



CASIS INTELLIGENCE

#35 – FALL 1999

SPECIAL Y2K ISSUE

President's Column

CASIS News

1999 Annual General Meeting

Canadian Intelligence

International Intelligence

Micellaneous Intelligence

Publications and Research

Announcements

Canadian Association for Security Intelligence Studies

The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) is a nonpartisan, voluntary association established in 1985. Its principal purpose is to provide informed debate in Canada on security and intelligence issues. Membership is open and currently includes academics, concerned citizens, government officials, journalists, lawyers, students, as well as former intelligence officers.

Please direct all correspondence to:

CASIS Secretariat
P.O. Box 69006, Place de Ville
Ottawa, ON K1R 1A7
CANADA

For more information about CASIS visit its official website:

<http://www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS/>

CASIS Executive, 1999-2000

President: **Wesley K. Wark**

wesley.wark@sympatico.ca

Vice-President: **Alan Breakspear**

abreakspear@ibisresearch.com

Past President (ex-officio): **Jim Maddin**

jmaddin@interlog.com

Secretary-Treasurer: **Jacqueline Shaw**

jtshaw@igs.net

Atlantic Representative: **David Charters**

charters@unb.ca

BC Representative and Web Administrator: **Stuart Farson**

farson@sfu.ca

Quebec Representative: **Jean-Paul Brodeur**

brodeuj@cicc.umontreal.ca

Ontario Representative: **Holly Porteous**

ea488@freenet.carleton.ca

Prairies Representative and Newsletter Editor: **Steve Hewitt**

hewitt@duke.usask.ca

Note: The views and opinions expressed in the CASIS Newsletter do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Association for Security Intelligence Studies.

CASIS INTELLIGENCE

#35 – FALL 1999

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRESIDENT'S COLUMN.....	Page 1
CASIS NEWS.....	Page 2
- Message from the Editor	
- The 2000 CASIS Conference	
- Teaching Intelligence: Geoff Weller's Experience	
1999 CASIS ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING.....	Page 3
- Minutes of the Meeting	
- Executive Reports	
- Selection of Abstracts from Papers Presented	
CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE.....	Page 9
- SIRC: The Annual Report and New Appointments: Reg Whitaker Interprets	
- CSIS: 1998 Public Report and the Threat from Bioterrorism and Nuclear Weapons	
- CSE: Annual Report of the CSE Commissioner	
- DND: Y2K Readiness Report; Canada's Spy Satellite	
- CISC: Project SOLSTICE and 1999 Report on Organized Crime	
- RCMP: 1998/99 Performance Report; The Threat from Cyberspace	
- DFAIT: Development of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism	
- SolGen: More Money for Fighting Transnational Crime	
INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.....	Page 15
- United States: Stolen Nukes?; Project Megiddo; CIA Map Making; Holly Porteous Comments	
- Russia: KGB PM	
- United Kingdom: Good-byes to Spies	
- Pakistan: A Sticky Wicket?	
- Portugal: Accident Becomes Assassination	
- Japan: North Korea Steals People	
MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE.....	Page 20
- 1999: The Year of the Security Breaches?	
- Wanted: A Few Good Spies	
- The Man Who Might Have Been What? Peter Marwitz Reviews	
- The Red Files	
- Intelligence in Popular Culture	
- Reform MP Settles Out of Court and Launches New Allegations	
PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH.....	Page 22
- <i>The Mitrokhin Archive</i> and other Recent Publications	
- Research Notes: Accessing Records in Canada, the UK, and the US; Lee Harvey Oswald	
ANNOUNCEMENTS.....	Page 25
- Conferences	
- Internet Discussion Lists	

PRESIDENT'S COLUMN

CASIS has had a pretty good year in 1999. The prospects for our organization are even better for the year 2000. Presidents always say such things, but in our case, it is true!

First of all, we have been lucky to attract an infusion of new talent into our Executive and I want to extend a warm welcome and thanks to our incoming Newsletter editor, Steve Hewitt, and to our new Secretary-Treasurer, Jacqueline Shaw. The splendid job done by their predecessors, André Lapointe as Secretary-Treasurer and Bob Henderson as Newsletter Editor, was acknowledged by all who attended the CASIS conference in Toronto in June. André Lapointe was awarded a CASIS wallet (empty) as a special thanks for his work for the organization over the past two years. We may make a tradition of this—it beats new shoes at budget time.

The CASIS annual conference in Toronto last June was, I think, a success. Attendance was sufficient to pay the bills and sustain a good Q and A session after each panel. The quality of the presentations was very high. The June 1999 conference was marked by one innovation, which I hope we will continue—namely the practice of including at least one session featuring student presentations. I want, in particular, to thank those students who came to the conference, in some cases from far afield. Under the pressure of brutal time limits, they did a highly credible job. Special thanks must go out to our volunteer Toronto organizing committee, chaired by Victor Madeira and including Mathilde von Bülow, Will Fripp and Michelle Briones, who did such a good job for us in

bringing the conference off. Without their help, the conference would simply not have happened.

We are already looking ahead to the CASIS 2000 conference, about which the Newsletter carries a separate announcement (see CASIS news section). We intend to make this as big a show as possible, with Ottawa as our venue and with a theme centered on “The Future of Intelligence.” I am very pleased to announce that the CASIS 2000 conference will be provided with generous financial support courtesy of the Privy Council Office of the Government of Canada. For this support we are particularly indebted to Anthony Campbell, the Executive Director of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, and to Margaret Purdy, the Security and Intelligence Co-Ordinator.

The CASIS web site (visit us at <http://www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS>) continues to grow and improve, thanks to the excellent efforts of our web administrator, Stuart Farson. The web site has become, in little over a year, a highly significant resource for CASIS and an important part of our effort to provide a forum for the public dissemination of knowledge concerning intelligence and security matters. Use it, please, and help Stuart Farson make it better.

A new initiative is underway to try to link the various nationally-based intelligence and security associations — CASIS's counterparts abroad — together. If this initiative succeeds we can hope to broaden our international contacts and to look forward to truly international gatherings and exchanges of information in the years ahead. Crucial to this endeavour will be the availability of a common e-mail discussion list. One, known as “Intelligence Forum,” (IF) is cur-

rently under construction. Intelligence Forum may become, in future, as our experience of it grows, an accredited CASIS list, to which all our members will be invited to contribute. But for the moment, I hope our members will take note of its existence (see the Announcements section for information on how to subscribe to the list).

As the times dictate, we are becoming as wired as we can. But our Gutenberg era Newsletter remains our bread and butter. I hope you will all support our new Editor, Steve Hewitt, by providing him with material for inclusion in future issues, helpful feedback, and loads of encouragement.

The contact details for all the members of the Executive are listed in the Newsletter and I am sure that I speak for everyone in saying that we would like to hear from you. We would also like to have your charitable donations, which can be sent to Jacqueline Shaw and for which you will be provided a tax credit receipt. We also hope to see you at the next conference in Ottawa. Stay tuned for further news on the conference, which will reach you in subsequent Newsletter issues, via the web site, and by future mailings.

Best wishes,

Wesley K. Wark

MESSAGE FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to the latest edition of the CASIS Newsletter. Last June at the annual meeting I was appointed as its new editor. I would like to thank Dr. Robert D'A. Henderson, the previous editor, for consistently creating such a high quality publication.

The new newsletter will to a major extent be more of the same. Essentially, the contents can be broken down into six general categories: news and information related to CASIS and its members; news and information connected to security and intelligence matters in Canada; items of interest in the international world of security and intelligence; miscellaneous matters; recent publications and research issues; and, finally, announcements of interest to CASIS members.

In order for this publication to truly address the needs of the members of CASIS the participation of members is crucial. If you have news, information, references to publications, please send them along. To ensure that your contribution makes the next issue of the newsletter, please submit your material by February 1, 2000 at the latest.

Material along with queries, bricks, bouquets, darts, and laurels (no computer viruses please) can be sent to me by e-mail (hewitt@duke.usask.ca), fax (530-380-8746) or by mail (CASIS, P.O. Box 69006, Place de Ville, Ottawa, Ontario K1R 1A7).

In the case of this issue, I would like to express my gratitude for their assistance to Holly Porteous, Reg Whitaker, Wesley Wark, Jacqueline Shaw, Peter Marwitz, Geoff Weller, and Moira Harris.

Steve Hewitt, editor
CASIS Newsletter

2000 CONFERENCE: "THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE"

It seems fitting in the year 2000 to give the CASIS annual conference over to a special theme, "The Future of Intelligence." We plan to address this subject in both an international and Canadian context. Our futurology will be anchored in a comparison of international debates and experiences, and also in a strong historical foundation. The conference will be held in Ottawa; the rest of the details of the event are still a work in progress. We hope to have all the plans finalized in the near future and will keep our membership informed via all the available channels—CASIS newsletter, CASIS web site, and a special mailing.

The CASIS 2000 conference has received a very generous offer of financial support from the Privy Council Office of Canada. The Association owes a special thanks to Anthony Campbell, the Executive Director of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the PCO, and to Margaret Purdy, the Security and Intelligence Co-Ordinator.

If you have any questions about the 2000 conference please contact Wesley Wark at wesley.wark@sympatico.ca or by phone to 519-0836-9552.

NEWS FROM CASIS MEMBERS

TEACHING INTELLIGENCE *by Dr. Geoff Weller*

I recently taught a new course entitled "Intelligence and Security" as part of the offerings of the International Studies Program at the University of Northern British Columbia (UNBC). It was an undergraduate third year one semester course. It will be offered every other year and will alternate with a more

general course on security issues.

The course was organized into five sections. The introductory section compared definitions of the field, presented a brief history of the development of the intelligence communities, and tried to provide an idea of their current scope and roles. The second section covered elements of the intelligence process such as collection, analysis, estimates, coordination, dissemination, and feedback. It also contained lectures on intelligence cooperation and covert action. The third section dealt with security, counterespionage, and counterterrorism. The fourth investigated aspects of the role of intelligence in particular policy areas such as the economy, foreign affairs, defence, arms control, law enforcement, the environment, and health. A final section dealt with problems of intelligence and the various mechanisms of oversight and political control. Examples were taken mainly from Canada, the UK, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and Israel.

The course enrolled twelve students from a wide variety of backgrounds including psychology, anthropology, history, international studies, and political science. Their motives for taking the course were also varied and seemed to range from wanting preparation for joining an intelligence agency to finding out how to do away with them altogether. Some seemed merely curious. All arrived with what might be termed "media baggage," that is, popular and often highly inaccurate perceptions of the agencies and their roles derived from the television, movies, and novels. Thus, as with many other fields, "unlearning" proved to be a valuable initial exercise. The problem with that process is, of course, that fact - even if often more bizarre

than fiction - never seems to be quite as exciting to students as fiction. The fact that intelligence officers are bureaucrats (albeit a special kind of bureaucrat) and are expected to operate within the law and according to political direction seemed to be a bit of a disappointment. However, in time, the significance of the field and an interest in its intricacies and challenges appeared to develop. Nevertheless it seemed wise to mix the lectures with the showing of a few documentaries and a few episodes of "The Sandbaggers," as well as a visit by CSIS representatives. The students really appreciated the fact that CSIS was willing to send representatives to UNBC to talk to the members of the course and to the wider university community. CSIS clearly does itself a lot of good by undertaking these visits. Some of the students in the course developed more than a passing interest in the topic and one even went on to make a presentation at the CASIS conference held this past summer in Toronto. I thought that it was quite a brave thing for an undergraduate student to appear in front of assembled CASIS members - even though I know that we are a nice and friendly bunch.

Weller is a member of the Department of International Studies at the University of Northern British Columbia.

THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

CASIS ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, 12 JUNE 1999, TRINITY COLLEGE, TORONTO

Opening: The CASIS President, Professor Wesley Wark, welcomed CASIS members to the 1999 CASIS Annual General Meeting. A quorum was declared and the meeting officially open at 17:20.

