



# **CASIS INTELLIGENCE**

## **#36 – SPRING 2000**

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**CASIS News**  
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*CASIS 2000 Conference*

# Canadian Association for Security Intelligence Studies

The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) is a nonpartisan, voluntary association established in 1985. Its principal purpose is to provide informed debate in Canada on security and intelligence issues. Membership is open and currently includes academics, concerned citizens, government officials, journalists, lawyers, students, as well as former intelligence officers.

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<http://www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS/>

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Note: The views and opinions expressed in the CASIS Newsletter do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Association for Security Intelligence Studies.

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## PRESIDENT'S COLUMN

The big news is the forthcoming CASIS conference. I hope all our members will note the dates (September 28-30) on their low or high tech calendars and plan to join us in Ottawa at the Chateau Laurier for CASIS 2000. The Chateau Laurier, for those of you who know your Ottawa geography, is an impressive building in its own right; it also is but a canal away from the historic East Block of Parliament, where the Department of External Affairs of old housed its small staff of intelligence officers. With this as our backdrop, our theme for the conference will be "The Future of Intelligence." We chose this theme as a fitting way to bring CASIS into the 21st century; discussion of the future is also an excellent way to bring the past century into perspective, and to query the ways in which the present practice of intelligence will likely be transformed.

The conference will feature an impressive array of international and Canadian participants. Our ability to mount such a conference is due to the generous support of a grant from contributing departments and agencies of the government of Canada. The programme is being put together by a committee consisting of Tony Campbell (formerly the Executive

Director of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, Privy Council Office), Stuart Farson (Simon Fraser University, our CASIS Web Administrator), Martin Rudner (Carleton University), Reg Whitaker (York University) and myself as Chair.

Full details of the conference and information regarding registration will be mailed out separately to every member in the near future. But let me drop



a few tantalizing hints about who you can expect to encounter at the conference. Professor Christopher Andrew, of Cambridge University, the world's leading authority on the history of intelligence services, will be delivering a special lunch-time address on the Mitrokhin archive. This lecture will be named the John Tait Memorial lecture, in honour of Mr. Tait, who served in many senior government appoint-

ments, including the post of Co-Ordinator for Security and Intelligence, and who was a strong supporter of CASIS and a proponent of greater openness for the intelligence community. We will also be featuring a panel on "The Media and Intelligence" with some of Canada's leading journalists. There will be a panel on "The Future of HUMINT" which will include two former senior practitioners with strong and informed views — Fred Hitz, the former Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Alistair Hensler, a retired senior officer of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

But this is only a glimpse. CASIS 2000 will have much more to offer. And besides, the weather will be perfect and the autumn colours out in full glory.

Please plan to join us!

Any questions about the programme can be addressed to me at:

Wkwark@aol.com, or by mail to:  
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Canada

Wesley K. Wark  
CASIS President

## CASIS NEWS

### EDITOR'S FAREWELL

Welcome to the latest issue of the CASIS newsletter. Be sure to read about the changes to the CASIS website and about the CASIS mega-conference that will occur at Ottawa's Chateau Laurier this fall. Further information about the conference is available elsewhere in the newsletter.

Now I must say both thank you and good bye. First, thank you to those who contributed to the issues of the

newsletter during my tenure and to those who offered feedback regarding my first issue. Unfortunately, this latest issue represents my last issue as editor. Involved in a variety of projects at the moment, including two small children, I simply do not have enough time to devote to my job as editor of the newsletter. Because of this reality I have resigned my position effective with the completion of this issue. I would like to thank the CASIS members and executive, especially Wesley Wark and Stuart Farson, for their support.

Those of you interested in taking

up the challenge of editing the newsletter should contact Wesley Wark (wwark@aol.com). It is both a lot of work and a lot of fun.

### THE CASIS ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, 2000

Our AGM will be held on the closing day of the conference in Ottawa, September 30, 2000. We hope for a robust turnout to discuss CASIS business and elect officers to vacant positions. All CASIS executive positions are filled by a process of nominations and voting from the floor, and we

are always on the look-out for volunteers. Members of the executive serve for a two-year term, which may be renewed.

The following positions will come vacant in September:

President

Vice-President

Regional representatives:

British Columbia

The Prairies

Ontario

National Capital Region

Quebec

The Maritimes

As per our Constitution, a nominating committee chaired by the current President, Wesley Wark, and consisting of CASIS members Holly Porteous and David Charters, has been created to propose a slate of officers to the AGM. Nominations will also be accepted from the floor.

If you have suggestions for nominations, or would be willing to serve yourself in any of these positions, please contact Wesley Wark at [wkward@aol.com](mailto:wkward@aol.com), or by mail to 37 Shadybrook Crescent, Guelph, Ontario, or by phone to 519-836-9552.

### CASIS GETS A GRANT

The CASIS web site is currently administered through the Institute for Governance Studies at Simon Fraser University. The Institute has very recently obtained on CASIS's behalf a grant from the Privy Council Office in the sum of \$5000 plus GST. The purpose of the grant is to extend and develop the site. Among the new developments will be a bibliography of Canadian sources and an annotation of part of the site. Planning for the extension and development are now underway. This is an ideal time for members to make suggestions about what they would like to see on the site. Please send them to Stuart Farson at: [farson@sfu.ca](mailto:farson@sfu.ca)

CASIS and the Institute wish to acknowledge with thanks the provision of this grant from the Government of Canada.



### A NEW AND IMPROVED WEBSITE

Speaking of websites, the stopping point for CASIS on the world wide web has had a few changes since the last newsletter. Check out the new and improved website at: <http://www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS/>.

### CASIS AT THE LEARNEDS

As part of the annual meetings of the Canadian Historical Association at the Congress of Social Sciences and Humanities (Learneds), CASIS co-sponsored a roundtable discussion on the Access to Information Act. The panel, entitled "Access to Information: Past, Present, and Future," featured John Reid, the federal Information Commissioner, Normand Sirois, Head of Disclosures, Access to Information and Privacy Section, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Daniel German, Access Section at the National Archives of Canada, and Steve Hewitt, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan. Greg Kealey, Dean of Graduate Studies at Memorial University, chaired the session. Absent from the gathering was John H. Bryden, member of parliament for Wentworth-Burlington. Until recently, Mr. Bryden had a private member's bill that would dramatically have revised the Access to Information Act.

The panel featured short presentations by all of the participants followed by questions from the audience.

In his presentation Daniel German noted that in 1997-98, the National Archives was the second most active location for Access requests. Many of those requests were related to Record Group 146, Records of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service that are held by the National Archives of Canada. Under an agreement with CSIS all requests to RG 146 must be done on a formal basis.

Normand Sirois emphasized the importance CSIS places on the Access to Information Act and the considerable resources it devotes to its operation. He added that the Information Commissioner's warning earlier this year that the federal government faced an "information management crisis" did not apply to CSIS. "Remember that the history being written today," he added, "is only as good as the information organizations choose to preserve, and CSIS is committed to allowing historians to write accurate accounts of the past." Along those lines the CASIS representative informed those in attendance that the finding aid for RG 146 at the National Archives of Canada had been expanded in the summer of 1999 and now numbers a thousand pages in length.



After praising the Access to Information Act, Steve Hewitt raised some questions based on his experience as a researcher. He wondered about the historical memory of institutions such as the National Archives and CSIS and whether as time and distance stretched between the past and the present less material might in fact be allowed out because of a lack of historical knowledge on the part of those making deletions. He also raised the problem of inconsistency; depending on who does the reviewing, multiple versions of the same document can and do exist.

Finally, the federal Information Commissioner praised the Access work of CSIS and reiterated that other federal government departments are experiencing a crisis in their record keeping and that this ultimately would affect historians.

#### MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL

Just a reminder that the time has arrived to renew your annual CASIS membership. A special renewal membership form has been enclosed in the envelope containing your copy of the newsletter. If you have any questions contact the Secretary-Treasurer of CASIS, Jacqueline Shaw.

**CASIS MEMBER  
ELDON PATTYSON  
(‘PAT’) BLACK,  
OCTOBER 1925 - NOVEMBER  
1999**

*by John K. Starnes*

Pat Black's death in his 75th year was a grievous loss to his family and many friends and a serious loss to Canada's intelligence community, to which he contributed so much during his lengthy career as an External Affairs Foreign Service Officer.

Pat had great qualities of mind and spirit. A very lively intellect, loyalty, great patience and an inherent distrust of charlatans made him an ideal

intelligence officer. He was seldom fooled by appearances and for Pat, a secret was a secret. Information which had been entrusted to him was not something to be carelessly broadcast.

After joining the Department of External Affairs in 1949 he served in Moscow and Stockholm between 1951 and 1955, returning to Defence Liaison (II) Division (Security & Intelligence) where he remained until 1958. It was in this latter period that Pat became very knowledgeable about security and intelligence matters with Gordon Gale ('Bill') Crean as his division head. Indeed, the two men developed a close friendship which lasted a lifetime.

From 1958 until 1962 he served in London as a First Secretary, continuing his involvement in intelligence activities with his appointment as the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee's representative in London, with concurrent accreditation to the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). He performed these tricky, unusual assignments with sensitivity and great skill. In the process he developed a friendship with Sir Dick White, then head of MI6 and with senior members of the British SIS which was to serve Canada's interests well during an increasingly difficult period in East-West relations. From 1978 until 1983 he was Assistant Deputy Minister (External Affairs) in charge of security and intelligence affairs. In this influential position, among other things, he helped further to develop Canada's worldwide strategic communications intelligence (COMINT) gathering methods and capabilities in a significant and lasting way.

Although not directly related to his extensive background knowledge of security and intelligence matters, his book *Direct Intervention - Canada-France Relations 1967-1974* (published by Carleton University Press in 1996) clearly illustrates Pat's character, intellectual skills and determination. By the time he began to do the research and to write the book his health had begun to fail. It required great strength of mind and body for him to finish the job. The book is written in a delightfully pellucid, authoritative style providing read-



ers with an interesting, unique view of important aspects of Canada's recent and continuing history.

