapons by terrorist groups is clear and obvious. Disturbingly, it is only a matter of time, and we must be prepared for this eventual reality. In recognising this, we have a very long way to go before we will be capable of responding to the complexities of, for example, a bio-terror attack.

Panel 3 – The Knowledge Business: Training and Education for National Security

Chair: Mel Cappe, President, Institute for Policy Research
Presenters: William Nolte, Chancellor of the National Security University System, University of Maryland
Mark Lowenthal, President of the Intelligence and Security Academy, Washington DC, and former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, 2002-2005
Monik Beauregard, Privy Council Office, International Assessment Staff
Robert Heibel, Executive Director, Institute for Intelligence Studies, Mercyhurst College
Rapporteur: Sophia Ivonne Nadvornianski and Alexandra Bell, Ryerson University

William Nolte's talk on training and education focused on debunking the mythology of secrecy often connected with the field of intelligence and security. In order to achieve this, it is the belief that there needs to be an integration of both 'on the job' and 'in the class' training; consequently producing well rounded analysts in the field. By examining the systems of our allies, such as England, we can pick up on codes of conduct and ethics that can be applied to a Canadian or American education system, as well as explore the question of a decentralization of administration from the educators.

Through focusing on training, education, and research, both junior and senior professionals in the field will become further adapted to handle the increasing intelligence demands of today's world. Through the integration of community in the classroom, cross training and homogenization will occur; thus bettering the system of education in place. In closing, by re-establishing the ruptured union between academia and intelligence, the well rounded products of this proposed system will help to further remove the mythological and secretive bulwark currently surrounding the field of intelligence and security in the public eye.

Mark Lowenthal presentation argued that we are currently experiencing an influx of new professionals in the field of intelligence analysts. With this opportunity we can produce efficient and skilled professionals by training and developing skills in research, analysis/synthesis of information, writing, preparing briefs, and negotiation. Current demands require well educated individuals, as opposed to the 'out of the box' thinkers that marked the desired skills of intelligence recruits in the past. No longer should this field be viewed as a trade, and therefore new professional standards must be set. By using models of both the business and medical world, intelligence studies must reassess their current systems to produce top results. By doing this we will be able to work with the multitude of opportunities currently being presented to this field.

In Monik Beauregard's talk she broke down the problems of training and development into an exploration of the 'five W's'; then explored the ways in which we can meet the demands of the field. In examining why we need to reform the training and development system currently in place in Canada, the answer is quite clear. The analysts need more training, they are asking for it, and it is essential to remain up to the standards set but our allies. By teaching the fundamentals both to junior and senior analysts we will remove the risk of under-training our professionals, and consequently remain up to par with other nations. But the analysts are not the only ones who require this training, so who else does? In addition, it is currently believed that the managers of the analysts need training in order to better understand the career demands of their staff. As well, it is equally important to provide training to the customers of intelligence services and products in order to provide understanding across all levels of intelligence and security. This can be achieved through an integrated program that applies to everyone, then following the general program with training that is specific to internal departments. Lastly, training and development must begin in the world of academia, creating

well-rounded youth who will be able to fill the new opportunities in the coming years. By preventing group think and encouraging development of communication and analysis, the education of our intelligence professionals can meet the standards set by our allies. Encouraging the development of research skills, the professionals will be able to critically evaluate the credibility and reliability of sources, ensuring productive communication across all levels.

These demands are currently being achieved through the Intelligence Learning Program, or ILP. By standardizing an entry level course, all analysts are being given the same education and testing in order to attain an educational standard for all staff. In addition to the entry level course, additional training is being provided for senior analysts and specific departments. ILP also offers one day seminars for management, seeking to fulfill the demands in the field. Unfortunately, ILP has yet to create standard training for the consumer component of the equation, but is making efforts to do so. By having these courses and seminars, ILP is serving the community through allowing a culture exchange, harmonizing analytical practice, allowing departments to focus on their own needs, and building bridges with academia. However, like any system, ILP is facing some challenges. The two main obstacles currently being presented are the standardization of evaluation and ensuring proper resources and commitment from other organizations and the government. The impetus is present within the intelligence field, but developing an excellent standard of training will only occur completely with outside help.

Understanding the same demands addressed by the other panelists, Robert Heibel focused his presentation on the role of academia in training the future professionals in the field of intelligence and security. It was noted that last year in the United States out of the 1.4 million grads nationwide, less then 100 graduated in the field of intelligence. These are striking numbers and illustrate the demand for more education within the field. By using his own development of a program at the Mercyhurst College in Pennsylvania as a case study, Heibel offered suggestions on how to increase the number of students interested in studying intelligence. The demand for trained professionals was noted by both academics and the government, including the FBI, and the program started in the early 1990s as a result.

With a focus on the liberal arts, as well as the development of critical thinking and statistical analysis skills the program continued to grow. In 1995 a master's degree opened in conjunction with the undergrad program and since then Mercyhurst college has continued to stand as a foundation for other institutions to develop similar programs. In 2005, funding from the federal government was used to construct a centre for intelligence studies at the school, and currently businesses are using the facilities to further educate their analysts. The success of this program is demonstrated by the high employment rates for the graduates as well as the rounded individuals being produced. It is believed that in the future development of distance learning and construction of a research institute would only serve to better the marriage between academia and intelligence services.

Question and Answer Period

Question: Who is being asked to set the standards, the academics or the military?

Answer: A collective approach is needed, taking skills and programs from both areas.

Question: Is existing training going to be used in the new programs?

Answer: By examining gaps and what works, the systems in place will only serve to better the development of new training initiatives.

Question: What pillar is the focus, the analysts, the management, or academia?

Answer: Currently the majority of training in Canada is being provided to the analysts.

Question: How are you planning on instituting sanctions to evaluate the individuals who are taking the training?

Answer: This is still an ongoing discussion, that has no definitive answer as of yet. Some officials are pushing for certification, while others do not support this. The question that presents itself is what to do if an existing analyst fails the training. Without a defined standard, current practices within the ILP turn the decision onto the management of the organizations. As more people are being recruited this problem will only grow and that is why there is currently much discussion over how to standardize evaluation practices.

Panel 4 - L'Union Européenne et la lutte contre le terrorisme

Ce panel a été présidé par Gérard Hervouet, vice-président du CASIS
Presenters: M Gilles de Kerchove, Directeur, Securite Interieure et Justice Penale et Secretariat general du Conseil de l'UE
Olivier Delas, Universite Laval
Delphine Nakache, Universite de Montreal
Rapporteur: Oana Tranca, Laval University

M. Gilles de Kerchove commence sa présentation par deux remarques préliminaires. L'Union européenne n'est pas encore une fédération, les instruments de lutte contre le terrorisme se trouvent encore entre les mains de l'État. Le rôle de l'Union européenne est donc d'appuyer les États et d'offrir des standards communs en matière de normes de lutte anti-terrorisme. Les attentats de Madrid ont eu comme conséquence une réévaluation des politiques de lutte contre le terrorisme dans les pays membres.
Même si l'Union n'a pas un rôle direct dans l'élaboration des politiques nationale dans ce domaine, elle devient de plus en plus active par rapport aux pays tiers, par exemple en ce qui concerne les accords d'extradition avec les États-Unis ou le partage d'expertise avec certain pays musulmans concernant les mesures anti-terroristes.
La deuxième remarque préliminaire concerne la mise en place d'un espace juridique et pénal européen, basée sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions juridiques et la disponibilité des informations juridiques et policières entre les États membres, une entreprise qui n'est pas encore achevée.
La stratégie de l'Union européenne est basée sur deux éléments fondamentaux : privilégier l'approche policière et le multilatéralisme.
Quatre grandes questions caractérisent aujourd'hui la politique de l'UE en matière de lutte anti-terroriste : la prévention, la protection, la poursuite et la réaction.
La prévention concerne principalement la lutte contre la radicalisation et le recrutement des personnes impliquées dans des activités terroristes. La collaboration en matière de poursuite judiciaire devrait être facilitée par le partage d'informations entre les pays membres, notamment par la mise en place d'une législation promouvant l'échange entre les forces policières, les organes de renseignement et les instances judiciaires. En conclusion, l'Union européenne a réussi à avancer beaucoup dans le domaine de la lutte contre le terrorisme, mais cela reste quand même en deçà des attentes des citoyens. L'Union européenne devra aussi trouver le

juste milieu entre la liberté et la sécurité des citoyens. L'amélioration des activités de police et justice en matière de lutte anti-terroriste devra être accompagnée par la mise en place de mesures compensatoires qui assurent le respect des droits de la personne.

Olivier Delas : L'Union européenne offre une bonne protection en matière des droits de la personne, mais il y a encore de déficiences. L'Union européenne constitue un modèle de coopération qui dépasse le niveau intergouvernemental, fondé sur les valeurs démocratiques et la protection des droits de la personne. L'Union européenne et les États membres adhèrent à un corpus juridique destiné à protéger ces droits. A l'intérieur de l'Union, la Cour européenne de justice a établi les principes généraux protégeant les droits de la personne et chaque État membre est partie à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme.
L'Europe a une histoire de lutte contre le terrorisme qui date d'avant le 11 septembre et a constamment essayé de concilier celle-ci avec la protection des droits fondamentaux. Ces droits ne devraient pas considérés juste comme une entrave dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, ils sont en effet une condition nécessaire pour la coopération entre États en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme.
Limiter les droits de la personne au nom de la sécurité est dangereux parce qu'on peut ainsi aliéner certaines communautés qui ont un rôle essentiel dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
Les droits de la personne imposent en fait la lutte contre le terrorisme et selon la juridiction européenne, les États ont l'obligation de poser des gestes et des mesures pratiques dans ce domaine.
Des droits immuables, comme le droit à la vie, la protection contre la torture ou le renvoi vers les pays qui pratiquent la torture et les traitements inhumains ne peuvent pas être enfreints pour des raisons de sécurité. Il y a toutefois une série des droits qui peuvent être nuancés pour des raisons d'ordre public.
Une stratégie plus proactive de l'Union européenne en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme risque également de provoquer l'ingérence dans la vie privée, notamment par les mesures de surveillance, le traitement des données personnelles, le droit à un procès équitable.
Il y a également un problème systémique dans l'Union européenne à cause des décisions qui sont prises dans le cadre des piliers différents (qui ont chacun des procédures, des juridictions et des méthodes de prise de décision différentes). Un autre frein essentiel est le blocage de la Constitution, un domaine qui devrait être placé dans le cadre du pilier communautaire. Il est donc essentiel que l'Union européenne ne reste entre "deux eaux", une protection accrue des droits de l'homme nécessite plus d'intégration que moins.

Delphine Nakache : Après le 11 septembre, la lutte contre le terrorisme a souvent été entreprise par l'intermédiaire d'un renforcement des lois de l'immigration (la criminalisation des lois sur l'immigration). Ainsi, on a pu se prévaloir des ce type de réglementations pour renvoyer des personne soupçonnées d'activités terroristes dans leur pays d'origine. Toutefois cette stratégie n'assure pas nécessairement une amélioration de la sécurité interne. "Renvoyer les terroristes chez eux n'avance pas la lutte contre le terrorisme".
En effet, nous avons besoin d'une conciliation des droits de la personne et des besoins de sécurité, sans toutefois limiter les droits des étrangers qui se trouvent sur le territoire d'un État démocratique. Les mêmes garanties en matière de protection des droits fondamentaux devraient s'appliquer aux citoyens tout comme aux non citoyens.
Les lois anti-terrorisme ont ainsi modifié les lois de l'immigration sous deux aspects : une non éligibilité accrue des éventuels immigrants et réfugiés et la détention à long terme des personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme. Étant donné la complexité d'une investigation anti-terroriste, il est devenu plus facile de détenir une personne pour des motifs d'immigration en attendant que l'enquête soit achevée. Souvent, à la suite des telles enquêtes, les accusations ne sont jamais formulées.

En conclusion, il faut affirmer le droit de non refoulement des étrangers vers des pays pratiquant la torture comme un droit fondamental. Les assurances diplomatiques que certains États démocratiques exigent des pays vers lesquels ils renvoient des immigrants illégaux, n'offrent aucune garantie quant à leur protection contre la torture et les traitements inhumains. Il serait plus utile de poursuivre les personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme dans les instances des pays où ils se trouvent et il ne faut pas hésiter à appliquer les mêmes garanties en matière de protection des droits de la personne pour les étrangers tout comme pour les citoyens.