The Minutes of the 1998 Annual General Meeting as prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer, and which appeared in the CASIS Newsletter Issue #33, Fall 1998, were presented for review and approval. A motion to was put forward by Mr. David Shimmelpenninck Van der Oye to approve the Minutes as written. The motion was seconded by Ms. Holly Porteous. The motion was passed.

The CASIS President reviewed procedures for the conduct of the meeting.

The CASIS Vice-President, Mr. Alan Breakspear, presented his report to the assembly. Mr. Breakspear first noted that because of other pressures, he was unable to fulfill his role as program co-ordinator for the 1999 CASIS conference and offered congratulations and thanks to Wesley Wark, Victor Madeira and others for filling the gap so successfully.

Mr. Breakspear offered some comments on the roles and responsibilities of various positions within CASIS given their importance in fulfilling the mandate of the association. Specifically, he focused on the positions of Secretary-Treasurer, Newsletter Editor and the newly created Web Administrator's position. The following is taken directly

from Mr. Breakspear's hand-written notes:

"The Secretary-Treasurer has responsibility for the administrative, financial and business records of the society (CASIS). The form and content of these records are dictated, largely, by external requirements, expressed by various governmental authorities, and by the conventions of the society itself. The Secretary-Treasurer deserves our thanks and appreciation for meeting the Society's needs in all these areas very well.

The Newsletter and the Website together represent the 'journal of record' for CASIS, and are vital to the continued effectiveness and the potential for growth of the Society. They are not independent or autonomous organs; they are not bound to observe principles of 'journalistic freedom'; nor are they supposed to serve personal or commercial interests unless specifically endorsed by the society.

The Newsletter has long served the needs and objectives of the Society very effectively, and the website has begun to extend and continue this tradition, also with great effect.

Unfortunately, recent issues of the Newsletter have represented personal interests and views, inappropriate to and inconsistent with the CASIS mandate. The Executive and membership of CASIS expect and must be assured, that the records, communications and journals of the society will be maintained at professional and proprietary standards; and that they will contain and present only information which belongs to or is legally available to the society, and which contributes appropriately to the society's mandate and purpose."

In response to Mr. Breakspear's

comments, the President offered some clarification concerning recent difficulties within CASIS and thanked the Vice-President for his remarks.

The Secretary-Treasurer submitted the CASIS Financial Report for 1998-1999 and submitted for discussion the proposed budget for 1999-2000. The proposed budget was accepted with the caveat that modifications could be brought to it should the need arise over the course of the financial year. The motion was put forward by Holly Porteous and seconded by Mr. Ed Denbeigh. The motion was passed.

The Secretary-Treasurer read in its entirety the report submitted by the CASIS Newsletter Editor, Dr. Robert D'A. Henderson, who was not in attendance at the conference. [The Newsletter Editor's submission is annexed to the present minutes and constitutes an integral part of this record.]

Several members commented on the issue of the CASIS Newsletter. Holly Porteous noted that distributing the Newsletter in electronic form would constitute a considerable cost savings and she was willing to share her experience in this area. Wesley Wark suggested that Steve Hewitt, who would be assuming the position of Newsletter Editor, should become familiar with what is involved in the work first before considering electronic distribution. The President suggested that the proposal be taken under advisement. Mr. Breakspear endorsed the President's proposal and noted that a dramatic change at the present time was not appropriate. He noted that the web site had already opened new avenues for modifying or expanding the way CASIS did business and that electronic distribution was an option to

consider in the future.

The CASIS Web Administrator, Stuart Farson, presented his annual report. He proposed initiatives for continued growth of the CASIS Website. [The Website Administrator's submission is annexed to the present minutes and constitutes an integral part of this record.] The estimated cost for these initiatives was between \$5,000 and \$6,500. It was agreed that as yet unspecified steps would have to be taken in order for CASIS to be able to fund these initiatives. Mr. Breakspear put forward a motion that echoed Mr. Farson's call for all CASIS material (CASIS records, publications and communications) to henceforth be prepared in electronic form as well as in hard copy. David Shimmelpenninck van der Oye supported the motion and was seconded by the Secretary-Treasurer. The motion was passed.

The President addressed the issue of the proposed modifications to the CASIS constitution, highlighting, among many changes, that the Vice-President's new functions would be those associated with conference planning. Mr. Breakspear said that given that the membership had had ample time to review proposed constitutional changes and was also afforded time to comment, he was putting forward a motion that subsequent to any immediate questions or concerns, the entire set of proposed constitutional changes be voted on and approved "en bloc". Steve Hewitt seconded the proposal. The President addressed the concerns raised by the Newsletter Editor in his written comments to the effect that proposed changes would do away with "editorial autonomy." The President noted that the changes to editorial accountability were necessary to avoid the use of the Newsletter as a

vehicle for personal or commercial agendas on the part of the Newsletter Editor, one of the issues outlined by the Vice-President in his earlier address to the membership.

The assembly then addressed the election and appointment of new members of the Executive. The President noted that only one position on the CASIS Executive, that of Secretary-Treasurer, had to be filled by way of a formal election and another, the Newsletter Editor's position was ex-officio. The President expressed his gratitude for all the work Dr. Robert D'A. Henderson, the outgoing Newsletter Editor, had done for CASIS over the years.

The nomination of Dr. Steve Hewitt as the new Newsletter Editor was announced. The President noted that, as had been done for Mr. Henderson, Mr. Hewitt would be able to claim a portion of his Internet service provider costs as a CASIS-related expense. The President then put forward Ms. Jacqueline Shaw of Ottawa as the sole candidate for the position of Secretary-Treasurer. Holly Porteous seconded the nomination. Ms. Shaw was voted in unanimously as the CASIS Secretary-Treasurer for the 1999-2001 period.

The assembly then addressed new business. Several issues were raised in relation to the 2000 CASIS Conference, including the creation of a prize for intelligence writing in Canada and the establishment of a bulletin board for CASIS members to discuss issues of concern. The President noted that the aim for 2000 was a large conference. First, a theme had to be developed. He noted that given the start of the new millennium, the "future of intelligence" was certainly an appropriate theme. He also noted that much

planning was necessary if a successful conference was to be held and remarked that there was not much time left for planning. Mr. Breakspear explained that it was the Executive's intention that CASIS follow the preliminary plan for a conference which he and Holly Porteous had prepared. Specifically that the conference be held in Ottawa, either at Carleton University, CSIS Headquarters or DFAIT Headquarters, and that it be 2 to 3 days in duration.

There was much discussion concerning the issue of what should be included as topics for the conference. The suggestions put forward

included the need to attract historians in addition to those interested in policy; focusing not only on the future but also on the present and the past; addressing the issues surrounding information warfare, information security management, critical infrastructure, self-education and professional development. A proposal was put forward that the conference could have several parallel tracks or themes one could follow. It was also noted that the conference could either have a strictly Canadian focus or include an international focus. It was agreed that a combined approach would be best. The critical issue of funding was

raised and options, such as government grants and private sponsorship were put forward.

The President thanked the assemble for all their suggestions and proposed creating several committees to take on various aspects of conference preparation, all under the guidance of Mr. Breakspear. The President noted that the membership would be asked to participate in the preparation.

The adjournment of the meeting was proposed by Ed Denbeigh and seconded by Mr. André Lapointe. The meeting was adjourned at 19:10.

CASIS Financial Report
CASIS Financial Statements for Fiscal Year Ending May 31, 1999
 (Period covering June 1, 1998 to May 31, 1999)

Opening Balance on June 1, 1998	\$5167.41
Revenue	
Membership Fees and Back Issue Payments	\$3505.29
Conference Fees after HSSFC and U of O Deductions	\$ 253.53
Solicitor General of Canada Conference Grant	\$2500.00
TOTAL REVENUE To 31 May 1999	\$6258.82
Expenditures	
CASIS Newsletter production, printing and mailing (issues 32 - double, 33 and 34)	(\$4452.48)
Secretariat Expenses	(\$ 775.62)
Replacement Printer for Editor	(\$ 758.32)
Bank Charges	(\$ 17.60)
1999 Conference Costs (Partial)	(\$ 500.00)
TOTAL EXPENDITURES To 31 May 1999	(\$6504.02)
Closing Balance on 31 May 1999	\$4922.21
Submitted for 1999 Annual General Meeting Approval by André Lapointe CASIS Secretary-Treasurer 1997-1999	
 CASIS 1999-2000 Proposed Budget	
Opening Balance on June 1, 1999	\$4922.21
Anticipated Revenue	
Membership Fees and Back Issue Requests	\$3600.00
1999 Conference Fees	\$ 500.00
U of T Departmental Grants for Conference	\$ 500.00
TOTAL Anticipated Revenue	\$4600.00
Anticipated Expenditures	
Newsletter production (3 issues @ 1000.00)	(\$3000.00)
Secretariat Expenses	(\$ 500.00)
2000 Conference Preparation	(\$ 800.00)
Web Site Maintenance	(\$ 300.00)
TOTAL Anticipated Expenses	(\$4600.00)
Submitted for Discussion and Approval by 1999 CASIS General Annual Meeting by André Lapointe CASIS Secretary-Treasurer 1997-1999	

WEB ADMINISTRATOR'S
ANNUAL REPORT
1998-99

Background:

During the fiscal year 1997-1998 a web site was designed and established on a Geocities site at: www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate77. At our last annual general meeting, I was appointed the web administrator for a two-year term. What follows is, therefore, my first annual report.

**Events occurring
during 1998-99:**

My first step as the new web administrator was to establish a new web site under the auspices of the Institute of Governance, Simon Fraser University. This arrangement was successfully negotiated and does not currently incur any costs to CASIS, as we are perceived as a *bona fide* academic research organization. Our site address is now www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS. We are in good company; the igs site also includes that of the Canadian Political Science Association.

Initially, our site was a mirror of the Geocities site. It has now been significantly developed with the addition of numerous research links. This has all been done without the use of any CASIS funds.

A proposal is now on the table with the Executive to develop the site further by annotating and extending the research links and by adding a bibliography of Canadian intelligence sources. This, in my view, will require a considerable investment in terms of time and money and will necessitate CASIS soliciting funding.

At the request of the President, I solicited the views of Executive members regarding the lag time between the mailing of a hard copy of the newsletter to members and its



Canadian
Association for
Security and
Intelligence
Studies

Information About CASIS

[Membership](#)
[Executive](#)
[Constitution](#)
[The CASIS Newsletter](#)
[Security & Intelligence Courses](#)
[1999 Annual Conference](#)

Research Tools on the Web

[Security & Intelligence Links](#)
[Bibliographies](#)

What is CASIS?

The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) is a nonpartisan, voluntary association established in 1985. Its principal purpose is to provide informed debate in Canada on security and intelligence issues. Membership is open and currently includes academics, concerned citizens, government officials, journalists, lawyers, students, as well as former intelligence officers.



For more
information,
contact **Stuart
Farson**.

Last Updated: April 7, 1999

general availability on the Net through the web site. There was no unison of opinion on the length of the delay. The following views were expressed:

“Not more than 3 months” /
“One Newsletter behind” / “One
year after” / “6 months after”

Problems:

At least two serious problems exist. One concerns the continued existence of the original Geocities site (still available as of June 9, 1999), despite my request to the Secretary-Treasurer to have the site removed. In my view, the continued existence of the site with at least year old data does nothing to improve our image and should now be removed as quickly as possible.

The other concerns previous copies of the Newsletter. At last year's conference, the Newsletter Editor was advised of our desire to include previous issues of the

newsletter on the web site. He was subsequently advised to provide me with electronic copies of the newsletter. He has not done so for reasons that are obscure. In fact he claims not to have such electronic files available and posits that we will have to undertake the considerable task of scanning the originals.

From time to time, I have received requests from research students asking for copies of particular issues. The only venue at the moment is for someone to photocopy the material in question.