*John K. Starnes served as Director General of the RCMP Security Service from 1970 to 1973. His memoir, Closely Guarded: A Life in Security Intelligence, was published by the University of Toronto Press in 1998.*

**CSIS**

**SIDEWINDER AND THE  
MINIVAN: SOME QUESTIONS  
FOR PARLIAMENT  
TO PONDER**

by Stuart Farson

Last fall, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was seriously embarrassed by media reports detailing its mishandling of sensitive documents. In the most recent story, a briefcase, said to contain the Agency's operational plans, was stolen from an Ottawa-based analyst's minivan while she was vacationing in Toronto. As that document could help CSIS's targets establish if they had been detected and the effort placed against them (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "Furious spies call for officer to be sacked," *The Globe and Mail*, November 15, 1999), the theft arguably constituted the most serious security breach in CSIS's 16-year history. Besides eroding public confidence and that of government departments (Jim Bronskill, "CSIS feared theft could be disastrous," *National Post* (February 4th, 2000), it threatens relationships with allied agencies and the valuable intelligence they share with Canada. According to the lead story (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "Drug addicts steal secret plans: Key spy agency document taken in smash-and-grab car break-in," *The Globe and Mail*, November 12, 1999), federal officials believe the theft occurred during a "random smash-and-grab" conducted by "three drug addicts" and that there is no evidence of foreign involvement. Apparently, "incredibly good police work" led authorities to round up the perpetrators within days. On finding it contained no valuables the addicts had discarded the briefcase in a dumpster. However, because they were high at the time, they could not recall the dumpster's exact location. Despite an exten-

sive search, no documents were recovered. CSIS now believes them "irretrievably" lost, rotting in a landfill.

Reporters established this was no isolated incident. On three previous occasions top-secret materials had got into the wrong hands (Jim Bronskill, "Agents have lost, forgot or burned spy documents," *Ottawa Citizen*, November 16, 1999). In the first case, a Vancouver-based intelligence officer was transferred to Ottawa after losing "crucial data about the person he was tailing in a surveillance operation." In August 1996, an Ottawa-based intelligence officer was suspended for two weeks after she left a computer diskette in a Toronto phone booth. The diskette, which "detailed—in plain English—the names of confidential informants and contacts, information about the service's targets and covert operations in Canada and details about training exercises," was found by a member of the public but quickly returned to CSIS (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "The spy secrets in the phone booth," *The Globe and Mail*, November 18, 1999). Also in 1996, a former CSIS intelligence officer burned top-secret personal records in his fireplace before committing suicide.

In addition, there were several instances when Canadian intelligence officials posted sensitive information on the Internet ("One thing after another for red-faced spy masters," *The Globe and Mail* November 12, 1999).

Yet another newspaper story focused on the purposeful destruction of intelligence files by CSIS itself. This bank of files, codenamed "Project Sidewinder," covered a joint CSIS-RCMP intelligence effort. Established in 1995, it evaluated whether Chinese intelligence was working with Triads to influence Canadian business and politics. It looked particularly into allegations that Chinese interests were making political contributions, funding university projects and trying to purchase media outlets for propaganda purposes. It also examined whether

financial footholds had been garnered in Canada's banks, brokerage houses, commercial buildings, hotels, oil and gas interests, and shipping ports (Andrew Mitrovica, "Triad probe still needed Mountie declares," *The Globe and Mail* October 23, 1999). According to *The Globe and Mail*, (Andrew Mitrovica, "CSIS destroys controversial Asian-crime report," October 6, 1999), the head of CSIS's Strategic Analysis Branch ordered "the destruction of all copies of the reports and other related Sidewinder documents, including e-mails, because he felt its conclusions were overblown" in 1997.

Apparently, Canada's spy masters believe their employees have leaked these stories. The vigor with which the Internal Security Branch has forced employees to undergo polygraph tests to identify whistleblowers is said to have made an already "poisonous" atmosphere between senior management and some rank and file members worse (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "Spies face lie test in hunt for whistleblower," *The Globe and Mail*, March 13, 2000).

Though most of these cases have been, or are being, investigated by the Service, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and by the Inspector General (IG), they raise questions none can expect to answer satisfactorily because they involve more than one agency.

The recent theft from the analyst's car raises important accountability and oversight questions. Who was informed about the breach of security? What were they told, by whom, and when? Was fair treatment meted out along the chain of command to all responsible (Reid Morden, "Who ya gonna call? A spymaster's dilemma," *The Globe and Mail*, November 24, 1999)? The theft occurred on Thanksgiving weekend (between October 10 and 11). Though the analyst and her husband (who is a police officer) claim to have reported the theft of the briefcase at the time, they did not



inform the police of the briefcase's contents. Apparently, the analyst, who believed she had done nothing wrong "because others [within CSIS did] the same thing," delayed informing anyone because she could not remember whether she had left the plans at home (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "Fired CSIS analyst tries to shield herself," *The Globe and Mail*, December 14, 1999). Thus, senior management were not informed until she had returned to Ottawa and had searched her home—perhaps as much as a week later. Though the Solicitor General believes he was informed by the CSIS Director "immediately," this did not occur until about October 25. While the IG claims to have been informed "soon" after the theft, no one informed SIRC.

Ron Atkey, SIRC's first chair, claims the review body should have been informed immediately and that it was "unforgivable" for SIRC members to have learned the facts from *The Globe and Mail* ("It's time to go—CSIS Director Ward Elcock shows contempt for any kind of political scrutiny," *The Globe and Mail*, November 17, 1999). However, the current chair, Paule Gauthier, claims that neither the Director nor the Solicitor General is obliged to inform the chair about such security breaches (Jeff Sallot, "Ottawa accused of CSIS cover-up," *The Globe and Mail*, November 16, 1999). In his report on the incident, the IG has similarly concluded that neither the Minister nor the Director is under any obligation to inform SIRC (Jim Bronskill, "CSIS cleared of fault for lost secrets: Watchdog blames employee who broke rule for incident," *Ottawa Citizen* February 24, 2000).

But who is right here? Has a practicing lawyer so steeped in national security issues as Ron Atkey misread the law? S.20 of the *CSIS Act* deserves careful reading. It indicates that where an **employee** of the Service **may** have acted **unlawfully** both the Solicitor General and the Director have important obligations. The Director **must**

inform the Minister. The Minister in turn **must** make a report to the Attorney General and provide "forthwith" a copy of that report to SIRC. The only matter at issue is whether the intelligence analyst **may** have acted unlawfully. Certainly, a top-secret document was stolen. But that was not committed by an employee. And certainly, there was a breach of the regulations governing the security of such documents by the employee. That is confirmed by the IG's report and constituted the grounds for her dismissal. But can a breach of security regulations constitute an unlawful act? Foreign experience may be helpful. In the United States, a government scientist was recently charged with mishandling nuclear weapons data. Similarly, before the British *Official Secrets Act* was revised in 1989, several people were prosecuted for failing to take reasonable care of official documents or wrongly retaining them. Though Parliament recommended a decade ago that Canada's OSA should be replaced, no action has yet been taken. Consequently, such prosecutions are still possible in Canada. Though the Solicitor General is a Law Officer of the Crown, the current minister is not a lawyer. Responsibility for advising him on his legal obligations under the Act must, therefore, rest heavily on his departmental and agency staff, most particularly the Deputy Solicitor General, the IG, and the CSIS Director. Parliament should ask them all how they understand the section, what advice they gave the minister, when they did so, and whether they took legal counsel. And SIRC should be asked why it has consistently failed to provide Parliament with adequate details of alleged infractions under this section in a timely fashion.

There is also the question of the story itself to pursue. Readers who have had valuables stolen from a vehicle will know that the police, even when quickly informed, have little chance of identifying perpetrators, let alone retrieving stolen property. In this case, the trail was stone cold!

According to what reporters were initially told by federal officials, the Toronto police were able to identify the three "drug addicts" responsible and to establish that they were high. If true, this was a remarkable piece of police work deserving commendation. However, the story has worrisome aspects. Senior Toronto police officers are on record as saying that they were not involved in the arrest of the three addicts and knew nothing about it until November 12 (Stephanie Rubec and Sean Durkan, "CSIS vows to beef up security," *Toronto Sun*, November 13, 1999)! And since then they have been carefully forwarding questions to CSIS.

SIRC has a question or two to answer over the computer diskette left in the phone booth. When the Special Commons Committee reviewed the *CSIS Act* in 1989-90, it observed deficiencies in SIRC's research. Apparently, it only interviewed CSIS personnel and analyzed CSIS documents and communications traffic from headquarters. It did not consider the opinions of outsiders or those in the field. Parliament received a subsequent undertaking from SIRC that it would change its procedures. Brian Kravitz's letter to the editor further suggests poor research habits die hard (Brian Kravitz, "The man who found the CSIS diskette," *The Globe and Mail*, November 24, 1999). He disputes SIRC's claim that it made a thorough investigation: "nobody from SIRC contacted me, either to confirm facts about the discovery of the diskette or potential leakage of the information it contained, or to check on the conduct of the CSIS agents who made the inquiries. Just how thorough and effective was this 'full' investigation?" And while on the subject, SIRC should also be asked why it has consistently underplayed the import of this and similar cases in its public annual reports, the only documents Parliament currently sees (Jeff Sallot and Andrew Mitrovica, "Secrets remain secret at CSIS," *The Globe and Mail*, November 22, 1999).

Now that the media has revealed

that the intelligence officer who committed suicide had documents in his possession long after he had left CSIS (Jeff Sallot and Andrew Mitrovica, "CSIS agent's suicide sparked security," *The Globe and Mail*, March 4, 2000), Parliament should revisit its earlier recommendations regarding CSIS's treatment of employees. The Special Committee recognized that intelligence is a socially isolating profession that can be psychologically damaging to some individuals. It also recognized CSIS's vulnerability to disgruntled employees, particularly after they have left the organization. It, therefore, was extremely interested in whether CSIS had appropriate employee services (particularly psychological) to meet the needs of both current personnel as well as those who had retired from, or left, the Service. It was not satisfied that CSIS had satisfactory services in place. The circumstances of this intelligence officer's death raise further doubts.

The destruction of the "Sidewinder file" also poses questions that extant review bodies cannot answer. Media reports suggest there were distinct differences of opinion over the value of the initial report and the need for further evaluation, not only between the RCMP and CSIS, but also between CSIS management and those working on the project within the Service. Though senior management at CSIS maligned the report as "rumour-laced conspiracy theory," others saw it as "groundbreaking" and "years ahead of the curve" (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "The trouble with CSIS Recent embarrassing revelations," *The Globe and Mail* December 15, 1999). Unfortunately, none of the review bodies has a mandate to review the activities of **both** the RCMP and CSIS. SIRC, in fact, recognized its own limitations when it called last year for a government-wide review of the whole intelligence community. (Jim Bronskill, "Review of all spy agencies urged," *Ottawa Citizen*, November 2, 1999). Currently, differences of opinion concerning transnational crime can only be played out in the media. Besides

being unseemly, this leaves outsiders, particularly those charged with approving Estimates, not knowing whom to believe and wondering whether there is more going on than meets the eye. It also speaks directly to the weakness of SIRC's research methodology and mandate. Without documentation, how can it hope to review the matter satisfactorily? And, of course, it begs the question: if SIRC relies totally on CSIS's electronic and paper trails, how can it ever be certain that CSIS has not routinely destroyed whole file banks to avoid close scrutiny? There is also the question of whether the destruction of the file bank constitutes an offence under the *Access to Information Act* and should have been reported to SIRC. Finally, the file's destruction has been connected to corruption of the immigration process at the Canadian High Commission in Hong Kong between 1986 and 1992 by Chinese organized crime (Fabian Dawson, "Triads linked to hacking at Canadian mission, *Vancouver Province*, August 26 1999). While RCMP and Immigration Control Officers have persistently alleged that senior Ottawa officials stifled their investigations (Fabian Dawson, "Triads linked to Hacking at Canadian mission," *National Post*, August 26, 1999) others claim that senior CSIS officials similarly shut down "Sidewinder" because it was also heading into "politically sensitive waters."