The John Tait Memorial Lecture

Chair: Tony Campbell, past president, CASIS
Presenter: Jim Judd, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Rapporteurs: Steven Masson and Nathan Klassen, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Carleton University)

Introduction:
The John Tait Memorial lecture is dedicated to the memory of John Tait, who was a model career public servant with a passion for bridging the gap between government public servants and academia. CASIS reflects this bridge.

Jim Judd took up the job of director of CSIS following a thirty three year public service career that included fifteen assignments spread over seven federal departments and agencies. This reflects the importance that is being placed on appointing security and intelligence directors who have significant background across government.

Tait Memorial Lecture:
Five years after September 11, there has been a proliferation of research on the lessons and failures of the security and intelligence community leading up to and immediately preceding 9/11. Director Judd preferred to concentrate in this lecture on current and future threats facing the security and intelligence community today. His presentation had four main points: (1) the threat of terrorism today, (2) current priorities in security and intelligence, (3) technological challenges, (4) Director Judd's personal observations on changes that will be required in the future

1. Threat of Terrorism Today

Today most intelligence agencies are focused on the threat of terrorism and on the ideology of Al Qaeda, the threat posed by its affiliates around the world, or groups loosely affiliated but more inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda. This threat has been around for fifteen years and reached its zenith on 9/11. This threat today is defined by: (a) an ideology global in scope and adhered to by citizens of many countries; (b) revolutions in global transportation, which have allowed terrorist organizations to become a literal "United Nations terrorist movement"; (c) terrorist groups have proven technologically adept and imaginative; (d) terrorist leaders have shown political adroitness, for example the Madrid train bombings in Spain were timed to coincide with the Spanish elections; (e) Al Qaeda has shown itself to be a remarkable marketing organization, taking advantage of the Internet and international media to further their goals.

These challenges on their own are daunting enough for security and intelligence services. In addition, there is also the challenge that Al Qaeda ideology is attracting citizens and long term residents of western democracies including Canada. This is problematic because radicalization is not yet fully understood by intelligence services. Furthermore, when Al Qaeda's central leadership is combined with increasing radicalization, the results could be ferocious.

Combating foreign terrorists is one thing, but it is even more challenging when terrorist threats are carried out by your own citizens.

2 Priorities

In the past decade or so, most western intelligence agencies have shifted their attention and resources to the contemporary threat of terrorism. Security and Intelligence institutions in the past decade had spent most of their time in retrenchment, reaping the peace dividend that came at the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, security threats other than terrorism remain. This was recently demonstrated by North Koreas' detonation of a nuclear device. The leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq has re-iterated the call to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The Director of the IAEA also estimated that as many as 30 countries could develop nuclear weapons in the next several decades. Thus, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a critical concern for intelligence services.

Some examples of other threats that Canada still faces in addition to Terrorism include; (a) Foreign espionage, which is becoming more effective with the application of new technologies; (b) Foreign involvement in domestic affairs is becoming a new threat in large immigrant communities; (c) security of computer systems is also in doubt; (d) finally the threat of organized crime remains. In fact, two years ago, the editor of Foreign Policy wrote about international organized crime estimating that this industry has revenues at about 10% of world GDP. The large economic effect of these activities has been corrupting public institutions and some governments around the world.

3. Technological Challenges

There are a range of electronic issues that pose many dilemmas for those in the security business. Evolution in telecommunication industry has undermined the ability of intelligence agencies to maintain effective court warranted interception capacities. Intelligence services are increasingly facing the threat of going both deaf and blind as telecommunications evolve faster than their capabilities. For example, encryption technologies, password protected web sites, and chat rooms are making communication intercepts very problematic.

The use of the internet has assumed enormous importance, especially in terrorist activities. In some ways, the internet has become a terrorist university, obviating the need for terrorists to travel to conflict zones for on the job training. You can find recipes for explosives, detailed instructions on how to deal with being arrested, and detained, and the equivalent of internet based dead drops. The internet is also becoming a vehicle for promoting radicalization, allowing Al Qaeda to spread its ideology. All of these challenges will be exacerbated in the future as the world moves more towards wireless internet, and voice over internet protocol.

Finally, it is not uncommon to find individuals using multiple identities to traverse the globe unsuspected. It is an open question whether biometric technologies will help solve this problem.

4. Challenges in the Future

Intelligence services are often asking whether they are replicating the mistakes of the military, which organize themselves to 'fight the last war.' The intelligence services really worry about what they know, and worry even more about what they don't know. This raises the question of whether intelligence services have an adequate level of imagination to anticipate future threats. Security and intelligence domains cannot be static. CSIS has been an innovative organization in the past and recognizes ongoing need to adjust to the new demands and realities in the world.

Director Judd identified five areas where CSIS has to adapt or accelerate changes already launched:

1. The need to strengthen capacity of CSIS to operate outside of Canada in support of its national security mandate. It needs to strengthen information sharing with partners. While CSIS has had personnel operating abroad for some time, it further needs to expand its' capacity to operate outside Canada. Recently, it found itself in new enterprises such as evacuating Canadian citizens from Lebanon, managing Canadian hostage-takings in Iraq and supporting Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
2. The need for CSIS to address its substantial human resource issues in the coming years. Baby boomers are retiring and a mechanism must be found to transfer their cumulative knowledge to younger staff. There is also growing demand for new talent in areas such as information technology and metadata analysis.
3. CSIS needs to improve its ability to better communicate with the public and with its various stakeholders. It also must do a better job in reaching out to the communities most impacted by security threats, as CSIS cannot afford to have these communities feel isolated.
4. CSIS needs to do a better job of engaging expertise outside of CSIS to overcome group think and augment its analytical capability. Furthermore, this outreach should recognize the value and utility of open source information.
5. CSIS needs to expand on its partnerships with both provincial government agencies and foreign partners. CSIS needs better collaborative mechanisms to better leverage resources from the broader national security community in Ottawa and throughout the country, as CSIS does not have a monopoly on national security in Canada.

Director Judd hopes that this lecture will reflect some of the preoccupations that CSIS is concerned with today.

Panel 5 – The Afghanistan Challenge

Chair: David Charters, University of New Brunswick
Presenters: Larry Goodson, US Army War College
Mark Sedra, Bonn Centre for Conversion
Lee Windsor, University of Bew Brunswick
Rapporteurs: Anthony Ippolito and Nicholas Stewart, Carleton University

To understand the Taliban, we must understand their rise to power and the history of Afghanistan. The balance between urban vs. rural, and between different ethnic and regional cleavages was destroyed during the war against the Soviet Union and it is very difficult to regain this balance for 5 reasons.

1. Deep cleavage
2. Islamic blending with custom
3. 'Kam' identity emphasizing local superiority
4. Rugged terrain and geographic isolation combined with collapsed economic development.
5. Violent history of Afghanistan and the legacy of being a 'buffer state'

The depth of the destruction from the war with the Soviet Union left no prewar physical entity untouched. Institutions were fundamentally altered, infrastructure was destroyed and landmines remained littered across the countryside. The Mujahadeen and Taliban became the new elites backed by a large supply of high-tech weaponry and an economy based on the opium trade. The concept of modernity was represented by the defeated Communists. National resistance became national liberation which again transformed into Jihad. Moderate leaders were not welcome in this Jihadist movement. Resurgence of Islamism flourished throughout the Islamist world during the 1990s. By now, people throughout the Islamic world flooded into Pakistan to

participate in training camps, preparing them to fight the Soviets. The US backed these groups despite their ideology which was contrary to American values. These groups eventually turned on the West.

Now Afghanistan is crucial to the surrounding region for 4 main reasons:
1. Ethnic identity groups straddle Afghanistan's borders with neighboring states. Instability within Afghanistan can easily spill across these borders.
2. Islamists are increasingly gaining political legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.
3. Economic inter-connection is increasing in the region. This trend exists in legal and illicit trade.
4. The post Cold War power vacuum in the region led to meddling of Afghani affairs by most of its border states.

Three vehicles for opposition to the Karzai government have emerged: the Taliban, al Qaeda, and HIG. The movements are all distinct of one another, but have several shared views. All oppose the Karzai regime and the presence of the US in Afghanistan as illegitimate. Violence to the government and the US is seen as a legitimate option. Sanctuary and support is provided to all three groups in Pakistan.

Following the fall of the Taliban, the rank and file of the organization went home or fled to Pakistan. Electoral success for religious groups followed in Pakistan. Anti-Americanism grew in the region as US actions and words against Islam inspired a new generation of Jihadists. The opium trade was jumpstarted as a result of a failure to make economic gain and warlords were re-empowered by the US-led coalition. The Taliban today is what it was in 1994: an opposition movement to a corrupt government, viewed as legitimate by some people in not only Afghanistan but Pakistan as well. People in the area believe a civilization war with the west is thought to be possible.

Mark Sedra –'Understanding the Mission: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)'

Non-state actors count on the consent of locals for power. Denying this consent is the key to defeating these actors. Civilian and military organizations are co-operating like never before as security and stability cannot be achieved by military force alone. PRTs are a product of this environment. They have a mixed record of achievement.

There are 24 PRTs in Afghanistan being operated by different countries. Ninety to 95 percent of the personnel is military, but they have a limited military capacity. The PRT is an American idea which was later adopted by NATO, which viewed it as a cheaper alternative to a larger deployment of NATO forces. There are the goals for PRTs.
- Extend the authority of the government.
- Support Security Sector Reform (SSR).
- Reinforce national development priorities.
- Enable unity of civilian actors.
- Demonstrate a commitment from the international community to Afghanistan.

Problems
1. A blurring of civilian and military spheres has made NGOs uncomfortable and some NGOs have withdrawn from Afghanistan
2. PRTs have duplicated work that had previously been done by NGOs. This has distorted the development process.

3. The selection of local partners was often based on power instead of loyalty and intentions.

These fundamental problems have been compounded by several others. Humanitarian projects have been avoided as the focus has been squarely on security. Aid has been ineffectively delivered. Aid has sometimes been tied to intelligence and the cooperation of locals with coalition forces. On the other hand, there is also a tendency of aid to be unconditional.

It is time for PRTs to demand reform in return for assistance. Although PRTs must adapt to local conditions, some standardization is needed.

The Canadian PRT in Kandahar has seen good levels of co-ordination and plans a wide range of projects with a special emphasis on police training. The PRT has been reaching out to formal and informal local leaders. This PRT appears to have learned lessons from other PRTs. However, its impact has been limited due to an evacuation of civilian staff after the death of Gywn Berry and a lack of protection provided to the PRT. It appears that the PRT will soon be given higher levels of protection and we should reserve judgement for now as much is expected in the coming months. More resources must be invested in development and NGOs and international organizations are needed to assist.

Lee Windsor – 'Every Soldier as a Collector: Intelligence Gathering of Stability Operations'

Dr. Windsor offers an historical perspective on intelligence led operations. 'Effects-based' operations require high quality intelligence and quick assessments in order for these precise operations to be conducted successfully. Commanders can use every soldier in their force as human sources of intelligence. This concept is not new for the Canadian military. This has been successfully been employed, dating back to General Currie in 1917. Currie wanted to eat German rifle strength. He wanted to capture a small German position and draw German forces out and fight them on his terms. The aim was not just to repel but to kill the counter-attackers.

It may not be necessary to change the way the Canadian army operates. These old missions are good instruction manuals for current operations in Afghanistan.

Other skills can be used to further the human intelligence value of every soldier. Building relationships with locals has become a strength of Canadian soldiers which has been instilled in the army since peacekeeping operations began in the 1950s. These relationships can be used to obtain information of planned attacks. Company commanders can act on their own intelligence quickly. In Kandahar, the need for human intelligence is greater than in past missions.

The next step in the evolution of the growth of the army's human intelligence capability is to develop an army intelligence staff to deal with information quickly and accurately. Currently, the intelligence component of a brigade has already been expanded three-fold. The manning pool is very limited. Currently, there are only 700 regular and reserve intelligence staff.

The jury is still out on effects-based operations in Afghanistan. Dr. Windsor and Dr. Charters are working with 2 RCR Battle Group which is set to be deployed to Afghanistan in the next rotation. Dr. Windsor will be an 'imbedded historian'. A book will be published shortly after returning from Afghanistan with the aim of informing public debate.

Question and answer period:

Question: With regions like Kandahar slipping away how should missions be redirected? Should the eradication of poppies be continued and are subsidies for wheat farming create a way for farmers to sustain themselves?

Sedra: The eradication of poppies could have a negative effect without providing alternative livelihoods or developing rural infrastructure. These must be part of a wider strategy. The Taliban is currently using poppy eradication as a propaganda tool. The problem is poppy farming is 8-10 times more lucrative than wheat farming and is drought resistant – there currently is a drought. There is a lack of focus on drug traffickers and a multi-faceted strategy is needed.