I would like to underscore that it is absolutely essential that we take steps to ensure that we retain electronic records of our newsletter and other materials in the future.

I would like to invite all members to assist in the process of developing the site. If you see that a useful link is not present, please send me the address by E-mail. Similarly,

if something is not working to your liking, let me know.

Thank you.

Stuart Farson, June 9, 1999
<http://www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS/>

CONFERENCE PAPERS

At the annual meeting in June a wide range of papers were presented. For those of you who missed the conference, here is a collection of paper abstracts submitted by publication time. If you would like more information about the topic or even a copy of a paper, please contact the respective author or authors.

“Villa Maarheeze: The Netherlands Foreign Intelligence Service”

Bob de Graaff and Cees Wiebes
wiebes@psc.w.uva.nl

The writing of *Villa Maarheeze*, published on November 27th, and which the CASIS paper was based on, was not an easy undertaking. The Dutch government was not very cooperative vis-à-vis the authors who had to go court several times and who were forced to utilize legal assistance in order to get government documents and finally the book itself released. Former intelligence officials were explicitly warned not to speak with the authors. Despite the strong opposition of the Cabinet Office, the authors, Bob de Graaff and Cees Wiebes, succeeded, by using the Dutch Freedom of Information Act, in obtaining a large number of secret documents, reports and unknown internal publications. In spite of warnings by their (former) employer, many officials were willing to talk to the authors. The written materials plus more than 150 off-the-record interviews with former and still active intelligence

officials in the Netherlands and abroad, enabled them to reconstruct the history of the IDB.

“Fighting for Relevance: Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1943-1945”

David A. Messenger
dmesseng@chass.utoronto.ca

This paper examined the work of Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Spain during the latter part of the Second World War. Unlike SOE's broad mandate to sow dissent and disarray in occupied countries, in Spain agents were forbidden from any involvement in direct action and sabotage. Diplomatic concerns, namely the maintenance of Spanish neutrality in the war, overrode all other strategic issues in Iberia. SOE agents and leaders in Madrid, therefore, attempted to create a different role for themselves. Drawing on files released in the Public Record Office in 1998, the paper highlights SOE's limited success in the effort to establish for itself a part in the Allied strategic and diplomatic campaign against German wolfram (tungsten) smuggling. Success proved fleeting, however, and SOE's ultimate failure, in the face of hostility from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), to prove its usefulness beyond the wolfram campaign, would lead to its withdrawal from Spain. The story of the SOE in Spain represents, on a small scale, the failure of the organization to find a niche in the British intelligence community after the Second World War.

“A Matter of Espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Igor Gouzenko — The Canadian Connection Reassessed”

Bruce Craig
rbccraig84@hotmail.com

This paper challenges the the-

sis advanced by historian James Barros in his 1977 *Orbis* article titled, “Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White: The Canadian Connection” (*Orbis* 21/3 pp. 593-606). Barros argued that Russian defector Igor Gouzenko possessed evidence that linked both Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White to the Soviet underground. Based on documentary evidence found in the Canadian and American National Archives, and based on an assessment of Gouzenko's own statements before Congressional subcommittees and the press, Craig demonstrates that while Gouzenko made a profound contribution to western security officials' understanding of the Soviet underground, he possessed little direct knowledge of the espionage activities carried out by specific individuals in the United States or Great Britain. Contrary to Barros's conclusions, the defector did not possess a shred of evidence — documentary or otherwise — that implicated Harry Dexter White in the Soviet conspiracy. While White's involvement in what Canadian Under-Secretary of External Affairs, Norman Robertson, characterized as “a species of espionage” is clearly evident in the recently released VENONA decrypts, Gouzenko's revelations have no relevance or bearing on the espionage case relating to Harry Dexter White.

“Operation Mincemeat”

Laura Barnett
laura.barnett@utoronto.ca

Operation *Mincemeat* was an integral component of Operation Barclay, the World War II Allied deception operation in the Mediterranean, 1942-1943. While Operation Barclay attempted to secure the advantage of surprise in the Allied invasion of Sicily, Operation *Mincemeat*'s goal was to

support this attempt. A body carrying important documents was to drift ashore off the coast of Spain, supposedly the victim of a plane crash in the Atlantic. The documents were to fall into neutral, yet pro-German, Spanish hands who should pass them onto German authorities. The information in the documents was to divert enemy attention from possible landings in Sicily, leading them to consider other objectives in the Mediterranean field. Although *Mincemeat* is often touted as having confused the enemy and greatly aided Husky's element of surprise, its much-publicized success is more illusion than reality. While the deception did fool the Germans for a time, many aspects of the campaign did not run as smoothly as hoped. It is also debatable whether *Mincemeat* directly deflected German troop movements to Sardinia and the Balkans, and away from Sicily. Operation *Mincemeat*'s only real success lay in reinforcing Germany's existing perception of the situation in the Mediterranean, and in being an integral component of an ongoing Allied deception campaign.

"British Military Intelligence in the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915"

Sebastian Hubert Lukasik
slukasik@sfu.ca

The Gallipoli Campaign represents a thoroughly mismanaged military intelligence effort. The defects that characterized the activities of British military intelligence in all three spheres of military activity — the strategic, the operational and the tactical — contributed significantly to the failure of the operation as a whole. At lower levels of military action, the effectiveness of British intelligence activities was circumscribed by unsatisfactory leadership, the absence of fully

qualified personnel, problems of access to reliable sources of information and the limitations of contemporary intelligence-gathering technology. In spite of these difficulties, however, the quality of tactical and operational intelligence available to British forces at Gallipoli was not as unsatisfactory as could be expected. Regrettably, the limited successes of the British intelligence effort on the tactical and operational levels were nullified by the failings that occurred on the strategic level. The British War Council — the body responsible for the strategic direction of the war — sanctioned a purely naval, and ultimately a combined undertaking against the Dardanelles on the basis of several questionable assumptions about contemporary political, military, and social conditions in the Ottoman Empire. In the end, through its misuse and manipulation of strategic intelligence, the War Council endorsed an operation whose questionable strategic underpinnings could not be rectified even by the best efforts of operational and strategic intelligence.

"The Sharp End: Cooperation Between Intelligence Agencies and Law Enforcement in Counter-Terrorism"

Paul Christian
chrip@direct.ca

At 07:14 a.m. GMT on June 23, 1985, Air India flight 182 en route to London from Montreal, exploded off the coast of Ireland, killing all 329 people on board, most of whom were Canadian. The investigation revealed that Sikh extremists had planted the bomb on the plane in Vancouver. It was one of the worst acts of terrorism in the 1980s, and by far "the most heinous act of violence in Canadian history" according to Ron Atkey, chairman of

the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) at that time. Immediately following the incident was an investigation that would last more than a decade and cost Canadian tax payers \$80 million. In addition, the Air India incident pointed to serious flaws within the Canadian security intelligence system, most notably the relationship between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the newly formed Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

Counter-terrorism is best achieved when a working cooperative arrangement exists between intelligence agencies and law enforcement to combine their efforts. This paper examines the growing relationship between these two mechanisms and argue that one way of achieving this communication is by clearly defining the role intelligence and law enforcement agencies play, how these roles differ, and through the establishment of an intelligence producer - consumer relationship. While a theoretical approach covering the wide spectrum of the intelligence process will be considered, an emphasis on Canada is sought. Canada is an interesting case study because of its history in security intelligence policy, and the conflict between the use of conventional law enforcement versus an independent intelligence body that has existed since the troubles of the RCMP Security Service first became apparent. The paper is structured such that a review of the differing roles between intelligence agencies and law enforcement will begin, followed by a discussion of the similarities and differences of these roles. Three case studies will then be discussed. These case studies demonstrate the conflict and infighting that has existed since 1984 and legitimate the need for

clear separation and communication. The paper concludes with prescriptive recommendations on how Canada's security structure can benefit from the intelligence-law enforcement dichotomy.

**“A Security Service is as only as good as its sources”:
The Techniques and Organization of
the RCMP's Counter-Subversion
Operations on Canadian
University Campuses,
1945-1984**

Steve Hewitt

hewitt@duke.usask.ca

Long before Igor Gouzenko made his fateful walk on a September Ottawa evening, the RCMP had taken an interest in activities it deemed subversive. The focus of its attention was almost exclusively on groups and individuals connected to the Communist Party of Canada. After 1945 this focus changed little until the 1960s. What did change, however, was the nature of the RCMP's security operations. Throughout the post-war period, but especially in the latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the RCMP's techniques of intelligence gathering against perceived subversives became increasingly professional and sophisticated.

By focusing on one aspect of RCMP security work, operations on university campuses, this paper will offer new insight into post-war counter-subversion work, specifically by delving into how it was organized and conducted. Post-WWII counter-subversion work in Canada, unlike in the United States, has received little scholarly and popular attention, especially in comparison to counter-espionage and counter-terrorism operations. “A Security Service is as only as good as its sources” will be a small

step toward rectifying this neglect.

**“British Strategic Deception
during World War Two: From
Theory to Practice - The Years
of Trial - 1940-1943”**

Mathilde von Bülow

mathilde@trinity.utoronto.ca

This paper examines how the British, during the early years of the Second World War, were able to use the principle of strategic deception, and for the first time in modern history, turn it into a systematically-pursued, institutionalized activity. The groundwork therefor was laid by the enormous intelligence and security advantages provided by ‘Ultra’ and the ‘Double Cross System’. They furnished the means and the methods for the implementation of grand deception schemes, thus turning ‘theory’ into practice. The British then institutionalized strategic deception in such bodies as the ‘A’ Force, the London Controlling Section, and Ops. (B). These bodies could only function through the leadership and vision of such people as Archibald Wavell, Dudley Clarke, John Bevan, and Winston Churchill. Their efficiency and success further depended on the ability of operational and intelligence bodies to co-ordinate and co-operate their activities to the fullest. Only thus could a sustained deception effort, interlocking over every operational theatre, and lasting several years, be created. Yet, this recipe did not lead to immediate success. Indeed, it was through a long period of trial and error that Britain acquired the skills and the means - procedural, organizational, and intellectual - which led to the ultimate success of the greatest deception plan of the war, Operation *Fortitude South*.

CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE

SIRC: THE ANNUAL REPORT AND THE NEW APPOINTMENTS

On November 1, 1999 the annual SIRC Report was tabled in the House of Commons. The full text of the report is available on the Internet at:

http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/annual/1998-99/ar9899_e.html

Also during the year, Robert Rae, Frank McKenna, and the first Reform member to receive the honour, Raymond Speaker, were appointed to SIRC, and Maurice Archdeacon became the new Inspector General of CSIS. Sources: Norm Ovenden, “Ray Speaker named to spy agency board; First Reformer to get top national post,” *The Edmonton Journal*, 11 June 1999; “CSIS gets new inspector-general,” *Globe and Mail*, 30 July 1999.

Here is a look at these developments by an expert in the field.

RECENT CHANGES IN SIRC: FROM WATCHDOG TO LAPDOG TO WATCHDOG AGAIN?

By Reg Whitaker

In the early and mid-1990s, the accountability system for Canadian security and intelligence went through a difficult period. The CSIS Act of 1984 had provided for a new and unprecedented body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which is appointed by the Prime Minister, answers to the Solicitor General, and reports to Parliament. In its first few years, under the activist leadership of former Conservative cabinet minister Ron Atkey, SIRC negotiated a relatively strong role

for itself in the security intelligence process. However, by the early 1990s, a number of problems appeared.

The first problem was that former prime minister Brian Mulroney, after making good initial appointments to SIRC, chose to treat later appointments as patronage plums, with less regard for qualifications than for past party service. This was first signaled by the appointment in 1989 of elderly Tory press baron, John Bassett, with no background in the field, to succeed Atkey as chair. Other appointments included a former Tory fundraiser, Eddie Goodman, who never showed a strong grasp of the subject matter, and George Vari, a building contractor and major financial contributor to the Conservative party. Bassett's successor as chair in 1993 was a Montreal lawyer, Jacques Courtois, whose tenure proved mediocre at best.