It is now more than a decade since Parliament conducted its statutory review of the *CSIS Act*. The matters discussed here, their negative impact on CSIS's morale and public confidence, the continuing problems between the RCMP and CSIS (Dene Moore, "RCMP, spy agency competition hurts investigations: audit," *National Post*, October 18, 1999), the continuing culture clashes within CSIS itself between the old guard and the new (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "CSIS staffers divided over firing," *The Globe and Mail*, December 1, 1999 and, "CSIS to reassign 30 top managers," *The Globe and Mail*, March 1, 2000), between operational units and analysts

(Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "The trouble with CSIS," *The Globe and Mail*, December 15, 1999) and between management and the rank and file (Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sallot, "Canadian spies revolt over wages," *The Globe and Mail*, April 12, 2000) suggest that another full-length non-partisan review is now long overdue and that specific legal protections are needed for whistleblowers.

Stuart Farson is CASIS's web administrator and teaches political science at Simon Fraser University.

Editor's Note: Since Stuart Farson wrote this piece it has been revealed that at least one version of the Sidewinder report remains in existence. Excerpts from it appeared in the April 29, 2000 edition of *The Globe and Mail*. National security authorities are also vigorously attempting to ascertain who leaked the document to the newspaper.

The editor invited Ron Atkey to respond to Stuart Farson's article. Here is that response.

## IN REPLY

by Ron Atkey

You don't have to be lawyer to know when it is appropriate for the CSIS Director to call SIRC regarding some major screw-up. What's required is a good dose of common sense, an instinct for political accountability and a sense of proportion. Most people holding political positions of public responsibility, whether they be Ministers, Agency heads or Chairs of legislatively mandated review bodies, don't like surprises - particularly if the news is bad. The best practical approach, once the basic facts of a major security breach are known, is to tell the Minister - and to ensure that the review body is informed, one way or another, on a timely basis. It's that simple.

The fact that the wording and the framework of the *CSIS Act* seems to anticipate this kind of approach is helpful. Whether it's a "legal obligation"

really is beside the point. Certainly it would not be “illegal” to inform SIRC directly or through the Minister if the matter was indeed serious - as virtually everyone contends. And if the matter involved an unlawful act, the obligation to report is clear. As for Stuart Farson’s agonizing over whether the breach of security regulations constitutes an “unlawful act,” I would have thought this was clear notwithstanding the absence of an updated Official Secrets Act. Even if the CSIS Director had concluded that it is not clear, the better approach—once the facts and the seriousness of the particular situation became apparent—would be to account on a timely basis to the Minister, and eventually to SIRC.

*Ron Atkey was the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee.*

## THE BORDER

In December one of the most serious Canadian security issues in years materialized when Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian national, was arrested at a British Columbia-Washington border crossing with explosives and explosive-making equipment in the trunk of his car. Other arrests were subsequently made, including a Montreal woman who was later cleared of any connection to any planned terrorist attack.



Ressam was scheduled to fly from Seattle to London with a stop in New York City. That this occurred so close to New Years Eve has led to considerable speculation that a terrorist attack of some sort was planned to coincide with year 2000 celebrations. It also may have been part of a series of coordinated attacks, including one that was to have taken place in Israel but which was foiled by Jordanian officials, resulting in the arrests of thirteen people. The mastermind behind the scheme is said to be Osama bin Laden, the now infamous and omnipotent terrorist mastermind. In January the Canadian Security Intelligence Service revealed

**name: Abdelmajed Dahoumane**  
**(Wanted for : Section 81 (1)(d) and 82 (1) of the Criminal Code)**

● **U.S State Department offers five million dollars US to trace Abdelmajid Dahoumane**  
 MONTREAL, Thursday, April 6, 2000 — Effective today, the U.S State Department has offered a reward of up to five (5) million dollars US to anyone in the world who would help American authorities trace Abdelmajid Dahoumane, an Algerian national suspected of being involved with a terrorist organization.

[see larger photo](#)

**Take no action to apprehend this suspect. Anyone with information about this suspect's whereabouts is asked to call: 1-877-922-3456 or their local RCMP detachment, their local police department or crime stoppers.**

● Sex: Male  
 ● dob: 67.01.06  
 ● Eyes: Brown  
 ● Hair: Reddish brown  
 ● Height: 174 cm  
 ● Weight: 65 KG

**WANTED FOR: Charges have been laid against Dahoumane and Ressam pursuant to section 81 (1)(d) and section 82 (1) of the criminal code. A Canada-wide warrant has been issued for the arrest of Dahoumane.**

**Details: Vancouver — December 23, 1999 — The RCMP is asking for public assistance in locating Abdelmajed Dahoumane who is associated with the Ahmed Ressam investigation in Washington state.**


**CONTACT: NEAREST RCMP DETACHMENT OR LOCAL POLICE.**



that an associate of bin Laden’s, Mohambadou Ould Slahi, had visited Montreal for several weeks before the attack but that not enough evidence existed to detain him before he left the country. Ressam had also been monitored in his first stay in Canada after arriving in 1994. He left, however, before returning with a fraudulent passport under the name of Beni Norris. In May the director of CSIS labelled Islamic extremists as the number one terrorist threat to Canada. “You’re always at risk of sounding as if you’re talking about some gigantic Islamic conspiracy or Sunni conspiracy or whatever,” he told the *National Post* in an interview. “Having said that, there clearly are individuals who have a number of links, all of which are hard in some cases to define ... links to places like fighting together in Afghanistan or Bosnia or in Chechnya.”

Since December the response in both Canada and the United States has

been a myriad of calls for tighter border security between the two nations. The topic under discussion has expanded from tightening the border in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks to controlling the movement of illegal immigrants and narcotics. Leading the calls has been Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas who held a special hear-





ing that featured Canadian experts and others decrying Canada's lack of security. Former and current U.S. officials chimed in as well. Jonathan Winer, a former U.S. State Department official, described the boundary between the two nations as "extremely porous" and added that Canada's general social programs served as a magnet for illegal migrants. George Tenet, the head of the CIA, testified before a U.S. Senate committee that it was only an alert customs official who had prevented a "major terrorist event" in the United States and that the border with Canada is a vulnerable point. Similar points have been made on the Canadian side including by the recently appointed Toronto police chief, Julian Fantino, who labelled Canada as a haven for organized crime.

A few voices have been raised to the contrary. The governor of Vermont and the Canadian ambassador to Washington both challenged the notion of Canada as a terrorist haven. Behind the scenes, however, the Canadian government appears to be working toward mollifying the American government. The federal budget in February increased security-related spending by over \$1 billion. Canadian circles have also raised the concept of a fortress North America that would avoid having greater restrictions at the border which might hinder the flow of commerce between the two nations. Such a shift would require the "harmonization" of rules and regulations between the two nations along with greater cooperation between intelligence and police forces. The Business Council on National Issues, a Canadian lobby group, has advocated a similar measure to reassure Americans that Canada is safe thus allowing the border to be opened up even further for economic purposes.

Whether the United States has been swayed by this is another matter. In January it announced plans to add 600 additional customs personnel along its northern border. In May it added to the mix special cameras that

will be trained on the Canadian border twenty-four hours a day. Fuelling the American response is a growing sense of national insecurity similar to what it experienced at the end of the Second World War and especially during the "red scare" at the conclusion of the Great War. Other manifestations of this growing insecurity are the increasing fear of crime at home and the determination to proceed with the national missile defence program in the face of opposition from foes and allies alike.

The implications for Canada over this and other security related issues are tremendous. In May a CSIS report, "International Terrorism: The Threat to Canada," warned that

*These activities, left unchecked, can escalate in any number of ways. The danger to public safety from a potential terrorist attack is obvious, but there is another concern with dissident groups who actively oppose authoritarian regimes. If Canada does not take action against terrorists on its territory, others may. Some foreign governments are capable of silencing their opposition from a distance, and such an attack in Canada could conceivably put Canadians in the line of fire.*

In the case of the United States and what it wants, Canada will have little choice but to follow Arthur Meighen's suggested response during the Chanak Crisis: "Ready, aye ready. We stand by you." Sources: Mike Blanchfield, "Governor downplays criticism of Canada as haven for terrorists," *National Post*, 25 January 2000; Hilary Mackenzie, "Canada denies border 'leaks': Ambassador angry about U.S. call to tighten security," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 January 2000; Jan Cienski, "Crackdown at Canada-U.S. border to be permanent: Americans worried about terrorist threat," *National Post*, 27 January 2000; Andrew Duffy, "Ottawa urges U.S. to adopt continental security ring," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 January 2000; Andrew Duffy and Jim

Bronskill, "CSIS tailed key figure in suspected bomb plot: Spy agency made no arrest due to a lack of evidence," *National Post*, 28 January 2000; Barrie McKenna, "Canadian border vulnerable: CIA head Alert customs agent prevented major terror attack, Senate committee told," *Globe and Mail*, 4 February 2000; James McCarten, "Canada a sieve for criminal activity, Fantino says: Wants crime strategy," *National Post*, 14 February 2000; Neil MacFarquhar, "Woman Freed After Pleading in Border Case," *New York Times*, 16 February 2000; Marina Jimenez and Joel-Denis Bellavance, "Border with Canada must be tightened, U.S. expert says: Send message to migrants, former security official says," *National Post*, 24 February 2000; James Risen, "Foiled Terror Plot on Tourists Linked to bin Laden Aide," *New York Times*, 29 February 2000; Stewart Bell, "Islamic extremists No.1 security threat, CSIS chief says - Linked internationally," *National Post*, 4 May 2000; John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (Pluto Press, 1999); Evan Thomas and Michael Hirsh, "The Future of Terror," *Newsweek*, 10 January 2000; "International Terrorism: The Threat to Canada," at <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/misc-docs/200004e.html>; Robert Russo, "U.S. to monitor Canadian crossings with cameras," *National Post*, 18 May 2000; Alan Toulin, "BCNI urges extension of free trade," *Financial Post*, 30 May 2000; Heather Hamilton, "The Hands of Terror: Is Canada safe from the grasp of terrorists?" at <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/frames/rcmp-grc1.htm>

## **CSIS 1999 ANNUAL REPORT RELEASED**

In June CSIS released its annual report for 1999. Offering a broad overview of the activities of the Service for 1999, including statistics related to human and financial resources, the report also listed two disturbing trends from 1999:

*The use of communication technology and computers to enhance opera-*

rebel Rwandan soldiers in Uganda. Canada belongs to most international institutions and bodies, participates in peacekeeping missions and hosts major international events, all of which are potential targets for terrorists. Source: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publi-cr/p/pub1999e.htm>


**RCMP**



**DEALING WITH DRUGS**

On April 18, 2000, the RCMP released its assessment of the 1999 drug situation in Canada. Drug smuggling, according to the Mounted Police, “remains the principal source of revenue for most organized crime groups. In Canada, the drug trade has the potential to generate criminal proceeds in excess of \$4 billion at the wholesale level and of \$18 billion at the street level.” The report notes that seizures were down from 1998, an example, it argues, of the impact of budget cuts on Canada’s national police force. Apparently such words have had an impact on the number crunchers who opted to raise the budget of the RCMP by \$584 million over the next three years to better deal, according to Minister of Finance Paul Martin, with the “new challenges in the area of organized crime and international terrorism.” Sources: [http://www.sgc.gc.ca/WhoWeAre/Policing/Cross%20Border/ecrossborder/ecrsbrdr\\_bkgrd.htm](http://www.sgc.gc.ca/WhoWeAre/Policing/Cross%20Border/ecrossborder/ecrsbrdr_bkgrd.htm); Jim Bronskill, “Security spending boosted in response to growing fears: Police to get tools to fight illegal migrants, terrorism, organized crime,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 February 2000.