Question: With the current political economy emerging in Afghanistan, can you talk about corruption?

Goodson: This is a difficult problem that has grown. The national police is very corrupt. Failure must be put at the feet of the US for failing to provide development money early. This allows illicit money an opportunity to be invested and corruption flourishes without a legal economic base.
Sedra: We need judicial reform. This is a big gap in the process that hasn't been looked at. Now they are starting to arrest traffickers but this is just started because there has not been a legal system in place. We also need to remove corrupt figures from the Afghan government. This will not be easy but it can be done and would have a positive effect.

Question: One method of addressing the fighting in Afghanistan is to begin conversations with the Taliban. Would this be helpful?

Goodson: Yes and maybe. Reconciliation with the Taliban would be difficult. Any attempt of reconciliation has been resisted by the Northern Alliance and other minority groups. If the perception in Pakistan is that the Americans have lost in Afghanistan, and there are some reports this is the case, reconciliation will be even more difficult.
Sedra: Minority groups believe there are no moderate Taliban members. In principle, beginning conversations sounds good but you need to consider the dynamics at play.

Question: What are the domestic impediments to the effectiveness of PRTs in the American view?

Sedra: The plan is for PRTs to be established in every province and 10 more PRTs are planned. Tackling insecure areas was the primary focus but now the focus is to serve as a means to establish the government and the presence of the international community.
Goodson: PRTs were conceived as a minor pilot project in the US Defence Department after the failure of the US to move quickly enough out of the gate due to the viewpoint calling for a military solution. Commanders at PRTs were able to make small grants to locals but there the blending of the Afghan government was not much of a priority. Over time this has improved and the PRTs are becoming more sophisticated but they remain very much a work in progress.

Panel 6 – The Challenges and Costs of Prevention

Chair: Paul Heinbecker, Centre for International Governance Innovation, University of Waterloo
Presenters: Frank Harvey, Dalhousie University
Michael Kowalski, Office of the National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, The Netherlands
Rapporteurs: Adrian Morson, University of Ottawa

Introduction: Heinbecker
Addressing terrorism at the United Nations has been a fraught issue. While this can be seen in their inability to come to a consensus definition of terrorism, it has done a good job in terms of legislating against it. Intelligence has also been a difficult issue in that many developing nations are suspicious of the Permanent 5 imposing rules on their use of intelligence when they are breaking internationally held conventions.

Harvey discussed his "Homeland Security Dilemma" which agues that the greater the investment in homeland security that is made by a government, the higher the public expectations for security become making it increasingly impossible for the government to achieve this level, hence actually increasing distrust of the public in the ability of the government to protect them. There was a $58.3 billion increase in expenditures in homeland security post 9/11. If public assessment of government performance on war on terror was based on the amount of investment, you would expect public confidence to be very high. You would also expect the public to assign high level of approval in the prevention of terrorism since there has been no attacks since 9/11 despite many threats and constant calls for attack. But this is not the case.

There has been a consistent decline in approval rating in the Global war on terror. This is based on a number of reasons. First, the more security we have, the more security we feel we need. Second, small failures trump large successes in that failures outweigh successes in their impact on public perception. We judge out security on how many lives lost in an event, not on how many we saved. We in believe failures to failures more than successes – Terror arrests in Toronto were interpreted as a failure of society to integrate minority communities, not a tactical success to stop an attack. Third, has to do with public imagination. Statistics presented to illustrate that American populace is convinced that another attack will occur (60-80% believe it is a serious problem). This is because we tend to overestimate risks and threats for events we can't control and are unfamiliar with while underestimating threats we do have control over. Fourth and finally, has to do with political imaginations. Politicians must portray the image that they are knowledgeable as to what threats are out there. However, political officials are identifying where they think threats are because they are pressured into doing so, so as to prevent themselves from being criticized should an attack happen.

Kowalski asked whether Europe today is the Afghanistan of the past – namely a place where there is a proliferation of fighters and ideas. There are 8 key features of the terrorist threat as effecting Europe. First, it is a decentralized threat. So called homegrown networks can occur everywhere. Even individuals are capable of launching terror activities. This, it is crucial that there is a shift in the understanding of the threat. Second, the content of the "Islamic threat" has been decentralized and become varied. Third, counter-terrorism is an asymmetric conflict. This reflects a wider trend in conflict around the world as most post-Cold War conflict asymmetrical in nature. Fourth, the threat of terror spreads fear and that even the motives for terrorism have a psychological dimension. Fifth is the societal importance in religion. There is being seen a resurgence of religion around the world. Banning any religion from public sphere seems to be counter productive and Europe must avoid pitfalls of secular perception. Sixth, dealing with terror over long periods of time implies repercussions for culturally diverse societies. It can this can lead to societal polarization and inter-ethnic violence. Seventh is the conceivability of an attack. One must ask what the relationship is between the intentions and abilities of an attack. Eighth and finally, is that we must recognize that the way we analyze threats influence the threats themselves. There are abuses of intelligence for political purposes which fuels jihadist

fights. We must be prudent in labeling the threat because fueling ethnic thinking could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In conclusions, we must recognize that homegrown radicalism occurs worldwide. These local manifestations that we see in places like Holland and France reflect global themes. And to counter this we need an intelligence mix somewhere in between prevention and solutions.

Question and answer period:

Question for Dr. Harvey: Given investment in counter terrorism, what can be done by governments to increase confidence?

Answer: Critical risk management – Candor, refusal to speculate about attacks. Political officials generally do not follow these steps and typically, political officials emphasize on the gaps out there.

Question for Dr. Harvey: How much of your data was specifically about security as opposed to war on terror?

Answer: Most dealt with security directly

Question for Dr. Harvey: Do you think the lack of an attack over the last years is due to the accessibility to targets overseas?

Answer: Absolutely, but even with that in mind, there is still motivation to attack the US. There is still keen interest in attacking western targets and motivation is high. Even a small attack in US would have far more profound impact on sense of personal safety than an attack on a soft target overseas.

Question for all: Government statements allow media to create reality that is very different from the objective reality. Hyper-reality. Please comment on this…

Answer from Hienbecker: Pessimism is more fun that optimism. There is no question that the public makes the judgment on what is newsworthy and not. Watching the unfolding of Iraq is very different based on Fox, CNN, BBC reports. Even more so, what we see in the Arab media (al Jazeera) after a suicide attack, is an emphasis on the fact that people have been killed whereas in the Western media that sees just the rubble, twisted metal.

Answer from Harvey: Public perception of threat is based on sociological forces that create conditions within which people interpret threats in different ways based on their ability to control the threat. Positive stories don't linger in the news, negative do. Furthermore, positive stories also can have a negative influence – more people believed that a terrorist attack was more likely after the Toronto terror arrests

Answer from Kowalski: Public perceptions are based on the impact of the loss of political liberties. I am sorry, I missed the rest of his answer.

Question for Dr. Kowalski: Your perspective on the idea that the France rioting represents the opening of a European intifada.

Answer: There is not a jihadist dimension to the rioting in France. There are other issues about assimilation and racism that are not reflective of a start of wider jihadist problems in France/Europe.

Question for Dr. Harvey: To what extent do you believe the current intelligence/security establishments are merely acting with political expedience in mind when allocating huge resources towards homeland security, or are they truly working to address it?

Answer: There is an effort to address it, but political motivations are totally rational. Creating a threat runs the risk of failure. Thus, political implications of ANY attack (even tiny) are a serious motivator.

Question for Dr. Harvey: What were the factors that lead you to establish your statistical rationale?

Answer: Assigning qualitative measures is hard, but some (capturing Hussein, killing Zarkawi, Mission Accomplished Speech) generally believed to be significant successes. But success cannot win in competition with failure because failures can be so many disconnected things.

Question for Dr. Kowalski: What is being done to counter radicalization in Netherlands?

Answer: We have been trying to coordinate over 20 different organizations involved with counter terrorism. A comprehensive approach coined by Dutch security service a long time ago and this approach was based on an approach that develops an examination of potential targets and securing the processes
Heinbecker: He is not a believer of the "war on terror". When you start talking about war you think of armies and suspension of rights. This will not work for stopping terrorism

Question for all: Please comment on the idea that the war on terror supports a very closed state structure.

Answer Dr. Harvey: Similar to the Military Industrial Complex, the Security Industrial Complex either created the threat of homeland terror, it is response to a real threat.

Question for all: What are the threats that we face that intelligence people can't tell us?

Answer Dr. Harvey: What the problem exactly is. Successes can't be publicized as well as failures. There are a few straightforward ways for government to show they are securing us (airports), but it is hard and not a great deal to go on. Any failure on any place would render them a failure

Answer Dr. Kowalski: there may be intelligence services that are thinking in terms of conceivability instead of concrete terms. Because services are so aware of the difficulty in finding small groups, they are more and more talking in terms of possibility of attacks. There is the wish to cover themselves.

Panel 7 – Intelligence Scholarship: The State of the Art

Chair: Reg Whitaker, University of Victoria
Presenters: Loch Johnson, University of Georgia
David Kahn, author

Wolfgang Krieger, University of Marburg
Martin Rudner, Carleton University
Rapporteurs: Eric Cheyne, University of Northern British Columbia
Geert de Cock, University of Alberta

It is Loch Johnson's argued that the academic community started to show an interest in intelligence from 1975 on. The intelligence scholarship can be divided into four groups: A first groups deals with the history, structure and theory of intelligence (e.g. Lowenthal's work on organizational blueprints of intelligence agencies). A second group focused on the different types of intelligence missions (e.g. counterintelligence). A third group reflected on accountability, ethics and reforms of the intelligence sector and a fourth group looked at the issue of intelligence leadership.

Loch Johnson has seen a thickening of the relationships between the academic and intelligence community, but -despite some positive developments- mainstream academics continue to neglect the intelligence sector. Loch Johnson remarked that the more traditional theories of international relations continue to attract more attention than theory development about intelligence. The reasons behind this lack of focus on intelligence are multiple: The intelligence sector is perceived as an unsavory topic; there are problems with accessing data and there are structural pathologies in the intelligence community that keep it from liaising with academics. He sees three main challenges for intelligence scholars: To develop theory on intelligence, to make it more comparative and to engage a variety of disciplines.

David Kahn –author of the book 'Hitler's Spies'- followed up on the suggestions made by Loch Johnson and suggested possible topics of research that can fill gaps of knowledge about intelligence: Firstly, the question why diplomatic manuals from the 16th century on went into detail how to deal with spies and why this topic has disappeared from the agenda since the 19th century. Secondly, David Kahn suggested following up on the work of Georg Simmel and developing a sociological theory of secrecy, which would make it possible to break down this amorphous concept and make it quantifiable. Kahn suggested as a third topic the psychology of surprise: In his view, using surprise to corner the enemy is usually not an issue of time, but rather an issue of lack of time to digest the information available. A fourth topic could look into how political and military leaders deal with intelligence that is presented to them.

Wolfgang Krieger (University of Marburg) started his presentation by explaining the title: ‚German Intelligence Studies: Between Weltschmerz and Scholarship'. The first part of his presentation focused on the main issue in German intelligence studies, namely the preserved STASI archives. The Weltschmerz refers to the lack on interest in the German academic community to study intelligence issues. And the 'between' refers to the latest developments in Germany regarding intelligence scholarship.

Wolfgang Krieger explained the reason why the STASI were largely preserved. This mainly results from a proposal of the Roundtable movement in March 1989 and the decision of the newly elected East-German parliament in 1990 to open up the STASI archives to the victims of the East-German regime. The preservation of these archives was entrusted to a Commission[1], which established a research unit. This research unit has done groundbreaking work in writing the historiography of the STASI (e.g. on disinformation techniques, warfare preparations, links between the Rote Armee Fraktion and the STASI). Researcher from abroad have studied the

foreign intelligence gathered by the STASI (e.g. UK, Netherlands, and Africa) but important gaps remain about STASI intelligence from France, Canada and the US.

Wolfgang Krieger described that not a single political scientist in Germany deals with intelligence issues and explains this by the dominant mindset in Germany, which associates intelligence with the Nazi-era. A strong right-left divide still exists in Germany and a majority of predominantly leftwing German academics still perceives intelligence and security studies as a conservative issue. Moreover, the German civil service does not allow its former employees to get involved in academics after retirement and there is no regulation that allows for the release of classified records after a certain period has elapsed.

However, some efforts are being made to address this gap: An International Intelligence History Association was established and a small-scale forum on German Intelligence Studies was founded recently, but without any support or interest from the German intelligence service. Wolfgang Krieger thinks that this lack of interest in cooperation between the scholarly and intelligence community may change in the future as the German intelligence service may need academic expertise on Islamic fundamentalism.