These partisan appointments indicated a downturn in the quality and dynamism of SIRC, but a second problem surfaced after the 1993 federal election. The McDonald Commission that had originally recommended the 'civilianization' of the RCMP security service under a statutory mandate, had envisioned a parliamentary committee of oversight. The CSIS Act made no provision for a parliamentary role, but SIRC was required to report annually to Parliament. It was also provided that SIRC should be broadly representative of the partisan makeup of Parliament, to give confidence to the opposition parties that it would not be simply a government rubber-stamp. Thus for the first decade of its existence, SIRC always contained at least one representative of each of the two official opposition parties, the Liberals and the NDP.

In 1993, the Conservative government was reduced to two seats in Parliament, and the NDP also lost its official party status, falling like the Tories below the minimum number of seats to qualify. They were replaced by the Bloc Québécois and the Reform party. SIRC on the other hand was made up of three Conservatives (one more than in the House of Commons!), one Liberal and one NDP representative – and no BQ or Reform representative. To make matters more awkward, there were serious reservations about allowing a representative of the secessionist BQ on a committee that had high security clearance and unrestricted access to CSIS documents.

At the same time, MPs had decided to set up a House subcommittee on national security. A collision with SIRC seemed inevitable. When it came, it was over the so-called Grant Bristow, or Heritage Front, affair, and it proved to be very factional indeed, including charges from the Reform party that the former Conservative government had misused CSIS for partisan purposes. While the official SIRC report on the affair laid most of these charges to rest, a public, and often hostile, confrontation between the parliamentary committee and SIRC intervened. Clearly, SIRC had developed a legitimacy problem.

To its credit, the Chrétien Liberal government has quietly set out to strengthen SIRC and resolve, or at least moderate its legitimacy problems. One step was negative: the subcommittee on national security was not renewed after the 1997 election. True, the subcommittee had come close to self-destructing over the Bristow affair, and had hardly added credit to Parliament's pretensions to have a direct say in intelligence matters. Its abolition,

however, still leaves unresolved the important question of how Parliament can be brought responsibly 'into the loop' on intelligence matters. The Senate, under the lead of Senator William Kelly with his committee on terrorism and public safety, has tried to step into the vacuum with an interesting and wide-ranging report issued early in 1999. Under present circumstances, however, the appointed Senators have little legitimacy in the eyes of the Canadian public. Perhaps a joint parliamentary committee from the two houses might be an answer, but the Liberals seem little interested in pursuing any expanded role for the legislative branch at present.

The Liberals have contributed more positively by the quality of their appointments to SIRC and by striving to make that body more broadly representative of all the currents in Parliament. The first important step was the replacement of Jacques Courtois. The Liberals reached back to the original Atkey-era SIRC by bringing back Paule Gauthier, this time as chair. Her term will soon run out, in the spring of 2000. Ms. Gauthier was a non-partisan appointment in the first instance, and is also highly respected and able. Very importantly, her appointment was first discussed with the BQ leader in the House, and was endorsed by him as a valid representation of Quebec, even if not of the BQ as such. More recently, a former Reform MP, Ray Speaker, was appointed, thus giving the Official Opposition its first voice on the committee. Mr. Speaker has also been associated with the provincial Conservative party in Alberta. Many of the partisan problems that plagued SIRC for a time may have thus been resolved.

Two other appointments are noteworthy in terms of quality. The

last NDP representative appointed by Mulroney was Rosemary Brown. A feminist and black activist who had long championed human rights causes, Ms. Brown might have seemed an inspired appointment in terms of gaining legitimacy for SIRC on the 'left'. She never devoted sufficient time to the job to gain very much appreciation of the subject, however, and often acted somewhat erratically. Her NDP replacement is former Ontario premier Bob Rae, whose intelligence and ability is widely admired, even by his former political opponents. Rae will certainly be no rubber-stamp, either for the government or for CSIS, and can be expected to push SIRC to take initiatives. The other outstanding appointment is former New Brunswick premier Frank McKenna. Once thought a potential Liberal prime minister, Mr. McKenna was a remarkably successful premier, with a reputation for earnestness ('boy scout' is an epithet sometimes tossed at him), matched by a demonstrated capacity for independence, and a bulldog tenacity when he has a definite goal in mind.

There have also been changes in the permanent staff of SIRC. Maurice Archdeacon, Executive Director of SIRC since its inception, has been appointed Inspector General. This office has had a recent troubled history, including the resignation of one incumbent after a short period, and some difficult relations with the Director of CSIS. Mr. Archdeacon is as knowledgeable and experienced an official in this field as can be found in Ottawa. He may be able to put the IG back on an even keel as an integral part of the security intelligence accountability process. Conversely, some have speculated that his appointment may be preparatory to the

government amalgamating the office of the IG with SIRC, although this remains purely speculative. His successor at SIRC is Susan Pollak, who began her career in the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), then turned to a role in the coordinating machinery for intelligence policy centred in the Privy Council Office, and latterly has gained wider experience in senior positions elsewhere in Ottawa.

A renewed confidence at SIRC can be seen in its 1998/99 *Annual Report* released in November 1999. Instead of confining themselves to auditing CSIS operations and reporting on complaints, SIRC sets out some bold advice for the government. Fifteen years on in the life of the CSIS Act, some "fairly reliable conclusions" may be drawn about the "1984 'revolution' in Canadian security intelligence." SIRC would like to comment on the "larger picture beyond our day-to-day reviews," but about this larger picture, they are "less sanguine" than they are about the operations of CSIS itself.

The problem is that the 1984 legislation was born in the context of the Cold War and in the midst of a recession. The Cold War is over, and replaced by new concerns about transnational crime and economic espionage, which are inadequately defined as threats to security in existing law. More pointedly, SIRC notes that accountability has been attached only to CSIS, while ignoring the security and intelligence functions performed by a variety of other departments and agencies in Ottawa. In this regard, SIRC takes critical notice of the accountability mechanism provided by the Liberals for the CSE. The CSE Commissioner, Claude Bisson, is doing "commendable" work, but his position, and powers of investi-

gation, are purely at the discretion of the government. Moreover, the CSE lacks its own statutory mandate, a point made by the Auditor General in that office's recent landmark audit of the security and intelligence field.

SIRC now wants to address a major shortcoming of the 1984 'revolution', the failure to make all federal security and intelligence functions subject to the "kind of regulation, direction, and review which currently governs CSIS operations." The report calls for a "thorough Government-wide review of all the nation's intelligence systems and organizations." We may recall that the five-year parliamentary review of the CSIS act mandated under the original legislation, called for the passage of a "national security act" that would encompass all such functions, and would presumably have a single review and accountability mechanism that would keep the big picture in mind.


A newly confident and more aggressive SIRC is positioning itself not only as the spark for rethinking, but as the organization that will take on a larger and more responsible task of government-wide accountability in the future. The Liberal government has rejuvenated a body that just a few years was being dismissed by many critics, especially among the opposition ranks in Parliament, as a "lapdog" rather than a "watchdog." It remains to be seen if the Chrétien cabinet will now follow through by taking its watchdog's lead.

•• Whitaker is author of the recently released *The End of Privacy* and co-author of *Cold War Canada*. He is a member of York University's Political Science Department.

CSIS: 1998 PUBLIC REPORT

In June CSIS released its annual

Figure 1 - Human Resources



public report. The introduction offered a general assessment of Canada with respects to its security:

Most of Canada's security preoccupations originate abroad. However, a small number of domestic concerns also bear watching. In both the areas of public safety and national security, there are traditional and emergent issues that preoccupy the Service. These will be described in the segments of this report on CSIS' Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence programs. CSIS has a mandate to forewarn and advise Government on such activities, provide threat assessments and help to ensure effective consultation and information sharing with appropriate agencies.


With the new millennium less than a year away, one can anticipate that the coming year will be as turbulent as the previous reporting period. Millennial challenges are having a resource and technological impact on all public and private organ-

izations. The security and intelligence community has been preparing for this year, from a public safety perspective, with consideration for the social, economic, and technological implications. Aware of the growing requirement to work closely to ensure a safe and prosperous world, the foreign ministers of the G-8 countries and representatives of the European Commission met in London in May of 1998. They discussed a number of global and regional issues of common

concern. Some of these issues will be discussed in this report.

Under "Disturbing Trends," CSIS noted the growing sophistication of terrorists, and the potential for widespread damage to Canada's infrastructure simply through the use of a concerted computer assault. Another area of security concern is immigration. Over a million immigrants will be arriving legally in Canada in the next five years and some "will persist in importing their homeland conflicts or in using Canada as a safe-haven, or as an access point to the United States." Such comments with respect to immigrants have received criticism in some quarters, specifically from advocates on behalf of immigrants. The Canadian Council for Refugees accused CSIS of promoting intolerance, a charge denied by CSIS Director Ward Elcock, who met with representatives from the Council. More recently, an attempt by CSIS to have an Egyptian immigrant to Canada deported on security grounds was quashed by Justice Bud Cullen. Sources: CSIS 1998 Public Report, <http://www.csisscrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub1998e.html>; Robert Fife, "Terrorists,

Figure 2 - Financial Resources



spies using Canada's immigrant communities, CSIS says," *National Post*, 11 June 1999; Jim Bronskill, "CSIS scolded; Refugees aren't terrorists," *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 August 1999; James Cudmore, "CSIS muddled the facts on alleged terrorist, hearing told," *National Post*, 25 August 1999; Stewart Bell, "Judge frees Egyptian man arrested by CSIS under anti-terrorism law: Spy agency said man linked to bin Laden," *National Post*, 4 November 1999.

CSIS: THE THREAT FROM BIOTERRORISM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The extent of CSIS's concern over the threat of bioterrorism is evident in "Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism," a report obtained under the *Access to Information Act* by Southam News. The danger from right-wing organizations, religious fanatics, and millennial cults, combined with the increasing availability of deadly weapons means, according to CSIS, that attacks are more a matter of "when" than "if." The fact that the groups which pose the threats are often difficult to monitor (after all, it took only two men to kill well over one hundred people in Oklahoma City) diminishes the possibility of advanced warning. This lack of preparedness has been addressed by the Health Protection Branch which found Canada woefully unprepared to deal with the aftermath of an attack involving chemical or biological weapons. In a similar vein, Yosef Bodansky, a congressional researcher, alleged in Washington in August that Usama bin Laden, public enemy number one in the United States, possesses twenty suitcase-style nuclear weapons. Bodansky made his comments as part of a publicity campaign for his new

book about bin Laden. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "CSIS fears bioterrorism, nuclear attacks," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 October 1999; Jeff Sallot, "Bioterrorism threat real, scientists warn Canada unprepared for attack, report says," *Globe and Mail*, 19 October 1999; "Bin Laden has 20 nuclear bombs: Expert," *World Tribune.Com*, 9 August 1999.

CSE: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CSE COMMISSIONER

The Hon. Claude Bisson's report on CSE for 1997-98 is now out. In it Bisson found CSE's "sigint policies to be sound." He specifically addressed the matter of interceptions of the communications of "second party nationals" and the possibility of circumventing existing national laws through intelligence sharing:

I was able to observe that the policies require CSE employees to conduct their operational activities in strict recognition of, and adherence to, federal legislation governing the protection of the rights, privacy and freedoms of Canadians. The policies affirm CSE's commitment to respect the corresponding procedures of its close and long-standing allies, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States (also known as the Second Parties). However, these procedures must conform first to the laws of Canada.

CSE undertakes explicitly to treat the communications of Second Party nationals in a manner consistent with the procedures issued by the agency of that country, provided such procedures do not contravene the laws of

Canada. This is a reciprocal undertaking to ensure that the Second Parties do not target each others' communications or circumvent their own legislation by targeting communications at each others' behest. In other words, they do not do indirectly what would be unlawful for them to do directly.