Figure 1 - Human Resources




tional capabilities and encryption constitutes yet another challenge to the defence of national security. The increasing availability of methods to communicate quickly and securely has significantly changed the playing field. As well, society’s increasing dependence on information and technological infrastructures has heightened its vulnerability. In light of these, terrorist activities may become more destructive, while being more difficult to detect and prevent.

A particularly disturbing trend affecting Canada is the risk borne by Canadians working or travelling abroad. A record number of Canadian citizens are temporary residents of other coun-

tries. This past year alone, Canadians have found themselves at the centre of incidents such as a kidnapping in Ecuador, the Air India airline hijacking, and a hostage-taking incident at the Burmese Embassy in Thailand. Incidents during the past decade include the death of a Canadian woman and the injury of her husband in the December 1996 Paris Metro bombing; the death of a British-Canadian national caught in the crossfire between Yemeni security forces and kidnappers with reported links to Islamic extremists; and finally, a Canadian involved in the March 1999 kidnapping of international tourists that saw the brutal death of eight people at the hands of

Figure 2 - Financial Resources



**THE PROTEST EXPRESS:  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON,  
LONDON, WINDSOR,  
CALGARY ...**

Last November it was Seattle. Then in April came Washington and London, followed by Windsor and Calgary in June. What these cities have in common are demonstrations directed against global capitalism. And it appears that this could be a permanent trend, driven by a growing sense of disillusionment over the seeming hegemony of a single global economic philosophy and aided by the Internet which allows for greater alliance building and coordinating of activities. According to the *Globe and Mail*, west of Pincher Creek, Alberta, is the site of a training camp for activists and protesters, some of whom were active in Calgary. Information on how to deal with tear gas and an advancing riot squad was included in a variety of sessions. In turn, Canadian police forces, including the RCMP, have been cooperating with each other in an effort to handle any potential threats to public order. Sources: Andrew Mills, "Rioting 101: Radicals hone skills at Alberta boot camp," *Globe and Mail*, 12 May 2000; Naomi Klein, "Pack up your lessons in your old kit bag," *Globe and Mail*, 31 May 2000; Michael Kazin, "1890's: Function, 1960's Form, 1990's Flamboyance," *New York Times*, 5 December 1999; Michael Elliott, "The New Radicals," *Newsweek*, 13 December 1999; John Vidal, "The world@war," *Guardian Weekly*, 3-9 February 2000; Derrick Jensen, "Enemy of the State: Interview with John Zerzan," *Alternative Press Review*, vol. 5, no. 1 (spring 2000).

**DEPARTMENT OF  
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

**WANTED: A FEW  
GOOD NERDS**

With two high profile incidents already in 2000 involving "cyber assaults," cyber crime, in which the lives of millions can be adversely affected by the action of a lone individual,

appears to be a growth industry and thus of interest to intelligence and police forces around the world. The RCMP recently compared the Internet to the "wild west" of days of yore. A U.S. intelligence report claimed eighty percent of cyber attacks against American targets passed through Canadian machines on their way to their intended target. The Department of National Defence is attempting to do something about the situation by forming a special unit consisting of computer specialists to both work on defenses against hackers and to improve techniques for countering assaults and tracking down those responsible for launching the attacks. Sources: David Pugliese, "Canada is cyberterror hotbed: U.S. Agency says 80% of hackers' attacks go through Canada," *Ottawa Citizen*, 24 March 2000; David Pugliese, "Experts plot war on Web hackers," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 February 2000; "Cyberspace 'Wild West,' Mounties Declare," *London Free Press*, 16 May 2000; Jim Bronskill, "Mounties fear cyber-sabotage by animal-rights activists," *Montreal Gazette*, 7 December 1999.

**WHATEVER HAPPENED  
TO Y2K?**

Remember Y2K? Last December it was enemy number one as it threatened to disrupt computer systems, cause international chaos, spark a world-wide depression, and even lead to the toppling of governments. Little stood in its way except for a hearty band of computer programmers spending long hours in countries such as Canada and the U.S. Nations such as Russia and Italy were places to avoid when the clock ticked over into the year 2000.

The over inflated balloon of the Y2K problem burst rather dramatically. Now, however, a new Y2K danger has emerged— not from any computer bug but instead from those heroic programmers who fought against it. A DND report warns that some of the programmers were hired without proper security checks and thus may have installed

"back doors" into computer systems allowing them to access material or spread viruses. Sources: David Pugliese, "Military warns of Y2K bug sabotage: Some 'consultants' hired without security check likely still have access to computer networks, classified report says," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 March 2000.

**DEPARTMENT OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE**

**HUMAN RIGHTS AND  
CORRUPTION**

As part of the Organization of American States meeting in Windsor, Canada announced that DFAIT would contribute \$150,000 "to develop guidelines and best practices for human rights training for security institutions in the Americas." The training program, to be run by the Royal Military College in consultation with human rights' groups and experts, will be directed at police, military, and other security agencies. At the same gathering it was also announced that Canada had ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Sources: DFAIT Press Release, 5 June 2000; DFAIT Press Release, 6 June 2000.

**FIGHTING DRUGS**

On February 8 and 9 Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) David Kilgour attended the International Drug Control Summit in Washington. The summit was organized by the United States Congress and the United Nations International Drug Control Program and featured politicians and officials from the U.S., Canada, Japan, and the European Community. Solutions to curtailing the centuries long trade were sought although Kilgour warned "The threat posed by illicit drugs will not be countered with simplistic solutions. We must address both supply and demand." Sources: DFAIT Press Release, 9 February 2000.



## TERRORISM FUNDING

Also in February Lloyd Axworthy added Canada's name to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The agreement represents an international attempt to curtail the funding for terrorist activities in third-party nations. "Canada has been at the forefront of efforts aimed at fighting terrorism, through our work within the UN, the G-8 and other international fora," said Axworthy. "International co-operation is essential in the fight against terrorist crime. We have and will continue to strongly support measures to strengthen the international legal regime against terrorists." Indeed at the time it was reported that the federal government intended to remove the charitable status for groups in Canada believed to be raising funds for terrorist organizations, terrorism in this context defined as the use or threatened use of violence to achieve political change. The move was interpreted as an effort to counter the image of Canada as "a terrorist haven."

The matter, however, has not disappeared. It became an important political and media issue at the beginning of June when it was revealed that two federal cabinet ministers, Paul Martin, the Minister of Finance, and Maria Minna, the Minister for International Co-operation, had attended a Tamil dinner sponsored by organizations such as the World Tamil Movement and the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT). Both ministers faced a grilling from the opposition in the House of Commons. "FACT is a fundraising organization for the Tamil Tigers, that's well established. Yet even though our own security agency has made that very clear, the Finance Minister and other ministers go to these sorts of events and put money into that organization," stated Monte Solberg of the Canadian Alliance party in the House of Commons. "To condemn these people, to call them terrorists," replied Paul Martin, "is anti-Canadian. There is Irish blood coursing through my veins, but

that doesn't mean I am a member of the IRA." Also weighing in on the issue was the director of CSIS who in an interview with the *National Post* warned that groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are using Canada to finance their campaign for independence in Sri Lanka and to tolerate such activities is dangerous. Earlier this year, CSIS published as part of its Commentary series a special report by Peter Chalk of the Rand Corporation on the operations and organization of the LTTE, including how they relate to Canada. Sources: DFAIT Press Release; Stewart Bell, "Canada to outlaw fundraising for world terrorism," *National Post*, 30 December 1999; Allan Thompson, "Groups linked to terror targeted; Ottawa plans to strip charitable status from suspected fundraisers," *Toronto Star*, 10 February 2000; Stewart Bell and Andrew McIntosh, "Martin faces further grilling over Tamil dinner," *National Post*, 1 June 2000. Stewart Bell and Andrew McIntosh, "Canadian funds back terrorism: CSIS chief 'If you tolerate these activities you can run into problems'," *National Post*, 2 June 2000; Stewart Bell, "Sri Lanka's civil war and the Canadian connection," *National Post*, 3 June 2000; Peter Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization of and Operations- A Preliminary Analysis," <http://www.csisscrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com77e.html>; Adrian Humphreys, "Tamil Tigers raising funds from families in Canada: Cash for weapons," *National Post*, 21 March 2000.

## SOLICITOR GENERAL

### U.S.-CANADIAN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

The reality of 200 million people travelling back and forth across the Canadian-U.S. border each year has major implications for the security of both nations thus emphasizing the need for a closer relationship between security agencies. The trend to greater cooperation was in evidence prior to the border incident in December. In

1995 President Clinton and Prime Minister Chrétien signed an accord related to the shared border. In 1997, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service started a process of closer cooperation connected to the border. In that same year the Canada-U.S. Cross Border Crime Forum began in an effort to encourage closer cooperation to fight transnational crime. Those at the now yearly conference included representatives from the Solicitor General's office, the RCMP, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, Customs, DFAIT, and from the U.S. the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the U.S. Customs Service.