Martin Rudner (Carleton University) made a presentation, entitled 'A Tough Row to Hoe: Building Intelligence and Security Studies in the Canadian University System'. He lamented the lack of interest in the Canadian academic community to study intelligence. Of the 530 participants in the conference, there are only 20 academics present of which only 8 focus on intelligence. Of the 79 Canadian universities, only 9 offer courses on intelligence. None of the journalism schools offer any lectures on terrorism. Of the 1650 Canada research chairs, none is dedicated to intelligence within a civilian university. The board of governors of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council has decided in principle against research grants dedicated to intelligence.

The situation in the United States, Australian and the United Kingdom is very different. In those countries, government agencies invest large sums of money into the study of intelligence for research projects such as languages, regional area studies, etc.

The provinces do not fill the gap that is left by the lack of interest at the federal level, because the provincial level perceives higher education as a budgetary liability. The academic community (e.g. CASIS) tries to fill this gap, but does this on a shoestring.

Question and answer period:

Question: to Wolfgang Krieger, whether the engagement of German forces abroad may have a knock-on effect in terms of increased interest among academics in intelligence.

Answer: Wolfgang Krieger expressed doubt about such a development. There is already a large Military History Institute in Potsdam, but they do not focus on intelligence and do not train students.

Michael Herman made 2 personal suggestions for future research: cross-cultural comparison of intelligence forces and a synthesis on the role of intelligence during wartime.

Question: If the British, American and Australian have achieved more funding, why not Canada?

Answer: The difference is determined by political will. Here in Canada we do not invest in knowledge, we consume it, either at a provincial or federal level. There is an immense student and media interest; however it comes down to political will.

Wesley Wark wished to raise awareness that much of the intelligence expertise will retire in the coming years and that a lot of expertise will be lost. This may shame the federal level into a better financing of intelligence scholarship.

Panel 8 – Through Chinese Walls: Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Domestic Arena

Chair: Stuart Farson, Simon Fraser University
Presenters: Ron Marks, Senior VP for Government Relations, Oxford Analytica
Jean-Paul Brodeur, Centre International de Criminologie Comparee, University de Montreal
Willem de Lint: University of Windsor
Rapporteur: Stephen Buckly, Simon Fraser University
Brian Neary, University of Toronto

Ron Marks - "Domestic Intelligence Gathering in the US"

Constitutionally, the Americans value prevention of unchecked centralized powers because they do not trust the government. Since WW2, American foreign spying was an embassy-based inter-state competitive game. Oversight bodies formed in the 1970s to check domestic intelligence activities.
But the post-Cold War world forced the United States to focus on more intelligence issues and targets than just the Soviet Union. The 9/11 intelligence failed because the intelligence system was structured around a post-World War Two world with a focus on nation-states and a bipolar world, a structure that defeated the Soviet Union, but was nevertheless obsolete. Global terrorists, however, are fleet of foot and communication. In response to 9/11, the government created Homeland Security and the DNI in a climate when Americans still do not trust the government. The United States has yet to have the social and political debate about the merit of a domestic MI-5. It takes time to develop new intelligence structures, so Americans must think carefully about creating structures that match the nation's values and their constitutional provisions.

Jean-Paul Brodeur

Protecting national security is at odds with the letter or at least the spirit of the law. Domestic law enforcement groups should not be used for domestic security, thus our security service was separated from the RCMP into CSIS. Domestic security can be viewed in a static fashion where our borders separate us from the rest of the world, but we should treat domestic security dynamically, studying incoming, outgoing and returning traffic, as borders are functionally obsolete. Regardless of whether 9/11 could have been prevented, beforehand, various American intelligence bodies had actionable information about 9/11 hijackers that was not shared or acted on. Traffic monitoring is useful.

Law enforcement organizations are not appropriate bodies to perform domestic security. Criminal intelligence units gather knowledge whose truth is to be determined by an adversarial court process. Intelligence requires facts to actually be validated. The goal in intelligence is for information to be cross-referenced beyond the context of individual criminal cases. Further, criminal investigators do not work with probalistic inferences, hampering their effectiveness in security intelligence. Also, when various intelligence officials operate a specific informant, they

can neutralize each others' efforts through pursuing mutually exclusive cases. Finally, asking patrol officers to gather intelligence undermines their legitimate community role of building trust.

Willem de Lint - “Trust, Value and Information Flows in Security Networks”

The nature of threats after the Cold War has changed. A lack of consensus on confronting threats created pre-9/11 vulnerability. Further, the network society thesis, as operated by al Qaeda, is more organic, responsive and fluid than the modernist state model. Public trust in security agencies has been hampered but can be improved. The risk society and catastrophic society theses demonstrate undermined public confidence and trust in experts and authorities, as Richard Clark argued yesterday. Trust can be enhances when security oversight bodies incorporate the rule of law. Information exchange increases trust and legitimacy. Trust can be improved as intelligence officers interact and communicate with each other.

Weller Panel

Chair: Arne Kislenko, Ryerson University and Chairman, 2006 Weller Prize Committee
Presenters: Paz Buttedahl, Royal Roads University and Member, 2006 Weller Prize Committee
Omar Ashour, McGill University, 2006 Weller Prize Graduate Winner
Barbara McCartney, University of Ottawa, 2006 Weller Prize Undergraduate Winner
Rapporteurs: Timothy Naft, Ryerson University
Shalina Edge, University of Northern British Columbia

First, Barbra, the undergraduate winner presented her paper in medical intelligence. In it she discusses how medical intelligence has become a growing concern in the last few years. Issues such as anthrax, SARS, the avian flu, the Norfolk virus and AIDS are the primary examples she uses to explain why this subject and entered into the forefront of intelligence discussion. She explains that there is very little precision instructions as of now to deal with possible threats in this area should they come, just parameters to work within. She also discusses how defensive medical intelligence can work in two ways, either to stop possible threats or to aid troops should a threat occur. The strategic area revolves around prevention during maneuvers whereas operational medical intelligence is more about immediate reactions with specific step by step instructions on the proper procedures to take.

The field of medical intelligence expanded greatly after 9/11 and that the current global situation could result in a wide array of possible repercussions for which medical intelligence would be pertinent. She explains how defensive medical intelligence is meant to protect the health of the military and that this system is not in place to serve the public. Lastly she explains the added issues involved in dealing with medical intelligence at an international level. The two added problems are that there is international instability since each member of any international order will inevitably have a somewhat different agenda than any other member and that no one is sure whether the issue of medical intelligence and health care should be discussed vertically or horizontally.

Omar, the graduate winner spoke second. His paper was comparing the different Islamic movements in Algeria and Turkey during the second half of the 20th century and why they had differing impacts on each country. He starts by explaining the similarities between the two in that they both believed in a majority democracy and are both part of electoral Islam. He then poses the question as to why Algeria had to go through an eight year civil war from 1992-2000 while Turkey managed to avoid this and peacefully disposed of their leader to create a regime change. He explained that Turkey was an electoral state since 1970 and was part of a bigger

movement. He also explained that Turkey's familiarity with coupes also allowed for an easier transition since their history would create a familiarity with the transition that takes place during a coupe.

However, Algeria only created an electoral democracy in 1989 through a coalition of four Islamic factions. This meant that they didn't all unite under one leader but instead would follow the lead of their own section. This division was also evident in the civil war as some whole factions fought while others didn't based on their own leaders. The four factions were 1) those who wanted confrontation – jihad, 2) those who wanted to stay pragmatic in politics and based their religious beliefs on knowledge, 3) those who wanted to mobilize the streets (civilians) and have them help to push for reforms and 4) those who wanted fatwas and opposed Islamic intervention from outside countries. Omar goes on to explain about the difference in each country's political culture. He explains that in Turkey it is understood that the country was founded by military action which has resulted in 80% of the population trusting the military more than the government. Everyone in Turkey has a great fondness for the military as it is something they are indoctrinated with throughout their school life. The military is loved at least in part due to the fact that it was their intervention on three separate occasions that ended either a time of chaos or corrupt leadership in the country and reestablished order before handing the government back over to civilian rule. Conversely, Algeria has a military government from 1965-1989 that refused to relinquish control and caused the deterioration of the country. Violent confrontations and riots occurred in 1988 due to the poor job the military government was doing. These riots led to the reforms that would eventually bring democracy to Algeria in 1989.

Question and answer period:

Question: What is being done with expansion of medical intelligence?

Answer: Barbra thinks that medical intelligence should be integrated into part of the larger intelligence sphere and that steps are being taken to make it so. She also explains that Canada is taking on a security function for medical intelligence.

Question: Are existing and developing medical intelligence organization complimentary or split from organizations like the World Health Organization?

Answer: They are complimentary since they are working towards the same goals.

Question: What are the differences between the old and new Islamic movements?

Answer: The new movements do not hold the same support as the old movements so they wouldn't be able to gain the majority votes that the old movements attained. The new movements also do not have access to militaries large enough to topple current established governments. With regards to Hamas, Omar doesn't believe that they actually won the election but that Fatah lost by running four candidates in each riding thereby splitting votes within their organization.

Question: How did French supporters in the Franco-Algerian war managed to rise in rank afterwards since they were seen as traders during that conflict?

Answer: They switched sides after the war and subsequently got promoted. In spite of their new found success on the opposing side of where they started, they are still criticized for having begun their careers with the enemy.

Question: Should Egypt let the Muslim Brotherhood takeover?

Answer: They don't have the infrastructure set up to take over as of yet, they need to get their act together. There is another issue that since the current 'democratic' leader isn't very democratic there isn't a good chance that the current political system would allow them to be elected. They also have created many empty promises without any way of supporting them or backing them up which would result in a quick term in office if they were to get elected.

Question: Are there fault lines in Turkey because of the secular military that has a lot of support and the Islamic government that doesn't have very much support?

Answer: There used to be a bigger split but because the religious government is becoming more secular, the divided is narrowing. If Turkey were to join the EU this would prevent the military from taking power because this is not allowed under their rules – this is why the government is pushing to join the EU.

Literary Lecture – Intelligence and Fiction

Chair: Professor Wesley Wark, CASIS President and Munk Centre, University of Toronto
Presenter: Charles McCarry, author of Old Boys
Rapporteur: Steven Grainger, University of New Brunswick

Mr. McCarry spoke of his work as a writer as within the realm of fiction, or as he preferred, "believable truth." He spoke of some works of fiction as not being within the confines of "believable truth," where characters and settings were too neat; so easy to believe that they were in fact too believable, and would therefore not make good fiction.

He reflected that the Cold War era resembled a novel, where back stories would complicate matters into a tangling web of intrigue and mystery. He then noted the similarities between the lives of intelligence officers and fiction novelists. McCarry said they both most often spent their time alone, living in their imagination.

McCarry spoke of the critical and public reaction to the spy thriller or intelligence novel. He noted they are not seen as serious literature and lacked high regard, being seen merely as "thrillers," written solely for the sake of entertainment.

McCarry also noted that only those who had experience in the intelligence field knew how slow and unexciting the life was: the long periods of loneliness and boredom were broken only occasionally by periods of extreme action and excitement. He feels that too often, authors without real life experience eliminate the dull moments, and omit the fact that not every plan works out, and that bad things do happen. He also noted that it was these non-firsthand portrayals of the world of intelligence that have become the conventions of the genre and the portrait most accepted by the public.

For his own writing, McCarry wanted to write as truthfully as possible. He said that by the age of 25 he had written three novels, but none of them were published as he didn't know enough about the world to make believable truth.

McCarry recalled his early life in the CIA: traveling around the world, working 20 hour days and learning something new every day. He loved it, for at the time, Allen Dulles was attempting to

recruit as many bright Americans into the agency as he could. McCarry noted the quality of his co-workers, how he loved his work and trusted his co-workers absolutely.

McCarry spent ten years working abroad in foreign lands working under deep cover in covert acts, and took inspiration from his experiences. He wrote what he knew: the inside of politics and the outside life of a journalist, noting that the real CIA world was very different from the popular view, and saying sadly that many writers were merely trying to make a living from their depictions of the life.

McCarry said that he wanted to write stories that were true to his experiences, and that in his mind, it was possible to write the essential truth without “spilling the beans” of the agency. To keep himself from drawing on such sacred knowledge, McCarry typed out all that he could recall of his CIA days, 100 pages of single space paper, and then burned it as a precaution so as to not be accused of pillaging his past for his fictional works.