Finally, Bisson suggested that if the CSE Inspector General position is to become permanent important precedence is available from the parliamentary model of Echelon members the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Whether the government will follow his advice is yet to be determined. What it did do was renew his position for another three years, thus avoiding the question of whether or not to establish a permanent position or body to oversee CSE operations. He was also given the additional power to publicize the results of his investigation of individual complaints. Despite this change, Bloc Quebecois MP Richard Marceau is proposing a private member's bill that would require greater accountability on the part of CSE.

In his renewed position Bisson will also meet with a new CSE boss. In June the federal government announced that Ian Glen, a 52-year-old lawyer and civil servant, was to become the new head of CSE, replacing the retiring Stewart Woolner. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "New spy chief takes reins, watchdog reappointed," *Windsor Star*, 11 June 1999, CSE Commissioner Report at <http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/spooks/PCOEN.htm>; SIRC Annual Report; Jim Bronskill, "New powers add teeth to spy watchdog's investigations: Eaves-

dropping concerns: Complainants will learn if they were being snooped on," *National Post*, 28 June 1999.

DND: Y2K READINESS REPORT

The DND had been offering regular assessments on the preparations in Canada for dealing with the possible problems caused by the change over of computers at midnight on December 31, 1999. Here is an excerpt from its September assessment:

As of mid-September, the updated assessment continues to be generally encouraging about the readiness of Canada's critical infrastructure to meet the Year 2000 challenge. ... Some infrastructure elements are behind schedule. At this point, they still have time to meet their revised deadlines, although any further slippage would leave little time to fix any outstanding problems. It is important to note that, in general, key critical infrastructure service providers of electrical power, oil, gas, telecommunications and financial services, which are so fundamental, report that they have achieved operational sustainability and continue to be on schedule for business continuity planning.

Sources: http://www.ncpg.gc.ca/prccisy2r_e.html

DND: CANADA GETS AN EYE IN THE SKY—AH, MAYBE NOT

In June Canadian Press broke the story that the DND had authorized the placement of a "spy satellite" on board Radarsat-2, a

Canadian commercial satellite to be sent into outer space in 2002. Then word came out of the United States that because of growing American concern about the theft of sensitive technology (sparked by the affair with China) the satellite project might be squashed by American refusal to allow the use of certain sophisticated parts. This growing American attempt to control the use of high technology outside of its borders is apparent elsewhere. In July in a story ignored in Canada, the *New York Times* reported that the United States government's anxiety over the safety of its technology might even scuttle the establishment of a NATO pilot training centre at CFB Moose Jaw. The U.S. sought from the Canadian government a strong guarantee that the technology would not fall into unsavory hands before it would consent to allowing the export of twenty-four trainer aircraft. This American concern also applies to its British ally. The Blair government's privatization plans for military research centres, such as Porton Down where germ warfare research has been conducted, have been delayed specifically because of concern in Washington over the vulnerability of secrets. Sources: Dean Beeby, "Canada building spy satellite for 2002," *Globe and Mail*, 23 June 1999; Heather Scoffield, "U.S. security crackdown could ground Canadian satellite," *Globe and Mail*, 29 June 1999; Anthony DePalma, with Raymond Bonner, "U.S. Anxiety Imperils NATO Fighter-Pilot Training in Canada," *New York Times*, 16 July 1999; Andrew Gilligan, "US spy fears over Porton Down sale," *Daily Telegraph*, 25 July 1999; Joe Murphy, "GM killer bugs developed as defence against germ warfare," *Daily Telegraph*, 1 August 1999.

CISC: PROJECT SOLSTICE AND 1999 REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME IN CANADA

The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, a collection of Canadian police forces including the RCMP, issued its 1999 annual report. It included a description of the preparations for dealing with Y2K-related crime:

The Y2K issue includes a number of concerns for law enforcement. Project SOLSTICE, a multi-agency effort that includes the RCMP, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canadian law enforcement and DOMUS Security Division LGS Group Inc., has been initiated to complement the Year 2000 undertakings of Canadian federal government departments and enforcement agencies. It is intended to promote awareness and to deter any criminal threat.

Also released was its annual assessment of the activities of organized crime in Canada. Receiving special mention were Asian, Eastern European, and Italian organized crime operations, and the criminal activities of motorcycle gangs. In the latter category it was noted that the Hell's Angels had in the past year established chapters in British Columbia and Saskatchewan with Ontario next on its list. Sources: <http://www.cisc.gc.ca/Cisc99/99report.htm>; Jim Bronskill, "Security task force urges care when preparing for Y2K bug: Project solstice: Information warfare attack over the Internet feared," *National*

Post, 15 June 1999; <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/nr-99-17.htm>

**RCMP: 1998/99
PERFORMANCE REPORT
AND THE DANGER FROM
CYBER ATTACKS**

The RCMP joined the flock of organizations issuing annual reports since the last issue of the *CASIS Newsletter* appeared. Among the topics discussed in the report was the security problems that arose in Ottawa for the Force in his role of protector of foreign embassies after Turkey seized the leader of the Kurdish Worker's Party. Cyber-terrorism, or more specifically Canada's lack of preparation for dealing with such attacks, is an additional concern of the Mounted Police. The report warned that the chance of a major attack "has increased from low to medium, and the impact of such an attack remains high." On the other side, government departments and law enforcement agencies lag behind in developing the skills to combat such assaults. In July a federal study recommended the creation of an elite cyber squad to take on the hackers, perhaps operating as the Canadian Computer Emergency Response Team.

To address this problem in November the RCMP turned to the private sector, signing agreements between its Technical Security Branch and four private companies: ODS Networks Inc., Network Associates Inc., Internet Security Systems Inc. and Mytec Technologies Inc. The RCMP is to receive approximately \$400,000 worth of software and other equipment allowing it to improve its own computer security and offer better assistance to other federal government departments. Sources: RCMP Performance Report to Parliament,

1998/99, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/perfrep-eng.pdf>; Jim Bronskill, "Police can't handle cyber threats: RCMP report," *Ottawa Citizen*, June 1999; Jim Bronskill, "Cyber squad proposed to fight hackers," *Vancouver Sun*, 12 July 1999; <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/press.htm>

**DFAIT: DEVELOPMENT OF
THE MULTILATERAL
EVALUATION MECHANISM**

Further development of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) occurred in the latter half of 1999. MEM is an attempt to coordinate the efforts of the thirty-four members of the Organization of American States (OAS) against the international drug trade. Specifically, it is composed of a detailed questionnaire that will allow the anti-drug efforts of an individual nation to be evaluated more accurately. The data is broken down into five categories: National Plans and Strategies; Prevention and Treatment; Reduction of Drug Production; Law Enforcement Measures; and the Cost of the Drug Problem. Officials from the nations involved in MEM, specifically members of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (also known by its Spanish acronym, CICAD) met in Ottawa at the beginning of September. Canada's chief representative is Deputy Solicitor General Jean T. Fournier, who addressed the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in August and then the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Leadership Conference 1999 in Washington, D.C. in November. The MEM program will be a topic of discussion at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001. Sources: <http://www.sgc.gc.ca/eCICAD/ehome.htm>; Jean T. Fournier, "The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism:

Cooperation Against Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking," Address to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Hamilton, 25 August 1999. Jean T. Fournier, "The MEM and Human Security: A Milestone in Anti-Drug Hemispheric Cooperation," Presentation to the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Leadership Conference 1999, Washington, D.C., 5 November 1999.

**SOLICITOR GENERAL: MORE
MONEY FOR FIGHTING
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME**

In August, Solicitor General Lawrence MacAulay reiterated his government's commitment to fighting crime while addressing the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. MacAulay pointed to legislation such as Bill C-81, designed to combat money laundering, the \$115 million to renew the Canadian Police Information Centre, and \$78 million toward an anti-smuggling effort. Sources: <http://www.sgc.gc.ca/Releases/e19990822.htm>

**INTERNATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE**

**UNITED STATES AND CHINA:
NUKES ON THE LOOSE?**

by Holly Porteous

Whatever account of Chinese espionage you choose to believe, the biblically-proportioned Cox Report or the much less daunting Rudman Report, it seems that stealing US nuclear secrets is as easy as nicking chocolate bars from a half-blind, deaf old shopkeeper.

The Clinton administration-commissioned Rudman Report (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's Special Investigative Panel), which was intended to balance the scathing and unbal-

anced Cox Report, held nothing back in its criticism of lax security at US national laboratories. While the Rudman panel commended the Department of Energy's scientific and technical work, it says DOE's "culture of arrogance" has given short shrift to security and counter-intelligence. In its own words, "The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's [the Department of Energy's] current structure and culture." Bottom line: create a new, more security-focused entity, the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, using the National Reconnaissance Office's security system as a model.

The bi-partisan Cox Report, AKA the "House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China," leaves its readers with the impression that the People's Republic of China has based its nuclear and strategic missile programs almost entirely on purloined US technology.

Starting with Tsein Hsue-shen, who was accused in the 1950s of having passed on his knowledge of US rocket science to China, to alleged Los Alamos spy Wen Ho Lee, says the Cox Report, the United States, especially its national laboratories, has been victimized by Chinese-American spies. The Cox Report goes on to suggest that US companies Loral and Hughes made China's job even easier by using their influence with the Clinton administration to ease up export restrictions and look the other way when secrets were being passed under the guise of a civilian satellite launch program.

Not surprisingly, Beijing has

angrily denied the Cox Report's allegations, saying that it didn't need to steal US know-how to develop its own neutron bomb in 1988. The Chinese even resorted to a public on-line search of the Federation of American Scientists' website to demonstrate how much technical information about nuclear weapons is openly available.

Although the bizarre publicity stunt failed to reveal an entire web-based weapons program, this and China's surprising confirmation about its neutron bomb program does indicate a likely truth. That is, China, like many other countries who engage in economic espionage, probably based its modest nuclear weapons and missile program on a blend of stolen technology and sweat equity.

In this connection, China's rationalization of its economic espionage in two recent articles is enlightening. The two articles, "The International Economic Intelligence War" and "On the North-South Technology Imbalance," both suggest that, as an under-developed country, China is ethically justified in resorting to "informal" means to redress the international "technology imbalance." Icing on the cake for those looking to increase the resources of the FBI and the CIA in their effort to counter Chinese spies.

Although the Clinton administration's recent moves to loosen restrictions on exports to China of high-speed computers indicates its unwillingness to launch a CoCom-like clamp-down on that country, other draft US legislation originating from both houses of Congress shows a renewed interest in targeting China through export control restrictions. However, if we accept McGill University professor, R.T. Naylor's thesis in his latest book,

Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting and State-Sponsored Crime, such gestures will only be the prelude to future spy scandals.

- Porteous is CASIS's Ontario representative.

Sources:

United States House of Representatives Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, "Cox Report," on-line at <<http://www.house.gov/coxreport/>>

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, *Science at Its Best, Security at Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy*, Washington, D.C.: PFIAB, Special Investigative Panel, June 1999. On-line at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/pfiab/pfiab_report.pdf>

Michael Laris, "China Says It Can Build Neutron Bomb," *Washington Post*, 15 July 1999, p. A-1.

"Industrial Espionage Key to PRC Technological Development," in *National Counterintelligence News and Developments*, National Counterintelligence Center. On-line at <http://www.infowar.com/class2/99/class2_040799a_j.shtml>

Greg Hitt, "Senate Embraces Plan to Curb Exports of Technology, Tighten Labs' Security," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 May 1999, p. A3.

Peter Gosselin, "U.S. Computer Curbs on China May Ease," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 July 1999.

Paul D. Moore, "China's Subtle Spying," *New York Times*, 2 September 1999.

"Clinton Urged to Change Directions on Crypto Policy," *South*

China Morning Post, 27 August 99, reprinted from <www.newsbytes.com> (by subscription only).