The Ressay incident sparked a renewed effort to foster border cooperation in the form of the harmonization of relevant policies. In December Solicitor General Lawrence MacAulay and U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno had a telephone call to discuss border security. Then in June they met face to face in Washington to announce the creation of a new "Integrated Border Enforcement Team" for the east coast of the two nations. The new project is modelled after a similar measure under on the west coast since 1997. In addition, the two crimefighters signed an agreement to further the sharing of crime-fighting technology, in this case between the RCMP's Canadian Police Research Centre and the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice. "These joint efforts are truly a model for the future of cross-border law enforcement cooperation – the shape of things to come in cross-border cooperation," said MacAulay. His view was echoed by Reno. "The people of Canada and the United States expect a united and cohesive battle against cross-border crime. Combining our enforcement efforts is practical and gives us a clear advantage over those who think they can use our border to escape prosecution." Sources: <http://www.sgc.gc.ca/Releases/e20000609.htm>; <http://www.sgc.gc.ca/WhoWeAre/Policing/Cross%20Border/>

ecrossborder/ecrs\_brdrhome.htm; Jim Bronskill, "Canada-U.S. squad to target East Coast border crime Follows West Coast model: Agencies to share information on criminal databases," *National Post*, 10 June 2000.

### **MAJOR BUDGET INCREASE**

In part because of growing concern about border security and budget cutbacks to security agencies, typified by a call for funding increases by the Senate committee on security, one of the big winners in the 2000 federal budget was the department of the Solicitor General, whose agencies include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The department received an increase of \$810 million over three years. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "Security spending boosted in response to growing fears," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 February 2000.

### **CHANGES**

– RCMP Commissioner Phil Murray will retire on 2 September 2000.

– Former Solicitor General Andy Scott has become the new Chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

### **DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION**

#### **BUDGET INCREASE**

Another security winner in the February 2000 budget was the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The growing threat of illegal Chinese migrants and the fact that many of these migrants eventual destination is the United States prompted an increase that will amount to \$209 million for the current fiscal year and another \$371 million for 2002-3.

The federal government is also considering removing the provision within the Immigration Act that allows the Security Intelligence Review Committee to monitor the evidence

provided by CSIS in cases involving those with permanent resident status who are deemed to be a security risk. Sources: Jim Bronskill, "Security spending boosted in response to growing fears: Police to get tools to fight illegal migrants, terrorism, organized crime," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 February 2000; Jim Bronskill, "Spies get more power: Draft of new Immigration Act scraps key role of watchdog," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 April 2000.

## **INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

### **SOME CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN UK SECURITY INTELLIGENCE**

by Peter Gill



There are currently a number of developments in the organisation of security intelligence in the UK that, taken together, represent yet further diminution in the traditional gap between security and law enforcement intelligence. This is the result of movement from both ends of the traditional divide. Police in the UK since 1993 have formally embraced intelligence-led policing at all levels, against 'volume crime' at local level and through the targeting of 'core nominals' (those believed to be engaged in transnational crime) by NCIS ([www.ncis.co.uk](http://www.ncis.co.uk)). Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies continue to make slow but steady progress onto law enforcement turf - for the SIS the process began in the

mid-1980s with its involvement in analysing the impact of the drugs trade on states in the Caribbean. Although the then Director of the Security Service wrote in 1993 that there were no plans for the Service to become involved in fighting crime, by 1996 there was legislation to achieve precisely that. A year or so later the number of MI5 officers actually involved was understood to be only 15-20 but it was reported to have spent £10m. on fighting crime by 1998-99.

Part of the political agreement in Whitehall in 1996 was that MI5 would only become involved if and when tasked by a committee chaired by NCIS and involving representatives of other law enforcement agencies such as Customs. This remains the formal position but clearly NCIS struggles to maintain primacy within the Whitehall village. Since its inception in 1992 it has struggled to achieve credibility both with police forces and other intelligence agencies because of its shifting priorities, initially inadequate IT and continuing small budgets. At the end of last November Blair convened a 'crime summit' at Downing Street, attended by the heads of the three agencies at which it was agreed that they would divert resources from counter-espionage and counter-terrorism to crime (*Sunday Times*, December 5, 1999). Interestingly, the report of this meeting made no mention of NCIS - if they were not there then their formal position of primacy is clearly much compromised.

A further indication of the closure of the gap is the formation within the Met at Scotland Yard of an Intelligence Development Group from the merger of Special Branch, CID and covert operations. Traditionally SB was essentially autonomous within CIDs because of their role as MI5 'foot soldiers' but a process of re-integrating the Branch into mainstream policing started about ten years ago. The main targets of the IDG are expected to be 'organised crime' and drugs.

Meanwhile there are a series of

legal developments that are relevant to security intelligence, the common thread of which is to further empower the government and to protect the methods by which it seeks to gather information from legal challenge in the new context of the Human Rights Act that becomes effective in October 2000. For example, in September 1999 the police and customs published Codes of Practice for covert policing accompanied by a statement asserting that legislation was unnecessary. The Codes are concerned primarily with setting out detailed procedures for the internal authorisation of the deployment of informants, undercover officers, human and communications surveillance and the dissemination of intelligence to other agencies. They do not provide any limits on the ability of police to deploy covert techniques whenever they deem them appropriate (The codes and accompanying statement are at [www.ncis.co.uk/web/publications/](http://www.ncis.co.uk/web/publications/)).

However, in February 2000 the government introduced the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill that, for the first time, seeks to encompass police, intelligence and armed services. The first part seeks to up-date the Interception of Communications Act 1985 to take into account such developments as mobile phones and the Internet. It retains essentially the same procedures, that is, the requirement for ministerial warrants authorising interception. Part III seeks to deal with the problem of encryption by the issue of notices forcing the disclosure of codes. The sanction for refusal to comply with a notice is up to two years in jail; if the notice includes a secrecy provision and the person served makes an unauthorised disclosure of the fact of the notice to another person then there would be an additional offence carrying up to five years' imprisonment. Whether this attempt to maintain a traditional form of sovereign state control will be successful over the more libertarian 'nodes' on the Internet remains to be seen.

Part II covers surveillance and

human sources. It distinguishes between 'directed surveillance', for example, targeting of people that is not intrusive; 'intrusive surveillance', covering residences and private vehicles; and 'covert human intelligence sources'. As far as police and customs are concerned, the second of these is already covered by Part III of the Police Act 1997 and intelligence services have been required to obtain warrants for 'interference with property' since 1989 (MI5) and 1994 (MI6, GCHQ). This is the first time, however, that the vexed issue of informants has been dealt with in a statute. Their use may be authorised if necessary and proportionate in relation to a long list of circumstances including national security, crime, disorder, public safety, tax collection and any other purpose specified by an order from a minister. Also there are requirements in terms of handlers, supervisors and secure record-keeping.

The accountability structures established in Part IV of the Bill are essentially extensions of the existing mix of commissioners and tribunals. An Interception of Communications commissioner will take over from the former IOCA Commissioner and a new Covert Investigations Commissioner will be set up to review the new surveillance powers, except where these are already covered by the other commissioners already established by the Security Service Act, Intelligence Services Act and Police Act! A Tribunal is to be appointed, as with the other acts this is to consist entirely of lawyers and will investigate complaints. However, the new dimension to the Tribunal's work is that it will act as the Tribunal under the Human Rights Act to hear challenges that state actions were incompatible with Convention rights. This is potentially significant, though the Government have sought to confine the Tribunal's remit to the principles of judicial review, that is, making essentially procedural judgments as to the 'reasonableness' of the original authorisation for surveillance in relation to necessity and proportionality.

The proposed new Prevention of Terrorism Bill is being presented as a piece of 'New Labour' modernisation but critics point to the fact that it spreads the net wider, specifically to domestic groups by comparison with the existing Act's limitation to Northern Ireland and 'international matters'. While the new definition increases the threshold from 'violence' to 'serious violence', in other respects it is much broader: 'the use or threat, for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause of action which involves serious violence against any person or property, endangers the life of any person or creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.' Those whom are intended to come within this definition are groups based in the UK campaigning for insurgencies and dissenters abroad - after years of complaints from governments such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia that the UK is a haven for 'terrorists' - and home-grown 'eco-warriors' who have in recent years sought to disrupt the construction of new roads and airports.

Finally, New Labour struggles to maintain the progressive stance it adopted in Opposition on freedom of information. The hopes engendered by the white paper published in 1998 have been disappointed as the Home Office has taken control of the Bill and, despite some limited improvements, the measure now before parliament ensures that at each critical stage ministers retain a veto over the disclosure of information (All of these bills can be obtained via [www.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk)).

*Peter Gill is a faculty member of the Centre for Criminal Justice at Liverpool John Moores University.*

## **AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS**

### **INCREASED INTELLIGENCE SPENDING**

Without any fanfare, President Clinton signed at the beginning of December the Intelligence Authorization Act for the year 2000. Ten




intelligence-gathering agencies, including the CIA, were covered in a bill that promised to spend \$29.5 billion on American intelligence in 2000, up from \$26.7 billion in 1998. A specific component of the bill was directed at curtailing the narcotics trade which was described as a threat to the “national security” of the United States. One major emphasis in the U.S. anti-drug campaign is Colombia. The Clinton administration is directing \$1.5 billion to aid the Colombian military in its campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  
Sources: “Clinton Praises New Law As Aid in Fighting Drugs,” *New York Times*, 5 December 1999; Larry Rohter, “Colombian Army Hopes to Get Fighting Fit, No Easy Task,” *New York Times*, 5 December 1999.

### **ECHELON: BIG BROTHER, LITTLE BROTHER, OR BOTH?**

Arising from a 1948 agreement, the “Echelon” program, according to historian Jeffery Richelson of the National Security Archive in Washington, began in the 1970s and involves the linking of at least seven sets of computers around the world that along with other equipment are used to monitor communications. Involving the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the program has come under increasing scrutiny at the same time that others have been repeatedly raising the deficiencies of the electronic gathering capabilities of such nations. James Risen nicely captured the extremes of the debate in a *New York Times* op-ed piece when he observed that the National Security Agency “is under attack both ... for incompetence and omnipotence.”

Charging omnipotence have been members of the European Union, the American Civil Liberties Union and other non-governmental organizations. Even the CBS news program “60 Minutes” joined the fray with a program that featured former CSE employee Mike Frost. Frost also recently sparked controversy in Denmark




when he stated that antennae on the roof of the American embassy in Copenhagen were being used for intelligence gathering against the Danish government. Over all these different critics allege that there is very little control on what is gathered and that increasingly Echelon is being used, so goes the French argument, to collect economic information to aid America and its allies against their competitors. The EU launched an investigation in the face of British opposition while the French have threatened to sue over the “global anglophone spy network.” France has also reached an agreement with Germany to construct a spy satellite system that would reduce European dependence on the United States. On the other side of the ocean, the ACLU has established an “Echelon watch” website. Others have promoted days to jam the Echelon system by encouraging thousands of Internet users to send e-mail messages filled with some of the keywords (bomb, Jihad) that Echelon allegedly seeks out.