McCarry spoke at length of the process and art of writing. He felt that it unlocked the subconscious doors of the mind, whereas the conscious mind acted as the policeman, trying to keep the classified secrets from getting out, while the subconscious worked to keep the reader’s interest. He claimed to keep all of the atmosphere, the emotion and absurdities of his time in the CIA in his work, everything except the classified parts. He felt his work represented conventional tales of spies, and tried to write without giving away the secrets of the CIA.

He said that the act of writing fiction was a mysterious business, and wasn’t done entirely on a conscious level. He said that writing fiction was the most difficult thing he’d ever done. Describing his writing process, he said he usually have an idea floating around in his head for years: a character in his mind and a general sense of a story. Sometimes, he noted that stories themselves insisted on being written – inspiration would suddenly seize him, the story would come, and he would write, powerless to control the ideas that seized him in these moments. Aside from these moments of inspiration, McCarry was quick to note the importance of research, and the fact that it could not be ignored when writing fiction.

Again comparing fiction writing and his life performing covert operations, he felt that another similarity lay in the fact that in both fiction writing and covert operations, that which is done on impulse often turns out well, while that which is calculated turns out badly.

Mr. McCarry then went on to ponder how much of fiction is true, stating that for the author, every word of it was; the writer had to believe that he was writing the truth in order for the story to be successful. He felt that a work of fiction was a collaboration between the writer and the reader, each one an important ingredient to its success.

He closed in stating that any work of art was a stew of many ingredients, and that truth in art and in life were not the same.

Question and answer period:

Question: What is your typical writing style?

Answer: he replied that he never put his writing aside, and that he woke every morning and wrote 1000 words, then edited them the next morning and re-wrote another 1000.

Question: had he ever had friends come up to him who had identified themselves with characters in his books.

Answer: McCarry said that he never based his characters on living people, but when he had occasionally, no one ever picked up on it.

Question: if he interacted with other novelists of the genre.

Answer: no, that in fact he didn't even read spy fiction, and he felt that he wrote about different things in different ways.

End of Day Two

2006 CASIS International Conference, Day 3 Student Reports (October 28)
Editor: Cameron Ortis, University of British Columbia

CASIS Special Presentation

Presenter: Daniel J. Mulvenna, Counter Intelligence Studies Center, Washington DC and former officer, RCMP Security Service
"The KGB – RCMP Counterintelligence Battle – 1953 to 1979"
Rapporteur: Andrew Kurjata, University of Northern British Columbia
Jason Bisanz, University of Ottawa

Introduction

Mulvenna said that one of his key objectives was to leave the audience with insights into the complexity and importance of counterintelligence, because it is often not understood or misinterpreted, even by those within different intelligence services. A key message he wanted to convey was how easy it is to get things wrong and how big the consequences of doing so are. He started out by introducing the audience to some key concepts behind counterintelligence services. The key objectives of counterintelligence are broadly defined as identification (this includes identifying agents, methods of operation and their platforms), penetration (of other countries, using both human intelligence and technical surveillance methods), and neutralization of intelligence operations (including by discrediting, misinforming or taking control of the operation). The most important goals are to identify the platforms from which intelligence agents operate and to make them fearful to operate.

Next he went on to introduce the "agent-informant pyramid." At the top of this pyramid he placed the recruitment-in-place, which is an agent working for you but which the other side believes is working for them. These are most valuable because they are a continuous source of important information. Next is the defector, who can provide a lot of valuable information, but are only useful once. After this comes various other types with fluctuate in value given the context, including the double agent, access agent, and information source.

He noted that the double-agent and the agent-in-place are often confused. He said to remember that the double-agent imitates real espionage by posing as a volunteer or walk-in agent. This leads to a fear of walk-ins among intelligence agencies, because they never know when a volunteer is actually working for the other side. Because of this, it is preferable to select and recruit someone independently. This is also not fail-proof because of dangles, which is when a

double-agent poses as someone desirable for recruitment in the hopes that another intelligence agency will recruit them.

An Introduction to the KGB

The KGB gives priority to penetration of both adversary and allied services, double agent operations, and "operational games." Their tactics include dangles (most often nationals embedded in other countries both in the Western and Soviet spheres of influence), feeding disinformation through double agents, and using red herrings or exposing their own agents in order to direct attention away from "precious agents" who are of greater value. At this point, Mulvenna wanted to highlight two key lessons. First, that FEW CASES STAND ALONE when it comes to counterintelligence—the links between cases, events and individuals are often there. To find this, one must pay attention to what was known, when it was known, and by whom, and also to broad relationships and commonalities between cases. His second lesson was that few penetrations are uncovered by analysis alone. Finally, he concluded this section with what he felt was an important quote from Peter Wright, a spycatcher: "An intelligence service, particularly a counterintelligence service, depends on its memory and sense of history. Wihthout them, it is lost. "

First Chief Directorate, (Foreign Intelligence) KGB, Director K

Here Mulvenna wanted to narrow in on the departments of the KGB who were working against allied forces—mostly what was known as Director K. The mission of Director K was to protect the first chief director, protect Russian agencies, and penetrate allies and enemies. In particular were two units—the coordination unit and the 5th Department.

The mission of the coordination unit was to handle CIA and US military sources worldwide (except in the US), play operational games with the CIA worldwide (except in the US) and the RCMP in Canada, handle penetration of the CIA and RCMP, prepare and disseminate analysis of the CIA and RCMP, and educate other KGB agencies about the RCMP and CIA. Notably absent is the FBI, and Mulvenna is of the opinion that the KGB found the FBI too hard to operate against. Also, operations were conducted against the CIA only outside of the United States because it was found that Americans were easier to pitch, recruit, and manipulate when they were overseas. The mission of the 5th Department was essentially "mole hunting"—finding penetrations and locating defectors abroad, the latter of which is still going on to this day.

A few additional points that Mulvenna made:

1. a small group of people did the handling, often under 10
2. compartmentalization was often quite high—in some cases, not even the deputy-chief of the "K" was aware of some agents.
3. The KGB found Canada to be of "paramount importance" because it was one of a small group of nations—namely, the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand- where penetrating one gave you access to all the rest. Because of this and because of the closeness between Canada and the USA- both geographically and politically- it was often found that by penetrating the RCMP you also had information about and from the CIA, the FBI, and the British Secret Service, among others.
4. It seems to Mulvenna that the KGB had had enough success that some of their members knew more about the US Intelligence Community that the US Intelligence Community did.

Case Study- Vladimirovich Brik

This was the final part of the presentation, it is clear that Mulvenna had more case studies but ran out of time. Briefly:

Vladimirovich Brik was born to Russian parents but raised in the US. He was drafted to the US army in World War II and it was here the KGB picked him up—he was trained as an agent and a cipher. In 1951 he was sent to Canada—he entered Montreal using a Canadian passport acquired from a Canadian defector, and upon entering Canada took on another identity. His first mission was to familiarize himself with his "legend" (false identity and backstory), and so he toured Western Canada, which is where his legend was from. Though the KGB wanted to send him the US, Brik was hesitant, and so instead he toured Canada further. While in Winnipeg, Brik met a "charming young lady" Mulvenna identified only as "Ruth." Brik fell for Ruth, and convinced her to leave her children and move with him to Montreal, along with her children. About a month later he confessed to his true identity and Ruth convinced him to go the RCMP, which he did. It was Brik's hope that he could be legalized and live in Canada as Igor Gouzenko had, but the RCMP had other ideas and kept him on as an agent. Though he cooperated, Brik was felt guilty about it. After Ruth left him, he became depressed and took up drinking. One night he called up a Montreal paper with the intention of telling his story. The reporter thought it was a fake call, but the RCMP knew otherwise. Brik tried to quit, but the RCMP called his bluff, offering to send him back to Russia or turn him over to the FBI. However, during this time another Russian agent who had penetrated the RCMP learnt of Brik's true identity.

After a while, Brik was recalled to the Soviet Union, which was standard procedure. Though Brik was suspicious, the RCMP convinced him to go. He did, and was not heard from again for some time. At one point he was involved in setting a KGB trap for a Canadian agent, but it was not known whether he had done so willingly or not. Then, in 1991 an elderly gentleman walked into a British embassy in Russia and gave them a 35 mm film to be sent to the Canadian Security Agency. At this point there was no one in CSIS who had any idea who Brik was—but after cooperation with the RCMP, it was eventually figured out and Brik now lives in Canada. It turns out that Brik had been arrested upon returning to the Soviet Union and sentenced to 15 years in jail—he only escaped the death penalty because of his cooperation in the failed "trap" that had been set for the Canadian agent. Mulvenna concluded by saying that he hopes Brik has a happy retirement, as the life of a double-agent is not an easy one.

Panel 9 – Intelligence Gathering by Friend and Foe in the War on Terror

Chair:
Presenter: Dr. Tom Quiggin, Nanyang Technical University Singapore
Brian Jackson, RAND
Kevin O'Brien, Public Security Consultant and formerly RAND UK
Rapporteur: Jennifer Harvey, Carleton University
Edyta Polnicki, Ryerson University

Prof. Thomas Quiggin discussed the Centre of Excellence for National Security at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore as being in the developing stages but of which focuses on central issues such as human security and terrorism. Prof. Quiggin stated the need to have more technological institutions. In discussing the Risk Assessment Project, Prof. Quiggin illustrated how Singapore is seen as a target for violent acts because it has highly developed infrastructure and has an advanced military. However, Prof. Quiggin emphasized that even with the possibilities that Singapore is vulnerable to such acts, one must recognize that freedom is

not something that can be bought with fear and that in the face of a threat, knowledge must be an essential method of prevention.

In discussing national security issues, Prof. Quiggin stated that the role of the state has become more complicated and the environment has become complex and uncertain leading to such threats as transnational terrorism, SARS and organized crime.

The Risk assessment project was described by Prof. Quiggin as being a process where one must think about the future. In doing this, there needs to be solutions that are categorized. In order to have solutions and to think about the future, secrecy and intelligence must play a minimal role. More important roles are those of Faint Signal Detection and Pattern Detection which is supported by software pattern analysis that ultimately provides greater levels of signal detection.

Prof. Quiggin described some core beliefs of the Risk Assessment Project. A significantly important belief is that one cannot predict discreet future events. In doing risk assessment, one must focus on being pattern based. He described Front lines which have been successful and where fine grains of intelligence have occurred. He emphasized the need for strategic views to occur at all levels of intelligence, integration needs to begin at the front lines and that there needs to be cross agency training courses.

Prof. Quiggin compared the responses between the governments of the USA and of the UK in the aftermath of terrorist attacks to make a key point about effective methods of handling problems. Responses must be immediate and efficient especially to known, ordered or complicated problems. If one does not react in such a manner, complex and chaotic problems will arise. He strongly suggested that ultimately, it is the response that will shape the future. It is the role of the government to be resilient and focus on justice, security and peace. He stressed that intelligence officers must be intelligent and the future of intelligence lies in cognitive skills.

Mr. Brian Jackson spoke second. He spoke about his ongoing study which focuses on the link between terrorism and the use of internet. His study examined the terrorism internet link from a technological viewpoint. He stated that there are incentives for terrorists to use such technologies and that there has been a broader use of terrorism on the internet.

Mr. Jackson outlined some effects of terrorist use of internet technology. He described conceptual knowledge where there are terrorist organization functions and groups have become more efficient in this area. Terrorist groups have become more effective in that the internet has helped them be more lethal and accurate. Also, the internet has allowed terrorists to have improved security especially in the use of technology. As well, internet usage has encouraged novelty which for terrorism allows for new use of technology.

As a result of his study, Mr. Jackson described how there has been a scope of different effects in the link between terrorism and the internet. For example, it is very easy to see when something is new and data is simply to track as well. However, it is difficult to track such aspects as security and novelty from the perspective of terrorism. Mr. Jackson went on to discuss the implications of increased use of the internet by terrorists. The internet is becoming a communication function and a major effect for terrorist groups such as the fact that information can get out to the public more quickly.

There are benefits however to monitoring internet use. There are electronic fingerprints and often trials left behind by terrorists. There is suggestion that the internet is being used as a command and control type function by terrorists where they can coordinate activities around the world and monitor their successfulness. Mr. Jackson states that as one gets better at interception one can have a better understanding of problems. For example, tight cell communications are being seen as similar to small scale intelligence which can easily predict events. However, broad movements might not be about command and control and therefore are not helpful in predicting future events.

Dr. Kevin O'Brien reflected on assessing terrorist intelligence practices. He described two competing hypotheses: that one does not do intelligence and second that one can have uncritical acceptance of intelligence. He went on to describe the possible methods that terrorists can use to collect intelligence.