R.T. Naylor, *Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting and State-Sponsored Crime* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999).

Evan A. Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High Technology 'Revolution'? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," *International Security*, Summer 1999, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 95-126.

Also, for those of you who prepared to venture into Flag Waving Right Winger Territory, <www.freerepublic.com> has a Chinagate link chart compiled by congressman Curt Weldon. The chart shows an interesting set of connections between triad gangsters, business tycoons, the People's Liberation Army and the Communist People's Party.

FOOTNOTES: According to the *Washington Post*, the U.S. government has decided not to charge Wen Ho Lee with espionage because of a lack of evidence. Instead, any prosecution would involve a lesser charge such as negligence in handling sensitive information. Walter Pincus, "U.S. Near Decision on Indicting Lee in Los Alamos Case," *Washington Post*, 5 November 1999. The Chinese government response to the Cox Report is available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/1999/07/chinacox/index.html>

UNITED STATES: FBI AND PROJECT MEGIDDO

Even though the new millennium does not really begin until January 1, 2001, the beginning of the last year of the first millennium has had a great deal of symbolism

attached to it by a wide variety of groups, including those with the potential for carrying out violent and terrorist acts. The public version of a special FBI study on the topic, codenamed Project Megiddo, has been released. Lacking specific information, in part because of the difficulty in monitoring small and diverse groups, the report concludes on a cautionary note for other police forces:

law enforcement officials should be alert for the following: 1) plans to initiate conflict with law enforcement; 2) the potential increase in the number of extremists willing to become martyrs; 3) the potential for a quicker escalation of conflict during routine law enforcement activities (e.g. traffic stops, issuance of warrants, etc.).

Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Project Megiddo, <http://www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/publicmegiddo.pdf>

UNITED STATES: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The CIA annual report is out. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall affords the Agency with a chance to reflect on how much the intelligence world has evolved.



The Intelligence Community (IC) faces a very different world from what it was a little over a decade ago. The threat of Communism which touched every aspect of intelligence collection is gone. Today the threats encompass a wide array of issues which span the globe. There are two categories of threats that will occupy the IC's attention for the foreseeable future: threats from our strategic rivals- China and Russia - as well as from regional worries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq; and the transnational threats - organized crime, narcotics trafficking, proliferation, information warfare and terrorism.

To meet the challenges of this increasingly dangerous and complex world, our consumers are demanding more timely, accurate, and actionable information to inform their decisions and increase their effectiveness. The IC recognizes that it must continue to pursue better inter-connectivity which will enable analysts to share information quickly and produce more timely and accurate assessments.

Crime, especially drug trafficking, occupied the focus of the Transnational Issues section of the report.

Besides the work cited in the report, the CIA has been engaged also in damage control over two highly publicized issues. In April Seymour Hersh revealed in the pages of *New Yorker* the CIA's use of UNSCOM to aid in unscrambling

Saddam Hussein's encrypted telephone calls. The piece reveals infighting within the Agency over the handling of the matter. At the same time the war in Kosovo damaged the credibility of the agency after it was revealed that the CIA, using outdated maps, had selected only one bombing target: the Chinese embassy. The subsequent diplomatic furor that erupted (one story, still unconfirmed, suggests that the Chinese embassy was engaged in intelligence activity making the Chinese unwilling to accept that it was accidentally targeted), damaged Chinese-American relations. Clinton trade representative Charlene Barshefsky blamed the screw-up on a stereotypical male failing. When asked by Senator Phil Gramm why trade talks regarding China's admittance into the WTO were taking so long, she offered a succinct answer: "What happened ... is that men never ask for directions, and we mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade." Sources: CIA Annual Report, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/fy98intellrpt/index.html> Seymour Hersh, "Saddam's Best Friend," *The New Yorker*, 5 April 1999; Kathy Sawyer, "Primakov allegedly bribed by Saddam; Russian Premier said to get \$800,000," *Washington Post*, 29 March 1999; Eric Schmitt, "In a Fatal Error, C.I.A. Picked a Bombing Target Only Once: The Chinese Embassy," *New York Times*, 23 July 1999 "C.I.A.'s Gaffe? A Male Failing," *New York Times*, 3 November 1999.

RUSSIA: A SPY AT THE TOP

In August Russian President Boris Yeltsin performed a well-practiced trick: he made his fourth prime minister in seventeen months disappear. Yeltsin replaced Sergei Stephasin with Vladimir Putin, a

former member of the KGB and the president's choice to head the Federal Security Service in 1998. "I am confident in him," Yeltsin told the Russian people, a potential sign that Putin may have joined Stephasin on the scrap heap by the time the next newsletter rolls off the printing presses. On the other hand, the war in Chechnya appears to be fueling popular public support for Putin.

Who is Putin? Originally portrayed as a run-of-the-mill intelligence agent, recent media analysis suggests that the forty-seven-year-old Putin played an important role during his seventeen-year career. The theft of technology was his apparent specialty and while it is reported that most of career was spent in East Germany, there is some question as to the accuracy of the information. His political career has seen him dabble in reformist politics, but he remains closely aligned to Yevgeny Primakov. Sources: Jonathan Steele, "Yeltsin Picks Ex-Spy as Heir," *Guardian Weekly*, 18 August 1999; "Vladimir Putin: The Face of Russia To Come," Stratfor, 4 November 1999; "The World at 6," CBC Radio, 15 November 1999.

UNITED KINGDOM: ROGUE AGENTS

British intelligence experienced some rough waters in 1999. Extensive criticism was lobbed from some quarters over MI5's handling of the Mitrokhin archives, especially the agency's apparent failure to provide much of an advanced warning about the documents to its political masters. More damaging, however, has been the activities of two former British agents, Richard Tomlinson and David Shayler.

In May 1999, in an example of the power of the Internet, a list of

names of 115 alleged employees of MI6 appeared on the Internet. British politicians quickly denied the accuracy of the list, calling it a mixture of "fact and fantasy," and in the process drawing more attention to it. Within a matter of hours, and despite British efforts to have it removed, the original list had spread to several Internet locations and soon variations on the original began to sprout up.

With its first statement repudiating the list, the British government indirectly pinned responsibility on former MI6 agent (Sept. 1991 to April 1995) Richard Tomlinson. Tomlinson certainly has been an annoyance. He has testified on behalf of Paul Grecian, a British businessman suing his nation's government over what he alleges was a set-up by MI6. Tomlinson has also been offering assistance to Mohammed Al Fayed in his mission to find a more complex explanation for a crash caused by a drunk driver. That driver, Henri Paul, according to Tomlinson, had his name listed in MI6 files as an informant. (If so, that would have been the second intelligence service he was working for since Gordon Thomas alleges in *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad* that Paul had been recruited by Israeli intelligence as a source; Gordon Thomas, *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad* (St. Martin's Press, 1999), 4-9.

Offering newsletter readers special insight into the case of Tomlinson is CASIS member Peter Marwitz, who had the following e-mail exchange with Tomlinson.

From: Peter Marwitz
To: Richard Tomlinson
Subject: Too much
Date: Monday, May 17, 1999

Your views on assassination plots

are too wild, unworkable, and you should not have published the names of known or suspected field men as MI6 officers.

Peter Marwitz

From: Richard Tomlinson
To: Peter Marwitz
Subject: RE: Too much
Date: Monday, May 17, 1999

I did not write the assassination plot against Milosevic that I saw.

Moreover, it was a sketch-plan, not a firm plan. Firm plans are drawn up by the part of the SAS that works for MI6. I suspect they know a lot more about what is workable than you, I, or the officer that wrote the sketch.

As for the names, it wasn't me that published them, as you are probably aware by now.

Richard Tomlinson

From: Peter Marwitz
To: Richard Tomlinson
Subject: Re: Too much
Date: Monday, May 17, 1999

Mr. Tomlinson:

Perhaps, as you say, you had nothing to do with publishing those names.

Nonetheless, in your reply to me you hardly put any distance between that act and yourself. Why? Surely you do not condone it, do you?

Peter Marwitz

From: Richard Tomlinson
To: Peter Marwitz
Subject: RE: Too much
Date: Wednesday, May 19, 1999

Peter,

I don't condone it as it is illegal, but I think the alleged damage that this information has done has been massively hyped by the media and by MI6 themselves.

In fact, life in MI6 - including for those officers named - will go on much as before. Nobody's life has been endangered. MI6 like to hype up the importance of their work in the public eye because that justifies their budget. I think the taxpayer has a right to know the reality about MI6. That way, more money might go to hospitals etc. rather than expensive and largely unnecessary spies.

Richard Tomlinson

At last report Tomlinson had moved to Moscow and allegedly established an export business to ship cans of Vodka and tonic (called "KGB") back to the country of his birth. Sources: Richard Norton-Taylor, "MI6: The nightmare scenario as a rogue agent goes public," *The Guardian*, 13 May 1999; David Leppard, "MI6 defector to mix himself a Moscow cocktail," *Sunday Times*, June 13 1999; "Fayed sues over information on Diana crash," yahoo.co.uk, 21 July 1999.

David Shayler, the other ex-MI5 member, now lives in Paris and even has his own web site (www.davidshayler.com). In September he confirmed the case of Goldeneye, the MI5 agent with a license to kill. Goldeneye's victims were codenamed "pigeons." Actually, they were pigeons; Goldeneye was a sparrowhawk employed to keep MI5 headquarters free of annoying birds. This story is one of many that appears in a book on the Shayler case, a book cleared by UK censors. *Defending the Realm: MI5 and the Shayler Affair*, by Mark Hollingsworth and Nick Fielding, reveals that Shayler, once a journalist at the *Sunday Times*, gained the nickname of "Red Dave" at MI5 because of his unorthodox behaviour. After five years at the agency, he made his

break and soon was receiving international media attention because of his outspoken criticism of his old employer. Sources: "Agent Goldeneye flies to MI5's rescue," *Sunday Times*, 26 September 1999; Nicholas Rufford, "The spy who was left out in the cold," *Sunday Times*, 26 September 1999.

PAKISTAN: A STICKY WICKET?

According to the BBC World Service, the Pakistan intelligence service is rumoured to have reported that cricket players were out late at night and involved in "match fixing" during the recent world cup. Its involvement in Pakistani affairs is larger than simply spying on cricket players. The recent military coup in Pakistan has only heightened tensions between that country and India over Kashmir, the site of open conflict between the two nations earlier this year. Behind that crisis, however, according to Amin Saikal of the *International Herald Tribune*, was the Pakistan military's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, the agency specifically responsible for the infiltrators in Kashmir that India fought to remove. Sources: BBC World Service, 20 July 1999; Amin Saikal, "The real power behind Pakistan," *Globe and Mail*, 30 June 1999.

PORTUGAL: ACCIDENT BECOMES ASSASSINATION

A special Portuguese commission has labelled the death of the Portuguese Prime Minister in 1980, at the time attributed to a plane crash, as an assassination by a right-wing organization called Commandos for the Defence of Western Civilization. One current senior member of the Portuguese security service is rumoured to be a member. Sources: Eduardo Goncalves, "Portuguese PM was killed in faked plane crash," *Guardian Weekly*, 22 July 1999.


JAPAN: NORTH KOREA STEALS PEOPLE

In 1977 thirteen-year-old Megumi Yokota disappeared while on her way to school near the Japanese coastal city of Niigata. Her parents feared the worst and as the years passed by they came to accept that their daughter's life had been taken by a stranger. Then in 1997 a Japanese politician told them that their daughter might well still be alive and living in North Korea. Increasing evidence suggests that she and at least nine other Japanese citizens have been kidnapped by North Korea over the last three decades and used back in the Hermit Kingdom to teach Japanese to intelligence agents. Sources: Barrie McKenna, "Abducted into the world of espionage," *Globe and Mail*, 28 May 1999.

MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE

1999: THE YEAR OF THE SECURITY BREACHES?

A hockey game, a lover, the Internet. Seemingly unconnected, all three have in common their part in a series of security breaches experienced by CSIS and CSE over the last year. Attending a hockey game, a CSIS analyst left behind in the car strategic plans for the coming year.



Being Toronto, they were quickly liberated. Another lost her job after her lover revealed to the media details about a sensitive CSIS operation. (This in turn sparked a conflict between the CSIS Director and the Commons justice committee which sought more specific budget-

ary information about CSIS but had its request denied on the grounds of national security.) Finally, there was the Master Corporal employed by CSE who posted information connected to the Canadian military presence in Italy during the war against Serbia on his web site. Despite the apparent security breach, the web site still stands (www.trytel.com/~rvarsen/index.html) but the material specifically related to the CAF Balkan role has been removed, although not without a cyberspace grave stone to mark its place. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "Security lapses plague CSIS," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 November 1999; Robert Fife, "CSIS fires lesbian spy after lover airs secrets; Women demand inquiry over 'discrimination'," *National Post*, 10 July 1999; Jeff Sallot, "Head of CSIS refuses to account for budget," *Globe and Mail*, 27 May 1999; Jeff Sallot and Andrew Mitrovica, "Security reviewed amid Internet spy furor," *Globe and Mail*, 27 August 1999.

WANTED: A FEW GOOD CANADIAN SPIES

In June the *Globe and Mail* detailed current efforts on the part of CSIS to diversify its work force and make itself relevant to security and intelligence challenges of the present and future. One sign of the new openness is a willingness to accept Gay and Lesbian recruits provided that the individual is open about his or her sexual orientation. Sources: Jeff Sallot, "The spy masters' talent hunt goes public," *Globe and Mail*, 22 June 1999.

THE MAN WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN WHAT?

On October 7, 1999, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation aired a National Film Board documentary about the life of Herbert E.

Norman, former Canadian ambassador to Egypt, who ended his life amidst allegations that he had acted as an agent for Soviet intelligence. The debate over Norman continues to this day. In the late 1980s two academics published diametrically opposed interpretations on the question of Norman's guilt. Roger Bowen's *Innocence is Not Enough* portrayed Norman as innocent of the charges and a victim of the Cold War. James Barros, on the other hand, strongly argued that Norman was a Soviet agent. More recently, historian Christopher Andrew has joined the debate. Appearing on CBC Radio's "As it Happens" in September, Andrew stated that there was no reference to Norman in the documents smuggled out of the former Soviet Union by Vasili Mitrokhin. Furthermore, he added that he did not believe Norman had been a Soviet agent. Below is one more opinion on both the question of Norman's guilt and the documentary.

HERBERT NORMAN: AN AGENT OF THE COMINTERN

by Peter Marwitz

So much has been said of Herbert Norman that his life's story has become a hagiography of a celebrated victim of the Cold War who might have otherwise been a saint. As an External Affairs friend pointed out to me after the recent showing of the National Film Board documentary, "The Man Who Might Have Been: An Inquiry into the Life and Death of Herbert Norman," Norman was hardly depicted as a loyal Canadian. Instead the NFB left all of the national security questions still unanswered and made a good circumstantial case for his disloyalty. Norman lied during two security interviews in the early 1950s



regarding his membership in the communist party while at Trinity College, Cambridge University during the Great Depression. He dissembled to the FBI when questioned in 1942. He consistently tried throughout this period to disassociate himself from the Japanese communist, Tsuru Shigeto, whom he had known while involved with a marxist study group at Harvard University. Finally, Norman denied having been the Cambridge recruiter of colonial communists. His lies came home to roost causing him to commit suicide, in itself, an indicator of a guilty mind, despite the contents of his suicide notes.

What was Norman covering up? His mentor and recruiter into the Communist International was John Cornford, a self-described Lenin of Great Britain, among whose associates included what the KGB termed "The Magnificent Five." It stretches the imagination to think that Herbert Norman was not himself approached to struggle for peace on behalf of the Soviet Union, given that he exemplified the Comintern's best interests: a communist of intellect and standing who had the ability to make it as a

star in any profession of his choosing. Having graduated from Harvard University just before the commencement of World War II, he gained entry as a junior foreign service officer of External Affairs and rapidly climbed the ladder of success becoming the head of missions in Japan, New Zealand and Egypt while gaining access to information of critical interest to the Soviets. All along his Comintern file in Moscow recorded his development as a Soviet agent.

- Marwitz is a former member of the RCMP Security Service, CSIS and National Security Liaison Officer at External Affairs.

THE RED FILES

In September PBS in the United States ran a documentary series on aspects of the former Soviet Union, including providing insight on the Soviet space and sports' programs. The first program, "Red Files: Secret Victories of the KGB," dealt with Soviet espionage and included interviews with Soviet agents such as George Blake and Morris Cohen. Sources: <http://www.pbs.org/redfiles/index.htm>

INTELLIGENCE IN POPULAR CULTURE

Spies have always been greeted enthusiastically by the purveyors of popular culture. The last few months have resembled that reality. The American film "Enemy of the State," which has as its villains rogue elements in the National Security Agency, filled theatres across North America in early 1999. Less successful was a CBC effort. Originally destined to be a permanent series, "Cover Me," the story of the adventures, both in the work and romance departments, of an anglophone Mounted Policeman and female French Canadian CSIS agent ended up running over a few

nights as a mini-series. If there is a higher power, a sequel will not be forthcoming.

Then there was the example of fiction resembling truth. *The Linguist*, a spy thriller by British journalist Mark Urban, captivated at least one member of the Privy Council Office in Ottawa who wrote a memorandum about the sections of the book that apparently accurately portrayed aspects of the signals intelligence world. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "Secret Federal Memo Says Briton's Novel Spills Beans on our Allies," *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 May 1999; Mark Urban, *The Linguist* (General Publishing Co. Ltd., 1998), \$9.99.

REFORM MP LOSES COURT BATTLE AND LAUNCHES NEW ALLEGATIONS

Val Meredith, a Reform MP and former member of the late Commons' subcommittee on national security, settled out of court in a libel suit brought against her by former CSIS member Frank Pratt. Pratt, who watched over internal security at CSIS, had his loyalty to Canada indirectly questioned in public by Meredith. Although she later apologized, he sued the politician. With the conclusion of the case, Meredith called for a parliamentary committee to investigate the role of CSIS in the matter. She accused the agency of siding with Pratt against her. In November, she announced that she would make a formal complaint to SIRC about CSIS's role in the affair. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "Reform MP, spy reach deal in libel suit," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 October 1999; Jim Bronskill, "Reform MP battles CSIS with formal complaint," *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 November 1999.

PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Books

Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (Penguin Press, 1999), \$45.00. In September, a media frenzy erupted in the United Kingdom over the revelations contained in a collection of copied documents smuggled out of Russia in 1992 by Vasili Mitrokhin, a former archivist with the KGB. Over several years Mitrokhin carefully copied information from top secret Soviet intelligence files. After offering his collection to the Central Intelligence Agency and being rebuffed, Mitrokhin next went to the British who were much more accommodating. The former archivist and his family emigrated along with the documents to the UK. British intelligence in turn offered the documents to other intelligence agencies. In the United States the records led the FBI to Robert Lipka, a former National

Security Agency employee whom the KGB had recruited in the 1960s. The uses of the documents by other intelligence agencies is still not known.

Another who received an offer of the documents was the well-known British historian Christopher Andrew. He set to work with Mitrokhin on publishing the collection. The result was *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (or *Sword and the Shield* in the United States), the first of what will be a two-volume series. Initially, serialized by *The Times*, the book cause a media sensation, especially when it revealed the real identity of HOLA, a KGB agent whose code-name was previously listed in Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev's *The Haunted Wood*. HOLA is Melita Norwood, today an eighty-seven-year-old grandmother. She loyally served as a Soviet agent while working as a secretary for the British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association. Her story and the revelation of the activities of other agents sparked a media debate in the United Kingdom over whether she should be charged and also about why British intelligence had taken so long to inform the Blair government of the treasure trove of KGB information.


The British media frenzy spread to other countries. In the U.S. the story opened "60 Minutes." In Italy a heated debate over which politicians were or were not KGB ensued.

The Canadian reaction was especially interesting. Most of the coverage in Canada's two national dailies focused on the stories of two KGB illegals mentioned in the Andrew and Mitrokhin book: Yevgeni Brik and Dalibar Valoushek. Unfortunately, what was trumpeted

as new and original in reality only offered some new insight on stories that have been in the public domain for nearly twenty years. John Sawatsky, without the aid of secret archives, addressed the story of Yevgeni Brik in *For Services Rendered*, while John Barron provided considerable detail on Rudi Herrmann's spying in *KGB Today*.


The stories the media have missed relate to four other Canadian citizens or residents who were allegedly connected in some way to Soviet espionage. All four remain unidentified in the book. A McMaster academic, codenamed SHEF, allegedly was recruited by the KGB in 1974 (p. 272). A Canadian working for both UNESCO and Soviet intelligence in Paris in the 1970s received the codename REM (p. 608). The KGB called another agent operating in Canada GRIG (p. 272). Finally, there is SPRINTER, a Canadian involved with a high tech company who, according to the Mitrokhin material, walked into the Soviet embassy in Helsinki in 1974 offering to reveal secrets in return for cash (p. 284). No one has bothered to ask whether CSIS has any additional information on the activities of these four. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "Priests spied in Canada for KGB, book reveals," *Vancouver Sun*, 6 October 1999; Alessandra Stanley, "Italians Bare Soviet 'Spies' but the Disclosures Backfire," *New York Times*, 12 October 1999; Stewart Bell, "Archived KGB files won't help Canada catch spies: CSIS report," *National Post*, 10 November 1999.

John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (Yale University, 1999), \$46.50 This is one of several new studies that uses VENONA material to offer insight on Soviet espionage in the United



States. Another comes from the United Kingdom: Nigel West, *Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War* (Harper Collins Canada, 1999) \$43.95.

One work that incorporates both VENONA transcripts and documents of the former Soviet Union is Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (Random House, 1999), \$42.00. The authors of this effort had partial access to Soviet archives. They provide several details on KGB agent HOLA, a British secretary whose real identity was revealed in *The Mitrokhin Archive*.



Two more American books attempt to make sense of the post-World War Two Cold War era. Ellen Schrecker's *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Little, Brown, and Co., \$39.95), now out in paperback, examines the impact of McCarthyite tactics, in part put into effect by J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, on the United States. The other is the work of retiring U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Long a critic of excessive government

secrecy, in *Secrecy* the New York senator argues that the cult of secrecy damages the very government institutions it is designed to protect. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Secrecy* (Yale University Press, 1998).

Michiel Horn, *Academic Freedom in Canada: A History* (UTP, 1999), \$39.95. The first comprehensive study of academic freedom in Canada, this book by York University historian Michiel Horn touches upon several intelligence-related matters, specifically the cases of Samuel Levine, Leopold Infeld, and George Hunter. Unfortunately, Horn does not make use of relevant RCMP security records regarding these three individuals.

Articles

Dr. A. Walter Dorn, "The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence-gathering in UN Peacekeeping," *Intelligence in Peacekeeping. The Pearson Papers Number 4* (Cornwallis Park, NS: Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1999).

Dr. David A. Charters, "Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modernist Peacekeeping," *Intelligence in Peacekeeping. The Pearson Papers Number 4* (Cornwallis Park, NS: Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1999).

Journal of Conflict Studies:

Spring 99 issue (vol. 19, no. 1) contained an article by Robert Steele, "Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution Through Information Peacekeeping", pp. 69-105; and, reviews of: Larry Hannant, *The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Canada's*

Citizens, by F. W. Parkinson; Shaun P. McCarthy, *The Function of Intelligence in Crisis Management: Towards an Understanding of the Producer-Consumer Dichotomy*, by Melvin Goodman; and Curtis Peebles, *The Corona Project: America's First Spy Satellites*, by Robert Dienesch.