Then there is the contention, primarily directed at the National Security Agency, that with the combination of technological advance and its growing democratization state agencies are falling further behind in their intelligence-gathering capabilities. Satellite

imagery, for example, once the monopoly of state institutions is now readily available to the highest bidder. Indeed, thanks to an American company named SpaceImaging, the Federation of American Scientists now has images of the nuclear sites of a variety of countries such as North Korea and India (you can see Canada’s very own CANDU reactor at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/facility/trombay.htm>) on its website. As well, encryption programs for e-mail and new telephone technology are making monitoring such communication increasingly difficult.

In two *New Yorker* articles journalist Seymour Hersh has touched upon these fears by those inside the American intelligence system. Nor was the cause of American intelligence aided when it was revealed that its spy satellites were one of the few systems to be knocked out by Y2K and that the NSA suffered a computer crash at the end of January that left it unable to process information.

So which vision is the “Echelon” reality? Perhaps a mixture of both is the right answer. In his archival work Richelson found the big brother fears of “Echelon” critics to be unfounded. On the other hand, the appearance of



falling behind in technological capability may also be a way of generating budgetary increases. The CIA, however, is not waiting on more public money. It has launched its own non-profit venture capital fund, In-Q-Tel, in California's Silicon valley in an effort to harness the next generation of intelligence-related technological advances. Sources: James Risen, "Don't Read This: If You Do, They May Have to Kill You," *New York Times*, 7 December 1999; <http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/index.html>; <http://www.echelon.wiretapped.net/>; "Germany, France Agree on Spy Satellite Program," Reuters, 9 June 2000; Gregory Vistica and Evan Thomas, "Hard of Hearing," *Newsweek*, 13 December 1999; Seymour Hersh, "The Intelligence Gap: How the digital age left our spies out in the cold," *New Yorker*, 6 December 1999; Ian Black, "Drop spying debate, Britain earns EU," *Guardian Weekly*, 8 April 2000; Robert Lee Hotz, "Spy Satellites Evolve Into Private Eye in the Sky," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 June 2000; Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/eye/3nws.htm>; John Diamond, "Satellites on the blink for days," *Chicago Tribune*, 13 January 2000; Chris Oakes, "Echelon 'Proof' Discovered," *Wired News*, 26 January 2000; "U.S. envoy denies his embassy spies on Danish government," *Associated Press*, 3 April 2000; Walter Pincus, "NSA System Inoperative for Four Days," *Washington Post*, 30 January 2000; "National Security Agency Confirms Computer Crash," *New York Times*, 31 January 2000; Adam Sage, "French to sue US and Britain over network of spies," *The Times*, 10 February 2000; Suzanne Daley, "An Electronic Spy Scare Is Alarming Europe," *New York Times*, 24 February 2000; Elizabeth Becker, "Long History of Intercepting Key Words," *New York Times*, 24 February 2000; Jeffrey Richelson, "Desperately Seeking Signals," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, pp. 47-51; Constant Brand, "EU To Widen Echelon Spy Probe," *Associated Press*, 29 March

2000; Karen Breslau, "The CIA sets up a high-tech investment fund," *Newsweek*, 10 April 2000. Andrew Gumbel, "CIA goes snooping in Silicon Valley for secrets of hi-tech intelligence," *Independent*, 8 April 2000; Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind : Intelligence Cooperation Between the Ukusa Countries-The United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand* (Unwin Hyman, 1990).

### TAKING OFF THE GLOVES

On June 5, 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism, established after the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa, submitted its official report to the American government. The report recommended several measures including the use of sanctions against countries that while not supporters of terrorism do not do enough to combat terrorism on their soil. Greece was one of the countries mentioned in the report which came out only a few days before "November 17," a Greek terrorist organization, assassinated a British diplomat. The report also recommended the removal of restrictions on the recruitment of "unsavory" informants, restrictions that have been place since it was revealed that CIA informants had committed atrocities during the Guatemalan civil war. There apparently is some internal CIA opposition to the latter change.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is apparently already in the mode for doing more against terrorism and espionage. It was revealed that in 1999 the U.S. Justice Department received permission from a special federal court to allow its agencies to conduct a record 880 wiretaps connected to espionage and terrorism investigations. Sources: Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Is Urged to Preempt Terrorists," *Washington Post*, 4 June 2000; "Report of the National Commission on Terrorism," <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>; Vernon Loeb, "Panel Advocates Easing CIA Rules on Informants," *Washington Post*, 6 June 2000; Richard Willing, "Wiretaps hit

new record," *USA Today*, 4 June 2000.

## NATIONAL ROUNDUP

### ITALY

Rehearsal for attack on Pope?

Italian police had a scare in late December when they discovered that someone or some organization had control of police radio frequencies during a rehearsal for security for the Pope. Nothing happened other than tighter security. Source: Richard Owen, "Sect 'rehearsed' attack on Pope," *The Times*, 31 December 1999.

### ISRAEL

With Israel now having withdrawn from southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights may be next. Such a shift, however, will have an important impact on Israeli communications intelligence. At Mount Hermon sits an Israeli military base which provides Israel with access to Syrian communications and military activity. The "secret" post is visible from Damascus, only twenty-six miles to the north.

Also with regard to Israeli intelligence, for the first time the name of the director of Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service, was published in that nation's newspapers. He is Ami Ayalon, a former admiral in the Israeli navy. Sources: Deborah Sontag and William A. Orme, Jr., "For Golan Settlers, an Uncertain Future," *New York Times*, 16 January 2000; AFIO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE NOTES - WIN #48-99, 1 DEC 1999

### BRAZIL

In December President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil officially established his nation's first civilian intelligence agency. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency, which chose the Federal Bureau of Investigation as its official model, will replace a decentralized system previously operating under military control. The focus of the new agency will be on combatting the activities of organized crime. Sources: "Brazil Sets Up New Agency, Civilian Run, Like the F.B.I.," Reuters, 8 December 1999.

## ARGENTINA

In the first week of February Argentina cleaned house its intelligence community. Both the State Intelligence Secretariat and the Argentinian military fired over 1000 employees in an effort, the government said, to improve the efficient of the intelligence system. Reducing cost also was a factor as the human employees were to be replaced by computers. Sources: "Argentina defends mass firing of govt spies," Reuters, 13 February 2000.

## RUSSIA

Reminiscent of the Cold War era, Russia and the U.S. have engaged in a spy war over recent months. In November Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel King was arrested for supplying Russia with details related to U.S. submarine intelligence activities connected to Russia; he was apparently tripped up by a polygraph. Then it was Russia's turn as it claimed to have caught through a sting operation an American diplomat in Moscow in the process of attempting to acquire Russian secrets. She was allegedly carrying a device to aid in detecting monitoring of her activities. The diplomat also found herself expelled. A few weeks later the United States sent packing a Russian diplomat that it accused of using a bug against the U.S. state department. In April another American, this time a businessman, was arrested by Russia and charged with spying. In between Poland accused Russia of espionage and expelled several Russians. Sources: Michael R. Gordon, "Russians Detain U.S. Diplomat, Calling Her a Spy," *New York Times*, 1 December 1999; AFIO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE NOTES - WIN #48-99, 1 December 1999; Celestine Bohlen, "An American And a Russian Held as Spies In Moscow," *New York Times*, 6 April 2000.

## GERMANY

In March the United States began handing over to Germany East German intelligence files that the CIA seized in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The files, a source of contention between the two countries,

contain lists of agents along with their code names. The entire set of files is expected to be passed over within two years. The CIA has already been lending material to allied intelligence agencies, including that of Denmark's. A Danish official was arrested on espionage charges on Christmas Eve as he returned to Denmark from his job with the European Commission. It is alleged that he served as a Stasi agent, code-named "Lenz," while employed by the Danish foreign ministry in the 1970s and 1980s.

Offering further evidence of the skill of the Stasi were transcripts of conversations between West German political leaders that were revealed in German newspapers in April. According to a former Stasi employee, even former Chancellor Helmut Kohl's telephone conversations were accessed. Sources: Christopher Follett and Michael Evans, "Danish official faces Cold War spying charges," *The Times*, 30 December 1999; "U.S. Gives Cold-War Spy Files to Germany," *New York Times*, 6 April 2000; Peter Conradi, "Stasi phone taps sound alarm in Kohl's inner circle," *Sunday Times*, 19 April 2000.

## ROMANIA

The Romanian government passed a law at the beginning of December which will allow ordinary citizens access to records that the former Romanian secret police, the Securitate, kept on public figures. Accessing files on each other, however, remains forbidden in a nation where it is estimated that as many as twenty-five percent of the adult population secretly aided the state security agency. Sources: "Romanians allowed look at some secret-police files," *Globe and Mail*, 7 December 1999.

## SOUTH AFRICA

In December South African police in cooperation with that country's military and intelligence agency arrested four leaders of the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). They are believed to have been involved in as

many as eighty vigilante bombings that have occurred in South Africa. Also in December there emerged another reminder of the extent of South African government efforts in the 1980s to combat opponents of Apartheid. In the British medical journal, *The Lancet*, two doctors revealed that chemically treated clothing were used to murder the political opponents of the South African government. One of those targeted was Rev. Frank Chikane who is now in-charge of the office of President Thabo Mbeki. Sources: Chris McGreal, "Vigilantes held for Cape bombings," *Guardian*, 30 December 1999; Jeremy Laurance, "Toxic clothes 'killed 250 apartheid opponents'," *Independent*, 24 December 1999.

## FRANCE

Jacques Dewatre, who headed France's foreign intelligence service, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, for six years was replaced by the French government because of his agency's poor record during the Kosovo crisis. The new head of the agency is Jean-Claude Cousseran, France's ambassador to Turkey. Sources: "France Changes Directors," *The Times*, 15 December 1999.

## UNITED KINGDOM

According to police testimony, David Copeland, the alleged planter of three bombs in London in the spring of 1999, said he was inspired by the bomb that went off during the Atlantic Olympics. Copeland, a white supremacist, added that his goal was to spark a race war in Britain. And in a further example of the impact of the Internet, he discovered the instructions to make his bombs on a website.

In another act of terrorism, the explosion of a bomb underneath a London bridge in the first week of June has sparked fear of a summer bombing campaign in the British capital. The bomb, which consisted of 1 to 2 kg of Semtex, has been linked to the Real IRA, a splinter IRA group which opposes the Good Friday agreement. MI5 had apparently been warning



about the possibility of such attacks for several months. Sources: Nick Hopkins, "Nail bomber `tried to unleash race war'," *Guardian Weekly*,

8-14 June 2000; Nick Hopkins, Patrick Wintour, Richard Norton Taylor, Audrey Gillian, and John Mullin, "Bomb raises fear of new terror cam-

paign," *Guardian Weekly*, 8-14 June 2000.

## MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE

### GAY PRIDE AT THE CIA

File this one under how times have changed. In the first week of June the Central Intelligence Agency held a gay pride celebration. The event, which involved more than one hundred gay intelligence employees from both the CIA and the National Security Agency, featured Democratic congressman Barney Frank as guest of honour. Sources: "Gay Spooks," *WorldNetDaily*, 28 January 2000; Vernon Loeb, "At

CIA, Gay Pride Comes In From the Cold," *Washington Post*, 9 June 2000.

### TIMOTHY LEARY SANG LIKE A CANARY

The later LSD guru and 1990s Internet advocate, Timothy Leary, had pieces of his past surface earlier last year thanks to the Freedom of Information Act and The Smoking Gun, an Internet site that posts formerly classified documents. The documents offer a strong contrast to the public persona of Leary as an anti-authority icon incarnate. In 1974, fearing a lengthy prison sentence after hav-

ing escaped his previous one, Leary cut a deal with the FBI and supplied it with information about the Weathermen, a radical urban guerrilla organization, and the individuals who had helped the former academic break out of prison in 1970. An excerpt of the documents appears here courtesy of The Smoking Gun, the organization that obtained the material under the FOIA. Sources: "Timothy Leary Aided F.B.I., Records Show," *New York Times*, 1 July 1999; The Smoking Gun, [www.thesmokinggun.com/](http://www.thesmokinggun.com/).

### INTELLIGENCE HUMOUR(!?)

There was an IMINT guy, a SIGINT guy and a MASINT guy in a bar. Now, if you don't know the intelligence discipline, IMINT is imagery intelligence, SIGINT is signals intelligence and MASINT is measurements and signatures intelligence. They were having a chat and they noticed a couple of young ladies in the bar, on the other side of the bar in the corner, having a very heated discussion. And they looked at each other and they said, "It would be really nice if we knew what those young ladies were saying. We're intelligence types, we should be able to figure this out." The IMINT guy says, "I've got it, I've got this new long-dwell imaging system," and pulls out a big telescope. "I've got a new focal point array that I can update very rapidly, I can look at the video and I can read their lips and figure out what they're saying." He sets it up, gets it calibrated, gets it in focus; and every time he gets it into focus the ladies turn and he can't see their lips. He mutters something about terrain masking and says, "I can't do it."

The SIGINT guy says, "I've got it, I've got this new joint SIGINT avionics family. It's the latest digital system for the Department of Defense." He pulls it

CG 40-66

RJL: Okay, you probably seen his picture but I'll show it to you again, it's a picture of [REDACTED], can you identify that photograph?

TL: Yes, I believe this is the man who drove the camper from Morro Bay to San Francisco and from San Francisco to Seattle after my escape in September, 1970 . . .

RJL: When we first started talking about this and this is the man who told you that he was active in the P.L.

TL: That's right.

RJL: And had acted as a sort of counselor or adviser to the Weather people, that's in substance is the conversation you had with him?

TL: Yes sir.

RJL: Okay, [REDACTED]

(BELOW STATEMENT OCCURRED IN MIDDLE OF AN INTERVIEW BUT IS INCLUDED HERE FOR CLARITY).

TL: I'd like to discuss my motives, briefly in what I'm doing. Number one, I want to get out of prison as quickly as I can. And I believe that telling the total truth is the best way to get out of prison. I don't want to continue in a situation where hiding the truth is keeping me in prison. That doesn't make any sense to me personally, or philosophically. Secondly, I feel I have a great deal to contribute constructively, ah, activities in the United States of America. I'd like to use this as step number one, in seeing if I can work out a collaborative and an intelligent, an honorable relationship with different Government agencies and law enforcement agencies, and educational agencies, so this does not just turn someone over to get out of prison, it's part of a longer range plan of mine, I'm in full possession of my faculties, I think I can contribute a great deal, I've learned a great deal, and I intend to be extremely active in this country in the next few years, however, the things turn out. I prefer to work, I'm never going at it illegally ever again, but I would prefer to work constructively and collaboratively with intelligence and law enforcement people that are ready to forget the past, and to use me, in the future, because I still have a great deal to say in this country, I believe.

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out, says “I’ve got the whole spectrum digitized, I can focus in on what they’re saying and figure out what they’re discussing.” He turns it up and at first he gets a conversation over on the other side of the bar, a couple of gentlemen discussing business. He keeps tuning and tuning, he gets an FM radio station, rock and stuff. He can’t hear what the ladies are saying and he mutters something about co-channel interference and says, “I can’t do it.”

The MASINT guy says, “I’ve got it, I’ve got this great new technique where I use lasers to illuminate the subjects, and with a hyperspectral detector

I can figure out the acoustic modulation of the salinity content of the sweat on their brow, and by that I can figure out what they’re discussing.” He tunes it up and gets it all set up and data comes spewing out of the system, tons and tons of data. He doesn’t seem to be getting any signatures and he mutters something about aerosol scattering in the cigarette smoke and he says, “I can’t do it.”

So, they had pretty much given up on figuring out what the young ladies are discussing, when the young ladies come over and they say, “We understand you were trying to figure

out what we were discussing.” The intel guys look at each other, sorely puzzled, and the ladies say, “What we really ended up discussing was whether or not you guys would ever figure out what we were talking about.”

The IMINT guy says, “Well, how did you know that?” and one of the young ladies says, “Well, we tipped the bartender fifty bucks and he told us, that’s called HUMINT.”

Sources: This one comes via Intelligence Forum (<http://www.intelforum.org>) and its originator, Dr. Mark Lowenthal.

## **PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH**

### **RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS**

#### **ARTICLES**

“ABC: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000,” edited by David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000). This special issue includes: Stuart Farson, “Parliament and its Servants: Their Role in Scrutinizing Canadian Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations, 1939-2000*.

The newsletter of the International Intelligence History Study Group, vol. 7, no. 1, is now available at: <http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de>

“The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations,” edited by Richard J. Aldrich, Gary Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley, *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999).

The autumn 1999 issue of *Intelligence and National Security* (vol. 14, no. 3) features:

- Raymond Garthoff, “Intelligence Aspects of Early Cold War Summity (1959-60),” *Intelligence and National Security*.”
- Len Scott, “Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penovsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
- Gil Merom, “The 1962 Cuban Intelligence Estimate: A Methodological Perspective.”
- Geoffrey Swain, “‘An Interesting and Plausible Proposal’: Bruce Lockhart, Sidney Reilly and the Latvian Riflemen, Russia 1918.”
- Zach Shore, “Hitler’s Opening Gambit: Intelligence, Encirclement, and the Decision to Ally with Poland.”
- Yigal Sheffy, “The Spy Who Never Was: An Intelligence Myth in Palestine, 1914-18.”
- David Kahn, “Edward Bell and his Zimmerman Telegram Memoranda.”
- Deborah Kisatsky, “Voice of America and Iran, 1949-1953: US Liberal Developmentalism, Propaganda and the Cold War.”

From the spring 2000 issue of *Intelligence and National Security* (vol. 15, no. 1):

- Raymond L. Garthoff, “Intelligence Aspects of Cold War Scientific Exchanges: US-USSR Atomic Energy Exchange Visits in 1959.”
- Matthew M. Aid, “American Comint in the Korean War (Part II): From

the Chinese Intervention to the Armistice.”

- Noam Kochavi, “Washington’s View of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1961-63: From Puzzled Prudence to Bold Experimentation.”
- Simon Kitson, “Arresting Nazi Spies in Vichy France (1940-42).”
- Giles Scott-Smith, “The ‘Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century’ Festival and the Congress for Cultural Freedom: Origins and Consolidation 1947-52.”
- Steve Hewitt, “Royal Canadian Mounted Spy: The Secret Life of John Leopold/Jack Esselwein.”
- David Alvarez, “American Signals Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
- Meredith Hindley, “Teaching Intelligence Project.”

#### **ARTICLES FROM THE NON-ACADEMIC WORLD**

Alston Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 285, no. 6 (June 2000). A fascinating look at the early life of Ted Kaczynski. The author argues strongly that Kaczynski “is not only a killer but a sane one. He is a terrorist, like Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the World Trade Center bomber.” He concludes on a pessimistic note by pointing out that there

are more potential Unabombers across the United States, and that “single-issue’ terrorism” (such as animal rights, environmentalism, anti-abortion) will likely increase as will its destructive power.

Derrick Jensen, “Enemy of the State: Interview with John Zerzan,” *Alternative Press Review*, vol. 5, no. 1 (spring 2000). In addition to being a favoured pen-pal of Ted Kaczynski, John Zerzan is an influential American anarchist whose followers played a key role in the anti-World Trade Organization protests in Seattle.

Seymour Hersh, “The Intelligence Gap: How the digital age left our spies out in the cold,” *The New Yorker*, 6 December 1999. This is second article by Hersh that details the technological failings of American intelligence.

### BOOKS

John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge University Press, 1999). A timely examination by a soci-

ologist of the invention of the passport and the efforts of states to restrict the movement of citizens and non-citizens alike.

Reg Whitaker, *The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming a Reality* (New Press, 1999). A fascinating look back at the “century of intelligence” and into aspects of the future including the implications of new information technologies for personal privacy and the growing surveillance powers of the private sector.



Sharyl Cross, Igor A. Zevelev, Victor A., Kremenjuk and Vagan M. Gevorgian, eds., *Global Security Beyond the Millennium: American and Russian Perspectives* (MacMillan, 1999). One of several books that examines security in a post-Cold War world.

John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (Pluto Press, 1999). An examination by a *Christian Science Monitor* journalist of the American role in aiding Islamic rebels in their war against the Soviet Union and the impact of that support on today’s problems with terrorism.

Roger Hesketh, *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign* (Little, Brown/St. Ermin’s Press, 1999). Prepared at the conclusion of the Second World War, Fortitude tells the story of deception operations conducted by the London Controlling Section, which Hesketh belonged to, in conjunction with the D-Day invasion.

## FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS

### THE NORWEGIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, 1945–1970

**Olav Riste**, *Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, University of Oslo*

This history of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) during the Cold War is the result of a unique enterprise: for the first time a Western intelligence service has opened its most secret archives from the Cold War to an independent historian. After many imaginative and often speculative books about the Norwegian intelligence service, this book represents an authentic and thoroughly documented history. The author presents detailed descriptions of the build-up of a network of Norwegian signals intelligence stations in the north; border crossings by clandestine agents; the reporting of Norwegian merchant mariners’ from ports behind the Iron Curtain; the intimate co-operation between the NIS and the secret services of the United States and other countries; as well as the establishment of a ‘Stay Behind’ network. The author’s assessment is that the NIS was ‘Norway’s perhaps most significant contribution to the strength and security of the Western alliance in this crucial period of post-war history.’

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
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Rufina Philby, with Mikhail Lyubimov and Hayden Peake, *The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years* (Fromm International Publishing Corp., 2000). The inside story of Kim Philby's time in Moscow courtesy of his wife Rufina.