1. Intelligence as a product in that it is current, basic or speculative. All three levels of intelligence are seen in terrorist organizations.
2. There are subtle elements whereby terrorists focus on the historical perspective of other terrorist groups and attempt to understand where differences arise between terrorist groups as well as how terrorist groups have developed over time.
3. Intelligence can also be an institution for terrorists in how they organize themselves.
4. Terrorist groups have a doctrine of intelligence which command and control internet information. Most doctrines are available by terrorist groups online in magazines and manuals.
5. Terrorists need training and they do this by having training in a classroom set up or with ground training. This provides for terrorist groups to gain knowledge on the connection with them and other groups, themselves and other countries and themselves and other governments.
6. The process component emphasizes how terrorists use intelligence to task their targets. Terrorists often start tasking early on and scout out potential targets.
7. Collection intelligence by terrorists is done extensively. Terrorists gather information, do surveillance, conduct familiarization runs, security responses, and assessments of targets, action reports, and eventually analyses.
8. Product and dissemination allow terrorists to have comprehensive databases which can include ongoing production processes and target folders for operation processes.

Dr. O'Brien summarized by saying that the events of 9/11 were an example of one of the most comprehensive and extensive uses of intelligence by terrorists. A question arises out of this in that how does one judge causes of such research and intelligence? Is it by the failures and successes of terrorist attacks? There is not one standard that can be applied to such research.

Question and answer period:

Question: What tools are available to search the deep web?

Brian Jackson: There are limits to technology, doing the best to access such situations and gain information about them.
Kevin O'Brien: Cautionary tale and being aware of limitations. 10-20% of the web is useful and there are more searchable info on other websites.

Question: What research is being conducted to analysis psychology aspects of terrorism/forensic aspects?

Panel: Don't have the expertise to answer that question

Question: Is the government not concerned about terrorist groups using google environment/earth?

Kevin Jackson: That is a concern but ultimately it is difficult to stop since you can get whatever info you want if you really want it.

Question: After 9/11 Tom Quiggin made the statement that "planes should have been flying the next day, you must respond to deliberate behaviour" Have you looked into making such a decision and the reasons why?

Tom Quiggin: Brits had advantaged to respond; they were prepared and had anticipated an attack whereas 9/11 was a state of shock. There are different responses required if you can't adapt then you are moderate or severe trouble. With the kinds of intelligence information we should be able to avoid shock responses yet responses have to be immediate.

Panel 10 – Comparative National Security Law

Chair: Hon. Justice Richard Mosley, Federal Court
Presenters: Stanley Cohen, Senior General Counsel, Justice Canada
Richard A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School
Kent Roach, University of Toronto Law School
Ian Leigh: Durham University, UK
Rapporteurs: Michelle Magin, University of Toronto
Matt Armstrong, Western University

Hon. Justice Richard Mosley gave a brief introduction of the panelists and spoke of their fields of expertise, publications, and present work interests.

Stanley Cohen introduced the concern that counter-terrorism measures go too far, and damage the society that they intend to preserve. This is not a question of whether anti-terrorism legislation is justified, but if it threatens the principles of Canadian democracy. Fears are not always justifiable and actions are often scaled back due to their miss-use.

Stanley Cohen described how Canada's legislative approach is different from alternative states. Canada does not simply emulate other states. None of Canada's new anti-terrorism laws have been deemed unconstitutional. This is not to say that these laws have not met with criticism.

Cohen stressed that the challenge for democracy is not whether to respond to acts of terrorism, but how to respond to these acts. This challenge requires the negotiation of an effective response to terrorism with respect to the fundamental rules of law.

Critics of post-9/11 anti-terror legislation claim that Canada is less free, and that this change is strongly felt in minority communities. There is a wide-spread belief that minorities are subject to discriminatory enforcement of legislation. The system must therefore operate with social and cultural awareness. The Maharr Arar case demonstrated the serious shortcomings of the legislative process. Cohen said that too much intelligence information was given to the United States too easily. Similarly, the Air India Case demonstrated improper barriers to the free flow of information.

Cohen concluded by saying that openness is an integral component of all functioning democracies, but so too is secrecy. Secrecy seems to appear as an open affront to democracy, but no government can work with complete transparency.

Posner began with a discussion of the situation in the United States, and the controversy surrounding issues of law and national security. He first discussed an issue of ambiguity regarding the judicial interpretation of existing laws. The United States has a constitution aggressively interpreted by the Supreme Court. He argues that the Constitution does not impede the application of anti-terrorism laws. As public safety concerns arise, we can expect the Supreme Court to up-date their interpretation of the Constitution.

Posner then discussed the aggressive assertion of presidential power by President Bush. Post-9/11, the President claimed that any entity attacking the United States is equivalent to an enemy state. Any terrorist suspect even a suspected American citizen should be treated as an enemy combatant or as an enemy soldier. This paradigm raises issues in legal circles.

Main concerns:

1) In regard to detention it is generally accepted in the United States that people should have access to habeas corpus and a minimum access to the courts. Presently, in an emergency situation, existing forty-eight hour limits regarding the detention of individuals without probable cause can be suspended.

2) In regards to interrogation practices the constitution bestows broad allowances. Given extenuating circumstances it is permissible to gather intelligence through coercive methods and/or torture. Though information gathered through coercive methods is generally inadmissible in criminal courts, the potential threat of future terrorist acts justifies these actions.

3) It is permissible to try terror suspects in non-official federal courts.

4) In regards to electronic surveillance, the government argues that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is too restrictive. Under the act one may obtain warrants to survey known terror suspects, yet this tool is ineffective in discovering new terror suspects.

In closing, Posner suggested that an obsession with criminal law directs the general public to think of old ways to fight terror. Instead individuals should look to administrative methods to combat terror.

Leigh began by noting that there has been anti-terrorist legislation in Great Britain for decades due to threats from Northern Ireland. This legislation can become set in the government and mainstreamed into the criminal law process.

The European Convention has changed in regards to the Human Rights Act. This act forces courts to review legislation with an eye for human rights. There are three aspects to the European Convention System that affect Great Britain. Firstly, Great Britain is responsible for the mistreatment of any non-nationals deported. Secondly, the individual deported must be given an effective means of challenging this deportation domestically. Thirdly, regarding detention, individuals can only be detained pending trail or deportation.

Because of these changes the courts have been granted much leeway in their interpretation of anti-terror law.

Roach asserts that Canada has passed anti-terror legislation at a much slower pace than Australia. While Canada has passed the Anti-terror act and the Security Act alone, Australia has passed thirty-seven laws on anti-terror. Roach asks: how do we explain this difference?

Roach lists four possible reasons for this difference. Firstly, Australia has no statutory bill of rights. Secondly, Canada may not have internalized the threat of terror to the degree of Australia. Thirdly, the multicultural attitudes between the two countries may differ. Fourthly, Australia has politicized its security issues.

Both countries apply different definitions of terrorism. Australia defines terror in regards to political, religious and ideological motives. However, Australia does not include a provision that the expression of political beliefs satisfies this definition. Rather they define terrorism as intentional acts of harm that coerce foreign or domestic governments or the population. Canada alternatively provides a broader definition of terrorism. Australia defines many more acts as terrorist offenses. This includes being a member of a terrorist organization, associating with terrorists, and/or possessing documents regarding terrorist activities.

The ASEO now has the power to obtain a warrant and question people regarding terrorist threats. These questioning warrants represent a mixture of administrative and judicial authority. Additionally, there is a new trend of laws that target speech. This includes the targeting of groups that praise a terrorist act in a situation where there is a risk of a further threat.

Panel 11 – Secrets vs. Open Source: Changing the Definition of Intelligence

Chair: John MacLaughlan, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Presenters: William Nolte, University of Maryland
Michael Herman, Oxford University
Charles Barlow, Integrated Threat Assessment Centre
Perrin Beatty, Canadian Manufactures and Exporters Association
Rapporteurs: Steve Grainger, University of New Brunswick
Alex Satel, University of Toronto

Chaired by John MacLaughlan, Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Panel 11 debated the role and relevance of open source versus secret intelligence and information collection, and sought to shed light on the disparate opinions on the importance and usefulness of open source intelligence (OSINT) in the climate of today's global events.

William Nolte was the first to speak, and he opened by noting that the role of information was a critical factor in intelligence. Nolte's main question for the panel was whether the notion of intelligence was mainly about secrets or information (of which secrets were a part). He identified the Holy Grail of U.S. intelligence as the shift to becoming a more analyst-driven intelligence system, where policy or decision-driven objectives should become the norm. He noted sadly that the present U.S. intelligence system was collection-driven, acting within a competitive information environment.

Nolte stressed the findings of several high-level U.S. government reports, such as the 9/11 report, that found the need for information sharing and the better use of open source information. He said that while the U.S. was always thinking it was doing better than it ever had previously in its intelligence tasks, it was not moving fast enough to keep up with the pace of the intelligence and information environment.

Nolte argued that the American intelligence community's ability to warn of potential threats and dangers was dependent on open source information. He isolated several sharing issues that were important in this regard, namely: analysts were not empowered to seek out additional information and expertise on their own. Within the U.S. system, Nolte compared them to production workers, focused solely on the creation of documentation, which left little time to read the products produced. He proposed analysts be looked at as experts, where their goal would not be in the production of content, but the creation of expertise.

Nolte closed by stating that due to the competitive nature of open source intelligence, there was no longer any benefit in attempting to have an intelligence monopoly, and that the greater focus must be shaped to integrate secrets into the larger information environment.

Michael Herman, Oxford University

Mr. Herman began by noting the impact of the internet and how it has opened new intelligence opportunities. He stated that intelligence could be seen as two linked rows: the information obtained through covert means, which was more common, and the experts on a given subject, which was less common. He found that the government was most interested in intelligence that was useful while at the same time cost effective. He also noted that the Anglo-centric world of intelligence must be compared to cross-cultural factors.

Mr. Herman then spoke of the various types of decisions, namely tactical and strategic, which are used to help us define intelligence purposes. He felt that governments tended to prefer intelligence support for tactical decisions, while the academic world was stuck in the Cold War era. The military, in Herman's view, used intelligence at the top of the national level, planning for a war that never came. He felt that support for military and diplomatic operations represented a major shift in the intelligence focus.

He noted the value of tactical intelligence, specifically the importance of its immediacy, while noting that intelligence was often focused on violence or the threat of violence. He said that tactical counter terrorism was still the main concern, where military information, battle piece support, and military material dominated, where people as individual targets were not seen as important. He said the focus of counter terrorism should be aimed at people, not their weapons, so that there was some evidence of human meaning in the process.

In closing, Mr. Herman applauded the search for new intelligence, but felt that the old system which concentrated on the top level was still being used, when in fact the stress should be placed on diplomacy and counter terrorism. Action-oriented intelligence should be part of the new thinking on intelligence, and that open source should be taken into account.

Charles Barlow, Integrated Threat Assessment Centre

Mr. Barlow's talk was focused on identifying when open source intelligence was beneficial and when it was not. He noted that in his area, all assessments were made at the lowest possible secret classification as not everyone had access to secret materials. He felt that open source intelligence was excellent for history as they often provided better long-term summaries.

In comparing open source and secret intelligence, Mr. Barlow noted that while open source provides what is happening, secret intelligence can provide what may happen, also noting that most times, secret intelligence will become open source in time.

He noted that the intentions of terrorists were often available in open source areas, which provided a vital role in shaping the enemy's strategic intent. For tactical intentions (what to do and when), he felt classified sources often proved to be better sources.

Concluding, Mr. Barlow said that neither open nor secret were more valuable than the other, but that they each must be used together, as their value is determined by their source and circumstance, not their classification.

Perrin Beatty, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association

Mr. Beatty spoke of how to make information into business intelligence, and the role of journalists given the explosion of information with the advent of the internet. He said journalists were responsible for setting context, separating truth from fiction, and determining what was important amide the flood of available information.

In speaking of the value of open source intelligence, Mr. Beatty noted the common belief that secret intelligence was of more value, but noted that vital information was not necessarily secret, and that secrets were not necessarily essential. He also spoke of unnecessary secrecy, the over-cautiousness of our government and how it hindered the sharing of information by labeled too much information as secret.

He believed the richest source of intelligence was open source, but that the challenge is to find the resources to manage the volume of data available. He also noted that the speed of open source intelligence was both a benefit and a problem, as in the example of "breaking news," whereby both policymakers and the general public were audience to the same information, the "democratization of information" as Mr. Beatty called it.

Open source intelligence sets the context within which secret intelligence must be judged. Given the information available in open source, we must look to where the enemy hides in plain site, for terrorism is much like business, not merely as one body but linked to a larger system, using the same open source information systems as we do over the internet. Just like businesses, terrorists are recruited over the internet.