The Fall issue will have a review of Richard Aldrich, ed., *Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945- 1970*, by Philip Davies.

Canadian Foreign Policy:

Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian Intelligence being Re-Invented?" *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Winter, 1999): 49-83. Also see the reply to Farson's piece. Alistair Hensler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring, 1999), 127-132.

RESEARCH NOTES

Changes are coming to the laws governing access to information in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

In the case of Canada, the federal Information Commission, John Reid, has called in his annual report for a thorough review of the *Access to Information Act*. In later comments, Reid spoke out against a private's member bill being proposed by Member of Parliament John Bryden:

The Government's hand has been forced. What should it do? Support the Bryden bill? Introduce it's own bill? Provide a White Paper? Find another option, such as a review patterned on the three-year review of the Act, which was conducted in 1986? For my part, I favour the latter option. It seems to

me that good, strong reforms are most likely to emerge from a full, public review. I don't mind taking the slower route, if it means getting better results.

Bryden's bill would radically change the existing law. Under his *Open Government Act* a thirty-year rule would be introduced allowing for the opening of government records of that age or older unless the record contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to threaten the safety or mental or physical health of individuals or be injurious to the constitutional integrity of Canada or the current conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities.

Bryden's bill would also free legitimate researchers from having to pay for the processing of a request, unlike under the current system. Finally, the *Open Government Act* would block the release of documents that contain "information on plans, strategies or tactics relating to the possible secession of a part of Canada, including information held or collected for the purpose of developing those plans, strategies or tactics." This could mean, for example, that RCMP Security Service records related to René Lévesque, former premier of Quebec, would not be accessible under this changed act unlike in the case of current one where such records can be requested in 2007 (twenty years after Lévesque's death). Sources: Information Commissioner's Annual Report, <http://infoweb.magi.com/~accessca/oic.html#>; John Reid, "Remarks to Justice Canada," <http://fox.nstn.ca/~smulloy/99-Oct28-Justice-Ottawa.html>; John Bryden's Bill C-264: http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/private/C-264/C-264_1/361151bE.html; Jim Bronskill, "Access chief attacks 'culture of secrecy'," *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 July 1999.

In the United Kingdom it is a matter of finally getting a freedom of information law. Long promised by the Labour Party before obtaining power, what was finally offered by Home Secretary Jack Straw disappointed many. Exempt under the proposed legislation were issues related to intelligence, national security and defence. Information could be withheld if the government agency believed that its release had the potential for causing "prejudice." The original draft of the Freedom of Information Bill imposed costs on researchers up to a maximum of ten percent of the cost of processing the information although this was to be capped at £50. Should the cost exceed the £500 limit for the releasing agency, the bill proposed allowing it to decide if it was in the public interest to release the information.

The negative response, especially from Labour backbenchers, forced a partial retreat on the part of the Blair government, a fact Straw admitted in an internal memo. Among the revisions to the legislation is to provide an information commissioner with additional power, although the government did not go as far as it had originally promised by providing the commissioner with the power to order the release of government records. Sources: "What public can demand for up to £50," *The Times*, 25 May 1999; Jill Sherman, "Information

Bill condemned as toothless," *The Times*, 25 May 1999; Rob Evans and David Hencke, "Straw to climb down on freedom of information," *Guardian Weekly*, 14-20 October 1999.

With the United States the battle is over liberalizing a law that is already more liberal than in Canada and the United Kingdom. The situation is currently travelling in opposite directions. The momentum over the last few years had been toward greater openness. The issuing by President Clinton of Executive Order 12958, calling for the release of all records over twenty-five-years-old, except for the most sensitive documents, demonstrates this trend, as does the denial by the U.S. Justice Department of the CIA's request for an exemption from being bound by the decisions of the Declassification Review Panel. Smacking directly into this trend is the Chinese espionage scandal (see the article by Holly Porteous) and budgetary constraints. This controversy has been used by some to call for a slowing down of the declassification of previously secret records. Then there is the cost of declassification. In August Congress cut the Pentagon's declassification budget by seventy-five percent, arguing that there are more important areas for the money to be spent. Sources: Washington Update, National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, 9 August 1999, 24 August 1999, 20 October 1999.

JFK: THE STORY THAT WON'T GO AWAY

Two more chapters have been added to the seemingly endless story of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. In June at the G7 meeting in Cologne, Boris Yeltsin presented Bill Clinton with some newly

declassified Russian documents related to Lee Harvey Oswald's time in the Soviet Union. One of the documents in the package was Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship. According to one historian, the material in question is but a drop in the bucket of a much larger Russian file. But then can one trust documents? In *The Mitrokhin Archive* it is revealed that the KGB conducted a disinformation campaign to plant the story that American intelligence agencies and right-wing interests had been behind the murder of the U.S. president. The KGB's forgery section produced documents that influenced Mark Lane's 1966 conspiracy classic *Rush to Judgement*. Sources: "Still Secret: The KGB's Oswald File," *Newsweek*, 5 July 1999; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 296-9.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CONFERENCES

SIGINT In Europe During The Cold War

More and more students of the Cold War begin to realize that the intelligence communities played an important role during the Cold War. In recent years in particular the importance of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) has been stressed and especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military, commercial and other Communications of other nations.

This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those of the smaller nations like for example the Netherlands. For this exact reason a couple of years ago the Netherlands

Intelligence Studies Association (NISA) was established in which academics and (former and still active) members of the Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities. This growing interest had led in Holland to publications dealing with the history of the Dutch internal security service (1995), the Dutch Navy Intelligence (1997) and the Netherlands foreign intelligence service (November 1998). As honorary secretary of the NISA it is my pleasure to announce that the NISA will host an international conference dealing with THE IMPORTANCE OF SIGINT IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE COLD WAR. This conference with a particular emphasis on SIGINT and the North-western European nations will take place on Saturday November 27 in Amsterdam.

The program is as follows:

SPEAKERS:

- 09.45: Opening of the Conference and Welcome to the speakers and participants
- 10.00: Matthew Aid (United States, ex-NSA)
Introduction on the importance of SIGINT in the Cold War
- 10.45: Coffee
- 11.00: Richard Aldrich (United Kingdom, University of Nottingham)
GCHQ and SIGINT in the Cold War
- 11.45: Erich Schmidt-Eenboom (Germany, Forschungsinstitut für Friedenspolitik)
The BND, German Military Forces and Sigint in the Cold War

- 12.30: Lunch
- 13.30: Alf Jacobsen (Norway, NRK) Scandinavia, SIGINT and the Cold War
- 14.15: Cees Wiebes (Netherlands, NISA)
The history of the WKC (Dutch NSA/GCHQ)
- 15.00: Tea
- 15.30: Wies Platje (Netherlands, NISA) Dutch SIGINT and the conflict with Indonesia, 1950 - 62
- 16.15: Round Table discussion
The importance of SIGINT during the Cold War
- 17.00: Closing Remarks + Reception

Since the number of seats is strictly limited to 100, you are requested to submit your registration as soon as possible. Places will be allocated on a first registered-first served basis. The conference rate is US \$80 including lunch and drinks at the reception. Please register as quickly as possible by sending an e-mail or letter to the honorary secretary of the NISA, Dr. Cees Wiebes, at the following address:

Dr. Cees Wiebes
Honorary secretary NISA
P.O. Box 18 210
1001 ZC Amsterdam
The Netherlands
E-mail: EBES@PSCW.UVA.NL

US-Canadian Defence Cooperation

A conference on "US-Canadian Defence Cooperation", sponsored by DND, is to be organized and hosted by the Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 12 April 2000. A panel on Defence Intelligence cooperation is proposed. For more details, contact Dr. David Charters at: charters@unb.ca.

The Korean War: History Fifty Years After

“The Korean War: History Fifty Years After”, 24 June 2000. A one day symposium to be held in conjunction with the annual conference of the Society for the History of American Foreign Relations, being held in Toronto, at Ryerson University. Preliminary program: panels will cover origins of the conflict, Sino-Soviet relations during the war, international dimensions, mobilizing the US home front, and Korea in post-war political economy. Preliminary list of panelists includes: Bruce Cumings, William Stueck, Kathryn Weathersby, James Matray, Anna Nelson, Edward Hagerman. The final program will be decided in January. For further information, contact: charters@unb.ca.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Intelligence Process and Information Technologies in Historical Perspective

6th Annual Meeting of the International Intelligence History Study Group, 23-25 June 2000, Heinz Nixdorf Museums Forum in Paderborn, Germany

The conference program will be structured around five broad issues:

- 1) Collection of intelligence
- 2) Evaluation of intelligence
- 3) Processing and uses of Intelligence
- 4) Cryptology
- 5) Other information technologies related to the intelligence process

General considerations: The papers should focus on one or more of these topics. “Case studies” are welcome but so are comparative perspectives or presentations fol-

lowing a particular technology or process across a longer historical period. Those presenting papers with a highly mathematical or technological content are asked to make a special effort to address themselves to an audience of highly diverse professional backgrounds.

Papers should reflect original research, new interpretations, and/or personal professional experience. They should be delivered in English if at all possible. There will be no facilities for translation. Conference presentations will be limited to 20 minutes each although longer papers are welcome for distribution to the conference participants. We hope to distribute abstracts of papers in advance. At this point we cannot assure financial assistance but we hope to get funding which will allow us to reimburse at least part of the travel expenses incurred by those presenting conference papers.

Please send by **1 February 2000** a brief CV and your proposal to:

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Krieger
Centre for International Studies,
University of Toronto,
252 Bloor Street
Toronto, Ont. M5S-1V6
Canada
Fax: 001-416-926-4738
E-mail:
daadprof@chass.utoronto.ca or
kriegerw@mail.uni-marburg.de

Visit the WWW pages of the International Intelligence History Study Group for updates on program and schedule of the 6th Annual Meeting: <http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de>

DISCUSSION LISTS

Introducing Intelligence Forum (I.F.)

About Intelligence Forum:

Intelligence Forum is a private, not-for-profit organization that maintains a free electronic bulletin board dedicated to the scholarly discussion of intelligence.

Main goals:

1. Taking advantage of technology and the internet, Intelligence Forum seeks to provide scholars, professionals, and students with an international and multi-disciplinary environment in which to conduct an open dialogue on the history, theory, and practice of intelligence;
2. Intelligence Forum is committed to providing a venue for the free exchange of ideas and seeks to increase contact among scholars to discuss not only their current research interests but also new theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of intelligence;
3. Intelligence Forum seeks to facilitate research on intelligence by updating scholars on new archival sources, evolving declassification policies, and recent publications.

Advisory Board:

Anna Nelson, American University,
Co-Chair

Wesley Wark, University of
Toronto, Co-Chair

David Charters, University of
New Brunswick

Betty Dessants, University of
Florida

Timothy Naftali, Yale University

Christian Ostermann, National
Security Archive

Co-Directors:

Sarah-Jane Corke, University of
Prince Edward Island

Michael Dravis, University of
Maryland

Subscription Procedures:

There is no fee for membership in Intelligence Forum. To join, simply send an E-mail with name (please no aliases), organizational affiliation and topics of interest to: majordomo@his.com and put "subscribe intelforum" in the message body.

On the Web:

Intelligence Forum's web page is located at www.intelforum.org.

Sponsor:

Intelligence Forum is sponsored by *Intelligence and National Security*, a Frank Cass journal (on the web at www.frankcass.com/jnls/ins.htm)

CLOAKS AND DAGGERS

CASIS members with access to e-mail might also be interested in "Cloaks and Daggers," an unmoderated e-mail list related to international intelligence issues.

To subscribe send a message to listserv@maelstrom.stjohns.edu and include in the body of the message:

subscribe CLOAKS-AND-DAGGERS

The service is free and is frequently interesting and useful.