Richard Schultz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam* (HarperCollins, 1999). In an effort to win the Vietnam War American intelligence conducted operations that included secretly sewing documents into the clothing of North Vietnamese prisoners who were to be returned to the north. Hundreds were executed by the Communists.

John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival* (PublicAffairs, 1999). A study of the American role in aiding the Tibetan independence movement.

Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford University Press, 1999). An examination of the CIA's role in the overthrow of Guatemala's democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz.


Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (Granta, 1999). Saunders explores the impact of the Central Intelligence Agency on the cultural field during the early part of the Cold War. One revelation contained within relates to the role of the CIA in financing and influencing the content of the movie versions of George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *1984*.




Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (New York University Press, 1999). According to amazon.com, the book provides a comprehensive examination of the "American pursuit of the liberation of Eastern Europe from the end of World War II until the failure of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. It shows how the American vision of freedom led to interventions in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it details the massive propaganda campaign to persuade people at home and abroad of the virtues of U.S. possession of the atomic bomb."

Leo Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War* (Free Press, 1999). The memoirs of Leo Marks who served with British intelligence during the Second World War.

Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (Fourth Estate, 1999) Relying on primarily open sources, historian Stephen Dorril provides a lengthy (880 pages) examination of some of MI6's operations over the past fifty years.




Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, 1999). An institutional study of American intelligence entities and the inherent flaws within them.




Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Congressional Quarterly Books, 1999). A revised edition of Lowenthal's 1992 study that offers a detailed overview of intelligence from its gathering to how it is translated into policy.

Richard Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge University Press, 2000). A new and comprehensive look at the relationship between British and American intelligence in the Pacific theatre of the Second World War. Aldrich documents the extensive rivalry that existed between American and British intelligence forces.




W. Adam Mandelbaum, *The Psychic Battlefield: A History of the Military-Occult Complex* (St Martin's Press, 2000). An examination of the lengthy trend in human history to use the occult and other psychic elements to gather intelligence. Included is a discussion of the CIA's use of psychics in the Cold War.

Robert David Steele, *On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World* (Afcea International, 2000). The author, a former Marine and intelligence officer, looks at the role of intelligence in the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War in an era of increasing threats to the national security of the United States from transnational groups.



Bruce Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age* (Yale University Press, 2000). An exploration of the implications of the information age for intelligence gathering in both the present and the future.



Craig R. Eisendrath, ed., *National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War* (Temple University Press, 2000). The book brings together ten experts in the field of American intelligence to discuss the current intelligence environment and offer suggestions for future reforms.

Greg Treverton, *Reshaping Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge University Press, fall 2000).

Dieter K. Buse, Gary Kinsman and Mercedes Steedman, eds., *Whose National Security?* (Between the Lines Press, fall 2000). A collection of essays which critically examine the domestic activities of Canadian intelligence agencies.

### COMING SOON FROM DAME STELLA

The British intelligence establishment was apparently taken by surprise by the news that Dame Stella Rimington, the first female head of MI5, is intending to publish her memoirs after reportedly having received an advance of £500,000. Although she will follow proper channels in publishing the book, including having it pre-screened by the British government, many see it is a dangerous precedent, especially as the British government continues to use the Official Secrets Act and the courts against ex-intelligence agents (David Shayler), journalists (Tony Geraghty for his book *The Irish War* which detailed recent intelligence operations against the Irish Republican Army) and British newspapers (the *Guardian* and *Observer* for attempting to detail British intelligence operations). Sources: Anthony Lewis, "Big Brother Pounces," *New York Times*, 7 December 1999; Richard Norton-Taylor, "Secrets charges against Ulster spy author dropped," *Guardian*, 23 December 1999; Richard Norton-Taylor and Keith Perry Ex-MI5 chief to publish memoirs," *The Guardian*, 17 May 2000; James Clark, "Rimington's chat show deal spooks MI5," *Sunday Times*, 11 June 2000.

## RESEARCH NOTES

### STRANGE DAYS INDEED: JOHN LENNON'S FILE

A recent American court decision to allow out secret British documents connected to John Lennon may cause problems in the relationship between American and British intelligence. Lennon was targeted by MI5 in the 1970s because of his alleged connections to the Irish Republican Army and the Trotskyist Workers' Revolutionary Party. In turn, when Lennon relocated to the United States MI5 supplied materials to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The documents in question are said to contain two letters from British officials and notes regarding a conversation between American and British officials about keeping Lennon's file secret. Sources: Michael Evans and Grace Bradberry, "FBI Lennon file release breaks security protocol," *The Times*, 21 February 2000; "Lennon funded terrorists and Trotskyists," *Sunday Times*, 20 February 2000.

### THE CIA AND THE COUP IN IRAN

In April the New York Times published a detailed and still secret assessment of the CIA's role in the 1953 coup in Iran that brought Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi to power. The review report was written by the CIA in 1954 and includes detailed information on the planning and operations connected to the coup. It also addresses the role of British intelligence in the operation. The report, which was turned over to the Times by a former CIA employee, can be found at the New York Times website ([www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com)). Sources: James Risen, "The C.I.A. in Iran," *New York Times*, 16 April 2000.

### OPEN GOVERNMENT CANADA IS BORN

by Jim Bronskill

Canada has a new coalition dedicated to fighting for greater access to public information, including security and intelligence records. Dozens of

groups and individuals representing a wide spectrum of causes met in Toronto in early March to found Open Government Canada.

"We're ecstatic that Canada will finally have a unified public voice demanding greater government transparency," said Boni Fox, president of the Canadian Association of Journalists and a key organizer of OGC. "With government secrecy on the rise, there couldn't be a better time for such a movement."

OGC is the new national voice for freedom of information in Canada, bringing together a coalition of individuals and organizations who use access to information legislation.

The Canadian Library Association, the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, the Quebec Federation of Professional Journalists, the Manitoba Council of Women, the British Columbia Association of People with Disabilities, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression and the Canadian Newspaper Association were among more than 25 groups represented at the organization's founding conference.

Leacy O'Callaghan-O'Brien, associate executive director of the Canadian Library Association, will serve as chair of OGC's steering committee until an inaugural board is in place, likely next March.

OGC aims to educate Canadians on how to use access to information legislation, which members say has been weakened by cost-cutting and privatization of traditional government functions. The coalition will push for legislation that ensures greater access.

The efforts could succeed in loosening the government grip on security and intelligence information, which is among the most closely held data in federal files and archives.

Alasdair Roberts, a Queen's University professor, told the inaugural group of OGC members that access rights in Canada have been eroded over the past decade.

"We have information rights

because access to information is essential for the realization of basic civil and political rights," said Roberts. "Every individual has a right to live under a system of government based on informed consent."

Roberts has produced several studies on Canadian freedom-of-information problems, including the 1998 paper *Limited Access: Assessing the Health of Canada's FOI Laws*, which pointed out numerous disturbing trends.

"Government likes to keep its agenda secret," said Duff Conacher of Democracy Watch. "And it doesn't like to be held accountable when something goes wrong."

Conacher, who's been instrumental in organizing a coalition to shed light on the Canadian banking sector, will serve on the steering committee for the new organization.

"We have a bureaucratic culture in Canada that routinely restricts and delays the release of information with impunity," said Robert Cribb, vice-president of the Canadian Association of Journalists, which initiated the coalition. "That translates into less accountable governments and a less informed public."

Public information available in hours or days in the U.S. can take months to acquire in Canada because of slow-responding government departments that hide behind weak legislation.

"This is information that belongs to us and yet we often wait months and have to pay hefty fees to get access to it, when we get access at all," said Cribb. "And at bureaucratic whim, journalists and the public are often declined information altogether."

For further information, visit [www.opengovernmentcanada.org](http://www.opengovernmentcanada.org). The site has regular updates and sign-up procedures for the Canada FOI listserv, a lively discussion group on freedom of information issues.

*Jim Bronskill is a member of OGC's steering committee. He writes about security and intelligence issues for Southam News.*



### THE BRYDEN BILL

Bill C-206, "An Act to amend the Access to Information Act and to make amendments to other Acts," introduced by the member of parliament for Wentworth-Burlington, John Bryden, went down to defeat in the House of Commons in early June. The proposed bill would have radically altered the Access to Information Act, introducing a thirty-year rule and even going so far as to change the name of the legislation to the Open Government Act. In an open vote it failed to garner enough support to survive. Source: CBC National Radio.

### THE MOYNIHAN BILL

The declassification bill of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a long-time proponent of government openness, is still proceeding through the American political system although its latest version (available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/>

2000/s1801b.html), revised under pressure from the American intelligence community, has been criticized by the Federation of American Scientists. This new version of the "Public Interest Declassification Act" has been publicly endorsed by the White House; it would see the creation of a nine-person board to offer advice on declassification matters but without the power to actually order the declassification of specific documents.

In a related matter, this past November Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 13142 amending a previous order, Executive Order 12958, which governed the declassification of security records. It added eighteen months to the deadline for the declassification of such records. It also added three years to the deadline for the declassification of records that more than one governmental agency has an interest in. Sources: Steven Aftergood, Project on Government

Secrecy, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html>; Page Putnam Miller, NCC Washington Update, Vol 5, #41, December 1, 1999.

### MITROKHIN ARCHIVES UPDATE

A parliamentary investigation in the United Kingdom has revealed that despite MI6 having possession of the secret KGB records, the prime minister of the day, John Major, was not informed by his security chief of the gold mine until six months after President George Bush had been briefed by the CIA. When the Canadian prime minister was informed and what became of the at least four unidentified KGB Canadian agents will apparently never be known. Source: Michael Smith, "MI6 shared KGB secrets with US before Britain," *Daily Telegraph*, 14 June 2000.

## ANNOUNCEMENTS



### THE CASIS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 2000

The CASIS annual conference for the year 2000 will take place in Ottawa and will be held in the historic Chateau Laurier hotel. The dates for the conference are September 28, 29 and 30, 2000, which will guarantee us good weather and maybe even a glimpse of the spectacular foliage show that Ottawa puts on that time of year.

The theme of the conference is "The Future of Intelligence." It is a fitting theme for our first conference of the new millennium and we are looking for a large turnout and an interesting two days of talks and discussions. A planning committee chaired by CASIS President Wesley Wark and consisting of Anthony Campbell, Stuart Farson, Martin Rudner and Reg Whitaker will be putting the programme together. Any suggestions for the programme should be sent to Wesley Wark at [wkwark@aol.com](mailto:wkwark@aol.com) (further contact details can be found at the link to the CASIS Executive).

The conference is made possible by a generous grant provided to CASIS by the Privy Council Office and by the agencies of the Canadian intelligence community. Needless to say, CASIS retains full independence and control over the conference planning.

Please mark the dates on your calendar and plan to attend what CASIS hopes will be a landmark conference. Information packages will be sent to all CASIS members. Also check the website (<http://www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS/>) regularly for details of the full conference programme, registration and hotel information, which we will post as soon as possible.