He closed by stating that one limit of open source intelligence was that given the surplus of information available, the responsibility lies with finding a way to use it effectively.

Question and answer period:

Question: The panel was asked to rate Canada's use of open source information

Answer: we have a way to go and were working on it. Canada has to find ways to use both sources, cannot rely on one exclusively

Question: how should open source intelligence be judged for reliability

Answer: Nolte answered the viability of websites must be given strict scrutiny. The intelligence community was not alone; journalists too had to be held responsible for separating fact from fiction.

CASIS Keynote Lecture

Chair: Greg Fyffe, Executive Director, International Assessment Staff, Privy Council Office
Presenter: Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence and Security Academy, Washington DC and former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, 2002-2005
Rapporteurs: Nick Deshpande, Royal Military College
Oana Tranca, Laval University

Greg Fyffe introduced Mark Lowenthal as benefiting from a mixture of different perspectives on intelligence; he had a variety of experiences, both professional and academic, covering every significant angle of analysis in this field.

Mr. Lowenthal illustrated how the intelligence communities learned lessons from their inability to prevent the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their involvement with the decision to go to war in Iraq. He also addressed how misperceptions of the intelligence community evolved from these two events. He concluded that the standards for National Intelligence Estimates, a joint intelligence product, need to be revamped for a variety of reasons.

Lowenthal asserted that a lack of tactical thinking was the reason the US Intelligence Community failed to stop the attacks of 11 September 2001. Furthermore, the warnings received did not add up to anything tangible that could be addressed on a tactical level.

Collective security is a concept that has driven much of the activity and actions of the US since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Additionally, the intelligence communities in countries that face this common threat need to think more like the enemy. By focusing on significant dates, such as Christmas, we risk missing the 'go' dates established by terrorist groups. How we think about intelligence matters, stated Lowenthal.

Regarding the war in Iraq, most countries believed that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction; thus, the issue became a matter of disarming Iraq vice a matter of determining possession. Iraq promoted this perception in order to appear strategically powerful. Many of the problems perceived by critics of the US intelligence community are misconceptions, such as the existence of groupthink and the politicization of analysis. However, the US did fail to flag uncertainties in key judgments.

In Iraq, the main criticism concerned the fact that we came to the wrong conclusions about WMD. However this is not entirely due to intelligence failure. That Iraq had WMD was a widely believed view, even among the members of the Security Council. At the time the question was how best to deal with Iraq and not whether it had WMD. This universally held view was also shared by Saddam's own generals short before the war began.

The lesson learned from Iraq is that we used limited and outdated intelligence but this amounts to a more general problem in the intelligence field: how do we know what new and old is. The estimate intelligence analysts wrote for the Senate was a technical update of the Iraq situation, devoid of any political analysis or assessment of Saddam's future plans. In the light of recent research, Saddam actually sought to gain a strategic advantage to Iran. The estimate also did not take into account the nature of the regime, a "lieocracy" (a regime where everybody lies to everybody).
Thus, we failed to flag the misjudgments in the intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysts are not risk adverse but they are adverse to unrealistic expectations and being criticized for it.

A more general observation is that the analysis was not politicized. The lessons unaddressed: we have to better flag uncertainties in intelligence reports. While a lot of blame for causing the war went to the intelligence estimate, it was actually not that influential and in fact had little effect on the policy process that preceded the war.
In general, there is a problem when intelligence is asked to provide “casus belli”, and in that sense it was wrong to use the estimate in order to justify the war.

Finally, the unaddressed questions following 9/11 and Iraq is how right in the intelligence community are we supposed to be, how often and on what issues. Thus we have to come to the realization that intelligence analysts cannot be right every time. Actually, they will be wrong on a recurrent and regular basis. Intelligence reports are the result of accumulating information. The estimate on Iraq was based on intelligence stating that Saddam was a serial liar, that if he has WMD, he will use them and if he says he does not have them that contradicts the whole previous intelligence on him. Consequently we have to have a political debate on a reasonable standard to set for using intelligence as a political tool.

In conclusion, the US intelligence estimates have touched a moral, political and intellectual dead-end and we have to rethink how to make them shorter and how to better stress significant judgments hidden among insignificant paragraphs. We should also discourage the use of intelligence as a “buffet”, as politicians seek the phrase they need in order to justify they policies and decide to ignore the rest. As every estimate is the result of a plebiscite among different intelligence agencies, it would be better if we awarded a stronger voice to specialized agencies on specific issues. Estimates should also be less politicized, it is impossible to write an accurate report if politicians insist on giving guidelines for writing it.

Question and answer period:

Question: how opinions of people that did not believe Saddam had WMD were received by the intelligence community?

Answer: There were opinions that Saddam did not have WMD. However they were competing with the contrary established opinion of all great powers. And Saddam himself contradicted it by not accepting inspectors in his palaces. The accumulative experience we had in dealing with Saddam was contradicting an opinion that he was telling the truth after he lied so many times.

Question: how to do policy makers come to a point where they can accept that intelligence may fail?

Answer: Policy makers have to understand the cost of doing business: if you want to take risks, you have to accept failure.

Question: was the 9/11 Commission report overrated?

Answer: The 9/11 Commission described 9/11 as a failure of imagination but in reality we could not have stopped the flights. We have to think “dirty”, like the terrorists, if we want to prevent future attacks.

Intelligence agencies had the pressure to provide a rationale for the war, which is inevitable. But if intelligence agencies are required to be right all the time, then they will fail. Instead, a variable standard for success needs to be developed through public debate by parties with a vested interest.

CASIS Town Hall – The O'Connor Commission Report:
An Assessment of the Findings

Presenters: Reg Whitaker, University of Victoria
Jeff Salot, The Globe and Mail
Sheema Khan, founder and former Chair of the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations
Rapporteur: Anthony Ippolito, Carleton University

Reg Whitaker:

The Arar Commission had to make judgments on the behaviour of the RCMP, which has its own unique culture vis-à-vis security and intelligence agencies. The Commission also had to ensure that what happened to Mr. Arar never happens again, dealing with issues of evidentiary use, the sharing of evidence, and on the centralization of control within the RCMP in national security investigations. There is also the question of political control, in that the RCMP must have political direction when dealing with national security matters. The sharing of information is also crucial, both with domestic and foreign partners, but it must be done in a way that protects the rights of all people.

Mr. Whitaker remarked about the "unfinished business of the Arar affair, "the first item (of which) is the elephant in the room that is hardly ever referred to, but is in fact huge, and that is what happened to Mr. Arar was that Mr. Arar, a Canadian citizen, was kidnapped by the government of the US while in transit from an airport in New York and sent to a country known for its abuse of human rights." The Commission's purview was to examine Canadian complicity in this affair, but ultimately there is still the fact that, unfortunately, Canada's close ally and partner proved to be totally untrustworthy with the information that was passed to them, and they were willing to act with flagrant disregard for the rights of Mr. Arar.

The second aspect of "unfinished business" regards the recent legal decision striking down aspects of the government's ability to protect secrecy. In this case, freedom of the press was at stake. Secret documents appeared on the front page of the Ottawa Citizen, obviously leaked by members of the Canadian government, none of whom have been fingered for this incident. This was a deliberate effort by those within the government first of all to cover themselves, and to paint a picture of innocence, but secondly to smear and undermine Mr. Arar's reputation. Consequently, journalistic ethics and how the media can be used in these situations must be addressed.

Jeff Sallot:

Justice O'Connor has reported on, amongst other things, questions about the way the media practices its craft, including the protection of sources. O'Connor said there was a smear campaign to paint Mr. Arar as a dangerous man, even after his ordeal in Syria, and even after his return in Canada, and that this campaign has originated somewhere in the federal government. Media, however, were accomplices in this campaign. Just after Mr. Arar's release in 2002, Sallot wrote that Arar had been "roughed up, but that he had not been tortured" – an incorrect statement. Sallot's report denied Arar's suffering, further victimizing him. The "not-tortured story" no doubt made Arar believe he was not really safe from a repeat of all the things that had happened – he would have every right to believe that "powerful but unseen forces were

still aligned against him." Sallot apologized a few days later at a face-to-face interview with Arar. However, other journalists have been misfed information regarding Arar as well.

The media does need sources, but must now re-evaluate how they use them. The Conservative government is clamping down on people talking to reporters without prior authorization. Sallot's two sources about Arar were simply wrong, in that they were mistaken and were passing on hearsay. But what if the source deliberately lies, perhaps to dampen the need for a judicial inquiry, as Sallot believes happened? Sallot would then tell the source, as he has, to let them know that he was not pleased with the lies, and if he were to discover that a source has lied in the past, he would no longer be used a source.

Sheema Khan:

Ms. Khan presented views from the Muslim community. She went to the local mosque on the final day of Ramadan (Monday, October 24) and observed that the O'Connor Report was discussed for 15 minutes. Ms. Khan wonders how our security agencies can "get it so wrong", designating both Arar and his wife as Islamic extremists, saying that Arar was in tehe vicinity of Washington on 9/11 when he was in San Diego, saying that he refused a RCMP interview, saying that he left abruptly from Ottawa to leave for Tunisia when this was in fact just a vacation – so, even the basic facts are being misreported.

The Muslim community is concerned with oversight and accountability. Muslims are worried that the authorities in Islamic nations were questioning certain nationals regarding links to Arar. The outsourcing of torture is another concern, and the use of torture must generally be abhorred. Another area of concern is the use of databases, as Mr. Arar and his family were placed on a "lookout list" – without the right of appeal. The upcoming no-fly list is similar – what if an innocent citizen's name has been put on by mistake, and what are the recourses to appeal?

Regarding recommendations, O'Connor did say that the perception by Muslims with regards to CSIS and RCMP is something that should be taken very seriously. Prior to the Report, there was much mistrust, but following the Report, it has hit rock bottom. The Canadian government must work hard to rebuild that trust.

Furthermore, the use of the media to smear Mr. Arar is troubling, because it is likely these things might happen again since no one was convicted thus far. The flipside is that if this does happen again, it may prevent other foreign intelligence agencies from sharing information with Canada due to fears of leaks.

Justice O'Connor should be commended as his report is a model, showing that despite the excesses and the abuses, Canada is willing to reform. There is no hesitation here as seen with the Bush administration which has fought many attempts to question its practices regarding detainees. The sharing of information is very important to consider, in light of a recent US law allowing the government to classify non-citizens as enemy combatants, devoid of legal rights, and it is curious that our government has not protested, whereas the government of the UK has sought to receive an exemption from this bill for its citizens.

Public comments:

#1: The government of the day defines the terms of reference in a judicial inquiry, and while these have the appearance of being independent, these commissions are nevertheless executive tools.

#2: We expect judicial inquiries to be able to deliver stern findings with serious impacts, that they are used to hold the government to its word. We should expect changes to occur now in light of the Arar Report. It has been some weeks since the report has been released, and we have yet to see what the government will do about it. Therefore, judicial enquiries may not be as great as previously thought to be. Other methods exist and ought to be considered in assessing our security and intelligence methods.

#3: No one who attended this CASIS conference had any doubt that Western society is collectively facing a difficult, dangerous situation with respect to the current form of extremism and terrorism. We must address it properly. "One of the things that come out from the excellent O'Connor inquiry is that despite the seriousness of the problem, we run the risk of becoming so preoccupied, even obsessed, with the chimera of 100% security, something which is totally unattainable, that we run the risk as we pursue the course that we must pursue, of doing great violence to the rule of law and human rights in general in the pursuit of this absolute which just does not exist."

#4: We must shift our perception a bit, from government to the social fabric. Many private events occur that reflect an absence of security, such as when individuals have asked to have other people removed from planes when they suspect them, breaking down the bonds of trust between society at large. The inadequate provision of security and a tear in the social fabric go hand in hand.

#5: We have made some mistakes, and the Commission has helped remedy these mistakes, but public attitudes have been cynical. The lesson that we are teaching people is, "don't bother too hard to do the right thing, because in the end you will just be treated cynically anyways."

Final comments from presenters:

Whitaker: A cautionary note regarding O'Connor's findings is that it was recognized early on that the Arar operation is not in fact representative of the way things are being done now and that the policy recommendations coming in the second half of the report are addressing the way things are actually being done now.

Kahn: The public has become cynical, yet Arar wanted to restore public trust in our institutions. Despite everything, he still believes in them, that it is necessary to have these institutions to function appropriately, so not everyone is cynical.

Panel 12 – Roundtable: The Media and the Secret World

Chair: David Watson, Ottawa Citizen
Presenters: Jim Bronskill, Canadian Press
Colin Freeze, The Globe and Mail
Stewart Bell, The National Post
Michelle Shepard, The Toronto Star
Rapporteur: Steve Masson, Carleton University

Chair's Remarks:

David Watson opened the panel, highlighting the increasing clash between the journalistic drive to reveal the truth and the opposing requirement to maintain government secrecy. He noted that this is complicated by the vagueness in Canadian law over who constitutes a terrorist and what constitutes an official secret. Thus, the panel members report on terrorism at a time when no one is sure who constitutes a terrorist and what constitutes a secret.

Jim Bronskill:

Jim Bronskill is an Ottawa-based reporter for the Canadian Press. He began is remarks by noting that journalists like discovering state secrets, in part, because secrets are sometimes kept for the wrong reason. Sometimes, however, selective leaks, half truths, partial disclosures and outright lies can serve the official agenda but hurt the public interest. However, he stressed that this media call for more openness in national security affairs is not entirely self-serving.

Jim Bronskill outlined his use of the Access to Information Act to attempt to uncover what security and intelligence services are doing. Through Access to Information Act (ATI), he seeks access to such items as Cabinet briefing notes on counter-terrorism drills, policy discussions on potential landing of CIA planes in Canada, what sort of national security briefings the Prime Minister is receiving, and so forth. He observed that patience is becoming a virtue on the national security beat, as in the pursuit of such information, journalists are encountering increasing barriers. Reporters can encounter delays of over one year in obtaining documents under ATI. It appears as though responding to ATI requests are not a priority for many government agencies. Jim Bronskill believes that the ATI law should allow greater openness to cabinet records, background records, and all sorts of information that is too easily withheld from the public because of security exemptions. Even with older documents, dating back over sixty years, disclosure is withheld for security reasons. Yet, it is very difficult to understand how release of sixty year old records could damage Canada's international relations today.

As one example of the increasing trend of the Government of Canada withholding information, Jim Bronskill cited the case of Transport Canada's records on security screening infiltration tests at airports. These records were easily accessible prior to 9/11. After 9/11, however, the results of these tests were no longer disclosed for security reasons. While there may be a case for withholding particular information for particular airports, he sees no reason why the government should not release national statistics in the aggregate. The Government of Canada seems to use national security as a trump card to withhold release of information. But release of such information could actually have a positive impact for the public, for example, by increasing pressure on Transport Canada to improve the airport safety

These challenges add up to a situation akin to journalists trying to assemble a jigsaw puzzle in the dark. Furthermore, when the public lacks information on the extent and nature of the security threat Canada faces, it is hard for the public to make decisions on what kind of security arrangements it wants for the country.

Finally, with regards to the Maher Arar case, Jim Bronskill believes that damaging stories about Maher Arar, resulting from deliberately false information that was leaked, could be avoided in the future by the establishment of a parliamentary oversight committee for Canadian security and intelligence. Furthermore, he is worried about the current policy of the federal government which discourages federal agency heads to sit down with reporters in one-on-one interviews. This greatly complicates matters, for as Jim Bronskill noted, what are journalists to do when they have only half pictures, and half truths? He did offer a few options that journalists could

employ: avoid anonymous sources; seek out voices that might have something different to say; double and triple check stories; seek out documents in new places. Ultimately, old fashioned journalistic techniques can be used to overcome the challenges that journalists encounter on the national security beat.

Colin Freeze:

Colin Freeze was unable to speak at the conference, as his editor wanted to avoid a conflict of interest between his participation in the conference his coverage of the conference for the newspaper.

Stewart Bell:

Stewart Bell began by noting that Canadian journalists are doing increasingly more reporting on terrorism and counter-terrorism. However, this is still a very difficult beat for reporters to cover, because of the duel challenge of terror groups by their nature being secretive organizations and second, because of governments citing security reasons to justify withholding information.

Stewart Bell also focused his remarks on the Access to Information laws. As he explained it, the ATI works as follows: reporters send off a letter asking for documents and in response, they get partially blanked out papers back in the mail and told in the covering letter that sections are omitted due to national security. This raises the question of what is being omitted. He noted that sometimes, reporters stumble upon two copies of the same document, one in its entirety and the other with portions blacked out. Revealing what was omitted raises questions about the discretion used by censors in the Access to Information process. He cited two examples, (one of which is cited below) that raises the question of whether the government is achieving the right balance between openness and secrecy in determining what becomes public information under ATI.

Stewart Bell used as a case study the unclassified ITAC report written for official government use entitled, “Is Canada next?” Comparing the version of the report in its entirety with that obtained under ATI illustrates what the Government thought necessary to censor: a list of the type of targets that Al Qaeda has shown an interest in attacking; the admission that ITAC was aware of target reconnaissance in Canada; the explanation that Canada’s participation in Afghanistan and close ties with US being used as justification by Al Qaeda for keeping Canada on its target list; and the names of high profile terrorist suspects in Canada. Stewart Bell could see justification in ATI removing the names and lists of targets, but overall, almost everything else that was removed from these reports was already in the public domain. Moreover, the items omitted did not betray or reveal any intelligence sources or investigative methods. His conclusion is that in these government reports obtained under ATI, much more information could have been released then was actually released. This in turn raises the question of what is actually being omitted in other ATI reports and it is necessary for government censors to block the release of this information? Democracy does require some degree of accountability and transparency from its government to be balanced against secrecy needs. To that end, Stewary Bell noted that the Director of CSIS told the conference yesterday how it is becoming increasingly important to develop a clearer understanding of security intelligence and what CSIS does and does not do.

Stewart Bell concluded his remarks by asking, how are Canadians to decide how far they want their agencies to go in fighting terror without a more open and realistic understanding of the threats they meet today?

Michelle Shepard:

Michelle Shepard is the Toronto Star reporter who broke the story of the Toronto-17 terror cell. She has covered national security full time for the Toronto Star for over three years. Her stories have recently taken her to the Horn of Africa, to Pakistan, and to Guantanamo Bay. It is a sad comment on Canadian journalism that there are not more resources dedicated to the national security field. She cited two reasons for this: (1) the Canadian culture of secrecy, and (2) the difficulty in balancing access to sources and holding the government to account when pursuing stories on this beat.

(1) Culture of Secrecy
Michelle Shepherd's beat involves covering the CBSA, DFAIT, RCMP, CSIS, Public Safety, among other agencies. However, when she is trying to follow leads, she is often directed from one agency to the next and at the end of the day, usually only no more than a 'no comment' on the story. She believes that government cooperation with the media would help these public institutions do their jobs better. Thus, there is a lot of room for improving the government's openness to the media. She does see some level of increased openness among the security and intelligence community, but does not feel they have gone far enough.

(2) Balance
Michelle Shepherd also lamented that national security journalists are forced to play both good cop and bad cop in their reporting, which can lead to them oversimplifying their reporting at times. This is best understood in contrast to the reporting environment in the United States, where there are enough journalists covering the beat to allow for a division of labour with some playing bad cop, holding the government to account, while other newspapers can play good cop, nurturing and developing their access to principle sources. In Canada, there is not enough journalistic scope to allow for this, and so the single reporter has to be both the good cop and the bad cop at the same time. Michelle Shepherd thinks this one sided reporting is contributing to a public loss of confidence in reporting on national security, and thus, more balance needs to be achieved in the coverage.

Question and answer period:

Question: is there a recourse to the courts when access to information fails?

Answer: Jim Bronskill noted that this is often too costly an option for media outlets to pursue and leads to very little additional information being disclosed.

Michelle Shepherd, in response to a second question, commented on how breaking the story on the Toronto terrorist cell was not very frustrating, because there had been quite a bit of buzz in the intelligence community about it in the months leading up to the arrests. This gave her quite a bit of lead time to research the story before it broke. From her perspective, it only became frustrating when the international media became involved. Stewart Bell added that officials in the security and intelligence community seemed to be amazed at the amount of information about the case that the combined reporting of the CBC, Globe and Mail, National Post and Toronto Star were able to piece together about the case for the public. Jim Bronskill remarked that it would be interesting to see how much information is disclosed as the case now winds its way through the courts.

In response to a question concerning court ordered media blackouts on terrorism cases, none of the panelists saw it as a serious concern, as the same rules apply for any criminal trial, terrorism or not. In fact, Jim Bronskill observed that the courts are actually one of the best windows for discovering what is transpiring in terrorism-related cases. It was also noted that journalists are able to attend security-certificate hearings, even if they are restrained in what they can report.

It was noted by an audience member that the release of a document under Access to Information is almost certain to be misinterpreted by media consumers as they lack an understanding of the broader context related to the released information. For example, release of the statistics on airport security tests could be misinterpreted without release of the much broader background on the airport security file. This speaks to the broader dilemma outlined by Justice O'Connor in the Maher Arar Inquiry over how should a journalist report a story when they get a major scoop in this world of secrecy. In response, Jim Bronskill answered that any bit of information that is released is assessed on their merits by reporters; these reporters look at a number of factors such as whether the information can be corroborated and what the context of the scoop is. He said that for information revealed under Access to Information, a good reporter will make a phone call and ask for the information to be explained in the broader context. He said reporters are always testing and backing up any information that they receive. He does believe that there are times when reporters are in fact serving the public interest by not revealing items that should remain secret; he thinks that all the panelists from time to time have exercised restraint and asked themselves whether there is merit in other people knowing when they stumble upon government secrets. Michelle Shepherd added that the Arar case provides a good lesson for all journalists. That is, the only way to guard against reporting secret information out of context is to try to think about the motives for why the information was leaked; in the security and intelligence community, there are a very few people who are genuine whisleblowers. Most leaks have an agenda behind them. Stewart Bell observed that Canada does not have the same sort of politically motivated leak culture as does the United States or United Kingdom. Leaking in Canada is very rare in the national security beat.

There were also several observations made by audience members. CASIS President Wesley Wark noted that Access to Information is a misnomer and that it can often times be better thought of as the Access to Misinformation Act, if the relevant information is released at all. Another audience member remarked how she observed media deliberating framing questions and reporting in such a way that could create somewhat of a bias in their reporting. In response, Michelle Shepherd noted that this becomes a lot less likely when media outlets can devote a journalist full time to covering a given beat, which will lead to more balanced reporting.

Conference Conclusions and Wrap-up: Looking Back and Looking Ahead

Chair: Professor Wesley Wark, CASIS President and Munk Centre, University of Toronto
Presenters: Jennifer Sims, Georgetown University
Wolfgang Krieger, University of Marburg
Margaret Purdy, University of British Columbia
Rapporteur: Natalie Fraser, Carleton University

Wesley Clark welcomed the three speakers and said they would provide a sense of where we will take the ideas expressed this weekend and how we will take the conference forward.

Margaret Purdy – She said you cannot look forward without doing a retrospection of what you have seen and learned in the past. She wanted to focus her idea in three ways: as a Canadian, as a researcher and writer in the security field, and as a new member of the CASIS Executive.

As a Canadian attending this globally unique event, she thought frank ideas were shared on the most critical contemporary issues. The student participation at the event was very important. As a researcher and writer in the field, she thinks work remains to be done. The threat environment is robust and a lot of new information is coming in everyday. Today the operational, legal, and policy environment are all far from stable. As a new member of CASIS they have their work cut out for them. They have an opportunity to add new voices and different agendas next year, including on: criminal defense, open source, and homeland security in Canada. They also want to hear from new players in the security intelligence business, including private sector businesses whose facilities might be targeted by threats.

Jennifer Sims – She presented her impressions in the form of three take aways, calling them wicked problems. The first is imagination. They need more of this in the intelligence business. Sometimes there is too much of this and other times, including government there is not enough. Despite the existence of culturally involved people, these people are difficult to retain in the intelligence field. The second is surprise. Terrorism is a rapidly changing idea. The more we focus on the threat, the more we need to build adaptability and agility. The third is the law enforcement and intelligence conundrum. The fundamentals of them are different. There competitions and goals overlap, and sometimes they do not. She also added in counter intelligence as an increased reliance and the importance of an increased reliance on foreign intelligence liaison. It is very difficult to partner and retain suspicion.

Wolfgang Krieger – His wish list for CASIS: to keep up the good work, to thank the Canadian government for supporting the conference and to tell them to start supporting intelligence and security research at Canadian universities, and to not forget history when talking about intelligence studies. Intelligence history is the ideal training ground for learning. This creates a more informed public and creates more informed public conversation and debate. He thinks that the current post 911ism happening now is very concerning. We are old enough to remember the Berlin Wall coming down, and the idea of a new world that happened because of this event. This new world ideology did not last more than ten years, and now it is happening against post-911. We need more history in the conference program.

Wesley Wark ended the conference by telling attendees the next conference is in Calgary in 2007.

End of conference